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Every day, we face uncountable big and small decisions. From deciding 
whether to surprise your spouse with breakfast in bed or sleeping in yourself, deciding 
between giving honest feedback during a shopping spree or sparing your friend’s 
feelings, deciding whether to help a stranger at the post office pick up the mail they 
dropped, to deciding to let someone go in front of you in the queue in the supermarket 
because they only have two items in their basket, navigating the normal course of life 
means deciding what to do time and time again. Given their omnipresence and 
importance for shaping our everyday experiences, the decisions we make have 
roused the interest of research at the crossroads of psychology, economics, 
philosophy and beyond. 
In this dissertation, the focus is on decisions set in two specific contexts: (i) 
decisions in social dilemmas in group contexts, and (ii) decisions in moral dilemmas. 
In the former, decision makers choose whether to be prosocial or selfish towards in- 
or outgroup members, while in the latter, decision makers choose between what they 
think is morally right or wrong. Gaining deeper understanding of the decisions made 
in both contexts under investigation here has immediate pertinence for society. On 
the one hand, in a time of globalized mobility, strong emphasis on freedom of 
movement and of rising flows of migration societies experience new challenges in 
deciding how to face increasing numbers of immigrants of all types. For instance, as 
the number of newcomers rises, the native population’s willingness to trust and help 
a foreigner might sink (La Macchia, Louis, Hornsey, & Leonardelli, 2016). The question 
how people interact with ingroup versus outgroup members and strangers, and 
potentially discriminate against newcomers, thus has gained increasing importance in 
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many societies. Although the question of how societies face increased immigration is 
a complex issue, parts of this challenge can be distilled into a question of intergroup 
interactions: how do members of an ingroup interact with those of an outgroup? What 
are the driving forces of cooperation in these circumstances? Understanding 
decisions embedded in a group setting therefore affords opportunities to encourage 
fairness and cooperation beyond the borders of one’s ingroup.  
On the other hand, the more abstract question asking what is morally right 
or wrong has occupied philosophers and laypeople alike for centuries. A variety of 
moral questions and the way they are decided determine the way we live together in 
society. For instance, is it morally right for doctors not reveal their diagnoses to 
terminally ill patients, in an effort to uphold the Hippocratic Oath to do no harm (Oken, 
1961; Sullivan, Menapace, & White, 2001)? And is it morally right for a legal system 
to hinder people from committing voluntarily chosen behavior with limited externalities 
such as prostitution (Euchner & Knill, 2015), the consumption of soft-drugs 
(Blumenson & Nilsen, 2010) or suicide (Tännsjö, 2005)? Embedded in such broader 
moral questions, two distinct moral schools of thought are focused on in this 
dissertation: utilitarianism, the orientation to maximize outcomes in a moral struggle, 
and deontology, the orientation to uphold absolute rules. In a recent example of how 
these motivations are directly juxtaposed in moral decisions of societal scope, 
consider that in the aftermath of the 9/11 terror attacks the German parliament 
passed changes to the air security law, legalizing the shooting down of hijacked, 
weaponized airplanes (Gesetz zur Neuregelung von Luftsicherheitsaufgaben, 2005). 
Therein, the parliament subscribed to a utilitarian perspective of sacrificing a small 
number of kidnapped people to save lives on the ground. The German constitutional 
court, however, overturned the bill (Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2006), citing that 
quantifying human lives violates the guarantee of human dignity of the German Basic 
Law (Grundgesetz, 1949). Therein, the judicial review reminded the society of its basic 
values, and in this case of its core deontological values. Here, rather than aiming to 
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understand complex networks of morality and moral reasoning on the societal scale, 
the question is again distilled to individual decision makers as the smallest observable 
unit in these situations. How do people decide which solution to moral dilemmas like 
the air security law they support? Is moral reasoning the driving force in these 
circumstances or do people rely on their moral intuitions to solve these problems? 
In both areas, a large body of research in psychology, behavioral economics 
and beyond, which is reviewed below, has been devoted to understanding the 
situational and person-specific influences on choice outcomes. For instance, who 
decides to help others and who does not, and under which circumstances are people 
more likely to make utilitarian decisions? Surpassing this strong focus on choice 
outcomes, current debates about prosocial and moral decision making, however, 
have taken a turn towards the cognitive processes driving choices. This literature, 
which is summarized below, addresses the question how certain choices are made: 
Are some choices easier to make than others? Do some decision makers inform their 
choices better, and which information is more important to different decision makers? 
Answering such questions not only posits the opportunity for gaining a better 
understanding of the mechanisms through which people arrive at their decisions, but 
also offers possibilities to design informed interventions promoting fair and morally 
good decisions. Therefore, in line with current developments in scientific interest, this 
dissertation investigates in the cognitive processes involved in prosociality and 
morality.  
Gaps in the literature about these decision processes are identified, and 
subsequently addressed in the empirical chapters of this dissertation. Specifically, 
regarding prosociality in intergroup settings, three questions are addressed: First, 
what determines whether decision makers acquire information about others’ group 
membership when deciding whether to make prosocial or selfish choices when facing 
in- vs. outgroup members? Second, differences in utility derived from in- vs. outgroup 
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members’ outcomes reflected in differences in attention towards own and others’ 
outcomes? And third, are there differences in how much effort decision makers invest 
in informing their decision to be prosocial or selfish when facing in- vs. outgroup 
members? Regarding moral decision making, we ask whether deontological vs. 
utilitarian decision makers differ in the way they make moral decisions, and whether 
these differences are in line with a dual-process theory of moral decision making, or 
with a choice discriminability account.  
As tools to facilitate the investigation of decision processes, process tracing 
techniques, and in particular eye tracking, are introduced and critically discussed. 
Moreover, process theories of decision making are introduced, to provide context for 
the subsequent application of process predictions from the attentional drift diffusion 
model to the research questions outlined above.  
Finally, implications of the present research are discussed. In the domain of 
prosociality, such insights offer unique opportunities for tailored interventions to 
promote fairness. In the domain of morality, insights about processing during decision 
making yield immediate implications for current theoretical debates. Lastly, this 
dissertation discusses limitations of the studies presented, and summarizes avenues 
for future research. 
Decision Making 
The research presented in this dissertation is embedded in the broader 
decision making literature. Research on judgment and decision making focuses on 
“investigat[ing] the processes by which people draw conclusion, reach evaluations, 
and make choices.” (Goldstein & Hogarth, 1997). To give an overview of the field, a 
brief historical overview must begin at the roots of modern investigations of individual 
choice: Expected Utility Theory (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944) and Subjective 
Expected Utility Theory (Savage, 1954). Given the assumptions of well-defined, 
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transitive, continuous and independent preferences, the theory proposed that 
decision makers would behave as if they maximized expected utility over possible 
outcomes. Decision makers’ utility was conceptualized as related to decision makers’ 
desire for certain outcomes, and argued to be captured by observing or predicting 
choices (Samuelson, 1938). Soon, this conceptualization of decision making spread 
from economics to other disciplines such as psychology, spurred forward by 
publications such as Edwards’ (1954) seminal paper and Luce and Raiffa’s (1957) 
book introducing game and decision theory. Psychological research responded to 
Expected Utility Theory by questioning its descriptive validity and, consequently, its 
theoretical preeminence, drawing on paradoxes (e.g., Allais, 1953; Ellsberg, 1961; for 
a historical overview, see MacCrimmon & Larsson, 1979) and experiments showing 
the violation of its predictions and of its axioms (for an overview, see Goldstein & 
Hogarth, 1997; for historic reviews, see Amnon Rapoport & Wallsten, 1972; Slovic, 
Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1977). 
This critical attitude also addressed the fundamental assumption of Expected 
Utility Theory that actors would behave rationally to maximize their own utility. 
Expected utility theory leads to the prediction that decision makers choose what is 
best for them, regardless of the outcomes of others. For instance, Selten (1978) had 
theoretically demonstrated via backward induction that defection is the subgame 
perfect equilibrium in a two-player repeated prisoner’s dilemma game. Yet, empirical 
evidence showed that decision makers do not defect fully (e.g., Anatol Rapoport & 
Dale, 1966; Selten & Stoecker, 1986; for contemporary overviews, see van Lange, 
Joireman, Parks, & Van Dijk, 2013; Chaudhuri, 2011), violating the expectations 
derived from Expected Utility Theory. 
Social Preferences and Prosociality 
Breaking with the assumption that decision makers will always do what 
maximizes their own material outcomes, a new strand of the literature evolved, which 
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considered that others’ outcomes also matter to decision makers. This literature on 
social preferences is the basis for scientific debate about prosociality, and therefore 
briefly reviewed here. By introducing the concept of social preferences, others’ 
outcomes were integrated into decision makers’ utility functions (e.g., Axelrod & 
Hamilton, 1981; Dawes, 1980; Taylor, 1977). In other words, this line of research 
began investigating the nature and boundary conditions of prosocial acts, i.e., actions 
intended to benefit others motivated by the concern for their welfare (e.g., Mussen & 
Eisenberg-Berg, 1977) even at the cost of decision makers’ own material outcomes.  
In social decision settings capturing situations where individuals’ choices 
affect not only themselves but also others, formal models of Utility Theory are used to 
describe how individuals value certain actions depending on their weighting of 
outcomes for themselves and others affected (Messick & McClintock, 1968). An 
example of such a decision situation is a dictator game (Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, & 
Sefton, 1994), where one person decides about both her own outcomes and those 
of a second player. For simplicity and in line with the materials used in Chapters 1 and 
2, a decomposed dictator game is introduced here. Decision makers are assigned to 
the role of the dictator or the receiver. The dictator chooses between two options, 
where one alternative maximizes her own monetary payoff (for example, in Option A, 
the dictator receives 10€ and the matched player receives 2€) and the other option 
benefits the other player through a reduction of the dictator’s payoff (for example, in 
Option B, the dictator receives 7€ and the matched player receives 5€). The tradeoff 
between own and others’ payoff can be represented as differences in the respective 
decision weights wown and wother: 
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! =	$%&' × (own payoff)+$%*+,- × (others'payoff).1  (1) 
Individuals who value their own payoffs highly and disregard others’ 
outcomes (e.g., wown = 1; wother = 0) are more likely to choose the option maximizing 
their own payoff, which has higher a utility for them (PayoffOption A = 10, PayoffOption B = 
7) compared to individuals who assign high value to both their own and others’ 
payoffs (e.g., wown = 0.5; wother = 0.5, PayoffOption A = 6, PayoffOption B = 6.5). This 
preference for allocating resources between oneself and another person is thought to 
have relatively stable, trait-like characteristics (e.g., McClintock & van Avermaet, 1982; 
Swap & Rubin, 1983; van Lange, 2000), referred to as Social Value Orientation (SVO, 
van Lange, 1999, for an overview, see Murphy & Ackermann, 2013). The weight 
assigned to own and others’ outcomes allows the categorization of decision makers 
into types. Most commonly, decision makers present with altruistic (wown = 0; wother = 
1), prosocial (wown = 0.5; wother = 0.5), individualistic (wown = 1; wother = 0) or competitive 
(wown = 0.5; wother = -0.5) preferences, or intermediate assigned weights (Murphy, 
Ackermann, & Handgraaf, 2011), although other weightings of own and others’ 
outcomes are possible (e.g., martyrdom: wown = -0.5; wother = 0.5). SVO has been 
shown to be strongly related to the Honesty-Humility factor of personality (Hilbig & 
Zettler, 2009), the general tendency to be fair to others (Ashton & Lee, 2007), and 
strongly predicts cooperation behavior in a variety of situations (for a review, see 
Bogaert, Boone, & Declerck, 2008): Prosocial and altruistic types are more likely to 
share resources than individualistic and competitive types.  
Prosocial behavior, however, is not only determined by inter-individual 
differences in the degree to which others’ outcomes are valued, but also driven by 
                                               
1 The form in which others’ outcomes are integrated in to the decision makers’ utility function has 
been the object of several theories of social preferences. Depending on the situations where 
behavior is predicted, these theories added different components to the simple utility function 
suggested above (see Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Rabin, 1993). 
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situation-specific influences on the weights assigned to others’ outcomes (for an 
overview, see Kopelman, Weber, & Messick, 2002). Prominently featured among such 
situational influences on prosocial behavior are group settings.  
Prosociality in Group Settings 
As Chapters 2 and 3 are focused on prosociality in group settings, the 
theoretical background on this topic is reviewed below, including perspectives from 
both economics and psychology. Phenomenologically, the influence of group 
membership on prosocial behavior has been observed in a variety of contexts, 
indicating that ingroup members are often favored (Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002). 
For instance, ingroup members are trusted more (Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, & 
Soutter, 2000), ingroup cooperation is rewarded with higher reciprocity (Chen & Li, 
2009), and ingroup members are favored in prosocial decision making (for a review, 
see Balliet, Wu, & De Dreu, 2014).  
A model of how prosociality is affected by group membership was proposed 
by Chen and Li (2009), where the weight wother assigned to others’ outcomes in 
decision makers’ utility functions is determined by their membership to the in- our 
outgroup I, which leads to the (simplified) utility function 
! =	$%&' × (own payoff)+$%*+,-. × (others'payoff). (2) 
In more detail (Chen & Li, 2009, p. 441), the utility function proposes that the 
weight placed on others’ outcomes depending on their group membership is 
differently affected when decision makers’ own outcomes are larger or smaller than 
the other persons’ outcomes. Supporting this theoretical proposition empirically, 
decision makers were found to be more charitable to in- vs. outgroup members when 
their own outcomes were larger than the other players’, and to be more envious of 
out- vs. ingroup members when their own outcomes were smaller than the other 
players’ (Chen & Li, 2009).  
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Beyond this conceptualization of how group membership influences 
prosociality, a number of prominent theories are concerned with explaining human 
interactions in group settings more broadly (for an overview, see Hogg, 2016). In 
contemporary research, three theories are predominantly drawn from to understand 
intergroup behavior, which are summarized below.  
Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986) summarizes cognitive, 
motivational and behavioral influences of group settings. Aiming to explain why people 
form and maintain groups, the Social Identity Theory posited that individuals derive 
part of their self-concept from their categorization into social groups. Therein, they act 
not as individuals but as (self-categorized) members of their groups who aim to 
achieve positive distinctiveness from other groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). To maintain 
the ingroup identity and distinctiveness from other groups, discriminatory behavior 
emerges. It was argued that behavior favoring the ingroup and discriminating against 
the outgroup does not require competition of groups over resources (in contrast to 
the Realistic Group Conflict Theory), but that mere categorization into groups is a 
sufficient condition. When decision makers were assigned to minimal groups, i.e., 
groups with whom the participant shared no common past or future, group members 
were anonymous, and there was no conflict of interest over group outcomes, their 
choices demonstrated ingroup favoritism (e.g., Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & 
Flament, 1971).  
Translating the concepts of social categorization and identity into economic 
analyses, ingroup favoritism is also captured by Identity Theory (Akerlof & Kranton, 
2000; Bénabou & Tirole, 2011). The theory holds that social categorization and the 
resulting identity, such as being an alumnus of a certain college, is associated with 
specific expectations of behavior, e.g., for donations to be directed to one’s alma 
mater, not a different college (Akerlof & Kranton, 2000). Complying with these 
expectations maximizes utility, while deviating from the expectations causes disutility. 
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Therefore, rational decision makers would behave in line with expectations stemming 
from the social categories they belong to. 
While these theories assigned great importance to social identity in 
determining behavior in broader contexts, the Bounded Generalized Reciprocity 
Theory (Yamagishi, Jin, & Kiyonari, 1999) focused on the strategic advantage of group 
membership for maximizing one’s own outcomes. The theory proposed that groups 
help decision makers form better expectations of others’ likelihood to cooperate. 
Ingroup members can be expected to cooperate more than outgroup members, in 
turn increasing the likelihood that other ingroup members will cooperate with them. 
These expectations are based on a system of indirect reciprocity and reputation. The 
theory proposes that ingroup members have a reputation to cooperate that leads 
other ingroup members to expect them to cooperate. Additionally, reputation 
promotes cooperation even when there is no direct history of cooperativeness 
between the same people. Decision makers obtain and maintain the ingroup member 
status that allows them to benefit from favorable treatment by the ingroup. Critically, 
ingroup favoritism depends on the knowledge of others’ group membership, and the 
expectation that ingroup members cooperate more, as demonstrated in Yamagishi 
and Kiyonari (2000). 
In sum, in several theoretical systems and in many demonstrations of 
behavioral manifestations, decision makers favor the ingroup, in particular by being 
more prosocial to ingroup members than to outgroup members. Therein, ingroup 
favoritism constitutes a special case of prosocial behavior.  
Cognitive Processes driving Prosociality  
Despite the originally behavior-focused approach to decision making inspired 
by rational choice theories in economics (Gul & Pesendorfer, 2008), a more recent 
literature has turned towards investigating how decisions are reached (Camerer, 
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Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2004; for an overview, see Krajbich & Dean, 2015). Mirroring 
this growing interested in the cognitive processes of decision making generally, in the 
area of prosociality, advances have been made to look inside the black box of social 
preferences. A short overview of this literature (see below) reveals gaps in our 
understanding in particular when group settings are concerned. 
In individual-level behavior, the current debate on underlying cognitive 
processes in prosociality draws on the more general dual-process view of decision 
making, distinguishing fast and intuitive processing from slow and deliberate decision 
strategies (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001; Kahneman, 2003). On the one hand, some 
argue that cooperation is intuitive (Social Heuristics Hypothesis; Rand et al., 2014). 
This notion is based on findings that higher contributions in a Public Goods Game 
were made more quickly, and that time pressure manipulations increased 
contributions in comparison to time delay (Rand, Greene, & Nowak, 2012).2 However, 
diverging findings showed that cooperation was only effortless for prosocial decision 
makers, whose preference is consistent with the choice outcome (Mischkowski & 
Glöckner, 2016). Moreover, when accounting for choice discriminability, reaction time 
differences between prosocial and selfish choices would no longer remain significant 
(Krajbich, Bartling, Hare, & Fehr, 2015). When manipulating choice difficulty, time 
pressure no longer consistently increased prosociality (Merkel & Lohse, 2018). Finally, 
extreme choices were found to be more effortless than intermediate choices where 
utility differences are smaller (A. M. Evans, Dillon, & Rand, 2015). Therefore, in parallel 
to the debate in moral decision making, a competing choice discriminability account 
                                               
2 Although the finding could be reproduced in several contexts (for a meta-analytic overview, see 
Rand, 2016), some diverging evidence showed null effects (Tinghög et al., 2013; Verkoeijen & 
Bouwmeester, 2014). Moreover, other evidence suggested that defection was the more intuitive 
choice. For instance, prosocial SVO was associated with less intuitive processing through longer 
response times, higher fixation counts, and a higher proportion of inspected pieces of information 
(Fiedler, Glöckner, Nicklisch, & Dickert, 2013), a pattern that is replicated in Chapter 3 of this 
dissertation. 
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has emerged in prosocial decision making, proposing that decisions where 
preferences allow a clear distinction between the alternatives are processes more 
effortlessly. 
Although the debate about cognitive processes involved in prosocial choices 
in general is still ongoing, a socio-cognitive strand of the literature has added first 
empirical investigations of the cognitive bases specific to prosociality in group 
contexts (for a review, see Amodio, 2014). Initial evidence suggests that mental 
configurations for processing information related to in- and outgroup members differ. 
For example this evidence shows that ingroup members are evaluated more positively 
(Brewer, 1979; LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992; Perdue, 
Dovidio, Gurtman, & Tyler, 1990), that people make positive spontaneous trait 
inferences about ingroup members (Otten & Moskowitz, 2000), and that positive 
stereotypes are more rapidly associated with ingroup members (Dovidio, Evans, & 
Tyler, 1986). Furthermore, ingroup members are judged to be more similar to oneself 
than outgroup members even in artificial, minimal groups (Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996), 
which is thought to be based on inferences from own traits to the ingroup (Otten & 
Epstude, 2006). In short, research finds that our cognitive landscape is set up in a way 
that facilitates ingroup favoring behavior. 
In general, these research trajectories point to a growing research interest in 
cognitive processes in decision making with regard to prosociality generally and 
intergroup settings specifically. Issues such as what motivates decision makers to 
choose being selfish rather than prosocial, how much effort they invest into making 
their choice, and how difficult it is for them to arrive at their choice increasingly receive 
attention. However, the cognitive processes underlying prosociality in group settings 
are far from well described and well understood.  
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Investigating Cognitive Processes in Intergroup Settings 
To advance the understanding of the cognitive processes involved in 
prosociality towards in- vs. outgroup members, two empirical chapters will be 
presented. In Chapter 2, we investigate knowledge of others’ group membership as 
a necessary condition to engage in ingroup bias: Without knowing if the other person 
is an in- or outgroup member, decision makers cannot bias their choice depending 
on group membership. Finding out who belongs to one’s own group or an outgroup, 
however, is not a given in everyday interactions. Rather, decision makers may 
sometimes not notice others’ group membership, and sometimes even avoid this 
information. We show empirically that information about others’ group membership is 
deliberately avoided by some decision makers, who stay blind to avoid biasing their 
choices. Evidence is presented both for ignorance to group membership information 
in visual information search via eye tracking, and for active ignorance in explicitly 
stated preferences. Moreover, we aimed to investigate if some individual 
characteristics would make certain decision makers more likely to remain ignorant to 
group membership information. We present evidence that high identification with the 
ingroup increased decision makers’ likelihood to access group membership 
information, and that their first and second order beliefs of discrimination were 
correlated with ignorance. These insights suggest not only that systematic variation 
in whether people enter into a group-based decision problem or remain on an inter-
individual interaction level has previously often been ignored, but also that custom-
tailored interventions on discrimination beliefs may offer opportunities to ameliorate 
ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation. 
In Chapter 3, we investigate how decision makers weigh and process 
information to make decisions in a group setting. We show via eye tracking which 
importance decision makers with different social preferences assign to others’ 
outcomes depending on their group membership, leading to ingroup favoritism and 
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discrimination against the outgroup. Moreover, we investigate if decision makers are 
biased to invest more effort to inform their decision when ingroup members were 
concerned. Evidence surprisingly but consistently over two eye tracking studies 
shows that only individualistic decision makers’ decisions were relatively less effortful 
when making decisions affecting an outgroup member, although ingroup bias was 
small in this subsample. This finding suggests that individualists may struggle with 
competing group norms and individual preferences during the decision process, while 
prosocials more readily follow the group norm to bias their choices. 
In sum, these chapters address the open question how decisions to be 
prosocial to in- vs. outgroup members are made. Therein, the chapters relate to an 
increasing interest in the cognitive mechanisms underlying decision making, and 
apply this perspective to intergroup settings.  
Relation of Prosociality and Morality 
The scientific trend towards uncovering underlying mechanisms of choice 
behavior is apparent not only in the area of prosociality, but also in the adjacent 
literature on morality. This similarity in the development of scientific investigations may 
be understood as a function of a time trend, but the strong relatedness of both 
research areas, which is reviewed below, may also play a role in determining research 
trajectories. As a theoretical and empirical concept, prosociality, be in interpersonal 
or intergroup situations, can be seen as embedded in the larger domain of morality. 
Moral decisions, in general, are decisions that are concerned with doing what is right 
or wrong (VandenBos, 2007), therein constituting a broader field of investigation in 
which prosociality is but one facet. Indeed, both theory and empirical practice have 
often considered prosociality as a facet of morality (for an in-depth discussion, consult 
Turiel, 2015). Regarding the theoretical perspective, evidence for the close 
relationship of prosociality and morality can be found in a variety of domains. For 
instance, in economic theories, morality is often alluded to in the shape of equitable 
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outcomes and fairness considerations (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 
1999; Walster, Berscheid, & Walster, 1973). Moreover, theories of moral philosophy 
have often been concerned with human benevolence as a moral virtue (for overviews, 
see Kekes, 1987; Roberts, 1973). For example, Kant’s (1797) thought experiment 
posed a dilemma between honesty and prosociality: a passerby must decide whether 
to reveal to a murderer the location the intended victim or to lie about it. Empirical 
investigations further support the notion that prosociality and morality are closely tied, 
by investigating prosociality in opposition to other moral virtues such as obedience of 
the law or honesty. For instance, weighing prosociality against honesty as in Kant’s 
murderer dilemma is also evident in real-life decision situations: In a survey study, a 
sizeable proportion of physicians reported to lie to patients’ insurance providers to 
help patients gain coverage for medical care (Wynia, Cummins, VanGeest, & Wilson, 
2000). Further, Kohlberg (1981) investigated moral reasoning using the Heinz 
dilemma, in which a husband obtains a drug that could potentially save his wife’s life 
by stealing it from a greedy druggist, such that decision makers must weight 
prosociality against property rights. Finally, research shows that people consider 
prosociality morally obligatory in contexts where competing selfish interests are small 
or absent (Kahn, 1992; Nucci & Turiel, 2009). Compellingly, a recent study also 
demonstrated that decision makers’ preferences for doing what is moral, rather than 
specific preferences for equity and efficiency, determine prosociality (Capraro & Rand, 
2017).  
In sum, prosociality and morality can be understood as fundamentally 
interlinked concepts. Unsurprisingly, the investigation of moral decision making 
therefore raises similar research questions about the antecedents, influencing factors 
and processes of choices in the moral domain.  
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Morality 
Moral decision making has been addressed from a variety of perspectives. A 
vast area of research is concerned with explaining behavior that is mostly agreed to 
be morally problematic, such as teaming up with another person to cheat the system 
so both of you will be financially better off (Weisel & Shalvi, 2015), or more morally 
ambiguous situations such as closing one’s eyes to the consequences of one’s 
decision on others to selfishly exploit moral wiggle room (Dana, Weber, & Kuang, 
2007). Philosophical theories of morality explicitly ask how one can know what is right 
or wrong. Here, two general normative schools of thinking are of particular interest: 
deontology and utilitarianism. Deontological ethics is a normative theoretical position 
that judges the morality of an action based on rules, with strong ties to the Kantian 
argument of moral imperatives (Kant, 1785), while utilitarianism relies on the judgment 
of an action based on the utility (i.e., good, satisfaction, welfare, etc.) it produces 
(Hare, 1981; Mill, 1863). While the rules on which deontological judgments of actions 
are based can be seen as absolute (compare the literature on protected (Baron & 
Spranca, 1997) or sacred (Tetlock, Peterson, & Lerner, 1996) values, such as doing 
no harm, or being honest), utilitarianism requires weighing outcomes to achieve the 
greater good, suggesting its relation to Expected Utility Theory (Baron, 2014). Both 
perspectives prescribe which actions are right or wrong and can arrive at the same 
or at diverging evaluations of an action. Situations where deontology and utilitarianism 
arrive at opposing evaluations of the available choice options are referred to as moral 
dilemmas.  
Empirical research aiming to juxtapose the deontology and utilitarianism as 
principles guiding decisions has made extensive use of these moral dilemmas. The 
classical example is the trolley dilemma (Foot, 1967), a hypothetical decision setting 
in which an out-of-control wagon is described to be hurling down train tracks, 
moments away from killing five unaware workers on the track. The decision maker is 
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a bystander and is presented with the opportunity to intervene in order to save the 
workers’ lives by redirecting the wagon to another track. In doing so, however, one 
worker on the alternative track would be killed. Utilitarianism would prescribe 
sacrificing the one working, weighing the outcomes of this decision (one life lost) 
against those of the alternative (five lives lost). Deontology, however, would prescribe 
not rerouting the wagon, because taking lives is forbidden. A contemporary example 
of such a dilemma, the case of the German air safety law, was introduced above. 
Empirical research shows that how people decide in moral dilemmas pitting 
deontological against utilitarian motives is influenced by a variety of factors. For 
instance, most such trolley-type moral dilemmas confound deontology with omission, 
through consistently linking the deontological option with non-action. As decision 
makers think that harm stemming from commission is worse than harm from omission 
(Spranca, Minsk, & Baron, 1991), they would rather choose an omitting act in line with 
the deontological perspective, and prefer harm to be done only as an indirect 
byproduct of a choice (Royzman & Baron, 2002). Moreover, when actions require 
personal force (Greene et al., 2009), decision makers are more hesitant to intervene 
by choosing the utilitarian option. In sum, there have been wide-ranging theoretical 
and empirical contributions in the field of moral decision making.  
Cognitive Processes driving Moral Decisions 
Surpassing the question what people will do in specific morally ambiguous 
situations, a substantive branch of the literature on morality has raised interest in the 
cognitive processes underlying moral decision making. Ethics has long been 
concerned with conflicts of moral theories and moral intuitions (e.g., Hare, 1981; 
Rawls, 1971): when our gut feeling tells us that an action is wrong, this assessment 
is not necessarily congruent with rational or theoretical deliberations. For example, 
many individuals believe that incest is morally wrong (Björklund, Haidt, & Murphy, 
2000; Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993), even if it would be permissible from a utilitarian, 
INTRODUCTION 22 
rationalized perspective when the behavior is a victimless non-procreative action 
between consenting adults and therefore has no negative consequences.  
While some theories of morality posit that moral judgments take place solely 
on cognitive and rational bases, others emphasize the importance of moral intuitions. 
Exemplifying cognitive theories of morality, Kohlberg’s (1963) theory was based on 
interviewing children of different ages, positing six stages of moral development 
summarized in three levels: pre-conventional morality, characterized by obedience to 
moral authorities, conventional morality, in which moral standards are internalized but 
not reflected, and post-conventional morality, where moral reasoning is based on 
individual cognitive judgments. In contrast, the Social Intuitionist Approach (Haidt, 
2001) to moral judgment proposed that decision makers entirely rely on moral 
intuitions, which they justify and rationalize post hoc. Therein, the theory drew heavily 
on psychological literature on the boundaries of introspection (for an overview, see T. 
D. Wilson & Dunn, 2004), suggesting that people rationalize their behavior even when 
there is no objective possibility to rationalize it (e.g., Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; but see 
Smith & Miller, 1978 for a critique) or by providing reasons they had not actually used 
in their reasoning process (e.g., Meier, 1931).  
Aiming to reconcile such opposing theories of moral judgment, Greene (2008) 
formulated a dual process model, connecting with the distinction of fast and intuitive 
processing from slow and deliberate decision strategies to more general theories of 
bounded rationality in decision making  (for overviews, see Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001; 
Kahneman, 2003). The dual process model of moral judgment suggests that some 
moral decisions are supported by deliberate moral reasoning, while others are driven 
by emotional moral intuitions. Specifically, the theory posits the Central Tension 
Principle: utilitarian judgments, which require outcomes to be weighed to determine 
which one provides higher utility, require cognitive deliberation, while deontological 
judgments rely on automatic responses to moral issues (Greene, 2014).  
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In response to this dual process theory of moral decision making, a 
competing process model has been proposed (R. Kim et al., 2018), which may be 
able to better account for reaction time evidence used to infer the intuitive vs. 
deliberate processing mode. In this evidence accumulation model, choice 
discriminability is described as the central driver of the processing effort required to 
make a choice. The model proposes effortless responses in situations where the 
alternatives can be easily discriminated because a strong preference exists for one 
option. At the same time, more effortful responses are argued to stem from reduced 
choice discriminability given more similar preferences for the alternatives. In other 
words: when decision makers are undecided because they have no clear utilitarian or 
deontological preference, their responses in moral dilemmas would appear more 
deliberate, because more effort is required to make a choice.  
Overall, the moral decision making literature has long harbored research 
interests about the underlying cognitive processes. Overcoming strictly behaviorist 
observations of what decision makers will choose, the literature has frequently 
addressed the question how decision makers choose a specific decision alternative.  
Following this general research interest in cognitive processes underlying 
moral decision making, Chapter 4 of this dissertation contributes to the debate about 
intuitive vs. deliberate processing in deontological vs. utilitarian choices. We address 
the theoretical debate between the Dual Process Theory (Greene, 2007), suggesting 
that utilitarian decisions are supported by deliberate reasoning while deontological 
decisions are driven by moral intuitions, and the competing choice discriminability 
account (R. Kim et al., 2018), proposing that interactions of individual preferences and 
the choice made determine the processing effort needed. We use eye tracking to 
investigate both theoretical positions with relation to decision makers’ attentional foci, 
their decision effort and conflictedness during the decision process. We develop third-
party dictator game with a non-hypothetical moral good, in which choices and gaze 
INTRODUCTION 24 
behavior are studied. Surprisingly, results indicated that to deontologists optimized 
outcomes were more important during the decision process than the violation rules, 
which one would rather expect from utilitarian decision makers. Moreover, the study 
showed that decision effort was lowest for decision makers with strong utilitarian 
moral preferences, while decision effort was higher among deontologists, in contrast 
to the expectations derived from the Dual Process Model. Moreover, gaze patterns 
over the course of the decision suggested that preference-consistent choices were 
made with less decision conflict. 
In sum, this dissertation therein addresses a contemporary theoretical debate 
about the cognitive processes in moral decision making. In combination with the 
strongly related investigation of cognitive processes in the domain of prosociality in 
group settings, a research trajectory with a focus on the cognitive underpinnings of 
decision behavior is pursued. 
Studying Cognitive Processes 
Given the demonstrable interest of the scientific community and the use of 
process tracing techniques in this dissertation, here, a critical overview of methods 
that have been used to infer cognitive processes is presented. Examples from the 
domains of prosociality and morality are included for illustration. 
Hypothetical and Incentivized Decision Settings 
To study cognitive processes underlying respondents’ decisions, participants 
must first be exposed to a decision setting. Two general tendencies for the selection 
of such settings are apparent in the literature: One stream of the literature uses 
vignettes, hypothetical situations which are designed to reveal participants’ 
characteristics and judgments. Another stream of the literature uses incentivized 
decision situations, where participants’ choices have real-life consequences.  
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In the domain of prosociality and morality, vignettes are frequently used. As 
a classical example for the use of vignettes to study prosociality, consider a study on 
the influence of fitness-related circumstances on helping behavior (Burnstein, 
Crandall, & Kitayama, 1994). In Study 3 of this paper, participants were asked to 
imagine they were a citizen of a sub-Saharan country suffering from famine and 
disease. Further, participants were asked to imagine that two members of their family 
(e.g., 75-year-old grandfather and 3-month-old nephew) were asleep in a burning 
building, and they only had resources to recue one of them. Given these 
circumstances, participants were asked to indicate whom they would prefer to help 
(for a more recent use of these vignettes, see Graziano, Habashi, Sheese, & Tobin, 
2007). In the domain of morality, there is also a large body of research which relies on 
the use of moral vignettes (Christensen & Gomila, 2012; Cushman & Young, 2009) 
such as the trolley dilemma outlined above, immersing the respondent in hypothetical 
situations pitting different moral values against each other. 
However, the use of vignettes to elicit choices relies on a number of auxiliary 
assumptions, which must be borne in mind when interpreting responses and inferring 
the validity of processes assessment. In particular, it is questionable whether 
participants can indeed imagine the situational context: It may be easier to imagine 
certain vignette scenarios than others, which could bias the process results obtained. 
Beyond participants’ conception of the vignette context, the fact that the judgments 
are entirely hypothetical remains a problem. On the one hand, what participants think 
they would do might be a solid approximation for what they will do, assuming that 
they are able to accurately predict their own behavior and to report it accurately as 
well. While some believe that participants’ intrinsic motivation in laboratory studies is 
high, leading them to invest enough effort to consider the outcomes of their decisions 
even in hypothetical situations (Camerer & Hogarth, 1999), others argue that non-
hypothetical situations increase the effort participants invest in making their decisions, 
creating more naturalistic decision settings in the lab (Rosenboim & Shavit, 2012). To 
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determine if differences in respondents’ behavior must be expected between 
hypothetical situations and situations where their decisions has real consequences, a 
number of studies in varying domains of behavioral economics can be consulted (for 
overviews, see Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001; Kühberger, Schulte-Mecklenbeck, & 
Perner, 2002). In the domain of social preferences, findings generally point to the 
interpretations that hypothetical vs. incentivized settings yield different choices. 
Following the argument that incentivizing choices creates more externally 
valid decision settings in the laboratory (Rosenboim & Shavit, 2012), and assuming 
less noise in these measurements (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001), using decision 
situations with real consequences has become increasingly popular in empirical social 
science generally, and in the study of prosociality and moral behavior specifically. The 
use of economic games to study prosociality is widespread, employing different 
decision problems such as the dictator games and prisoner’s dilemma games 
introduced above. For example, a meta-analysis of behavior in dictator games 
addresses over 130 papers using this task to study generosity (Engel, 2011). SVO is 
also frequently studied via an incentivized measure of prosociality (for an overview, 
see Murphy & Ackermann, 2013). In the domain of moral decisions, the advent of 
incentivized settings has occurred only recently. In a seminal paper, participants were 
asked to decide between saving the life of surplus lab mice or receiving a payoff of 
10€ in the individual decision treatment (Falk & Szech, 2013). When market forces 
were active through the introduction of a bi- or multilateral market, participants could 
forgo saving the life of a mouse for a price a buyer endowed with 20€ would offer. In 
these market scenarios, more participants were willing to sacrifice the mouse’s life for 
less than or equal to 10€, indicating that market forces eroded moral decision making. 
In a follow-up study, donations to fund leprosy operations were used as a moral good 
while investigating the use of the replacement excuse (i.e., thinking that if one does 
not do X oneself, another person in the market will do X) depending on the presence 
of social norms (Bartling & Özdemir, 2017). In another example, a modified dictator 
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game was used to study people’s willingness to harm an orphan by taking away a 
donation to purchase food in order to benefit others with a greater donation (Perera, 
Canic, & Ludvig, 2015).  
In sum, both when investigating prosocial and moral decision making, using 
choices that have real consequences is the most promising setting to gain insights 
into people’s preferences, decisions and decision processes. 
Process Measures  
To investigate cognitive processes, a number of potential methods can be 
considered. Participants could be asked how difficult it was to make their choice, or 
in which order they weighed the evidence for and against each option. Although this 
approach may be intuitively appealing, two important problems of such a self-report 
approach exist. First, can participants accurately assess how difficult it was for them 
to make the choice? Participants may lack insights into their own reasoning process 
(see the debate sparked by Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Second, will participants 
accurately report their subjective decision difficulty? In particular in the domains of 
prosociality and morality, social desirability may bias participants’’ responses. To 
avoid these issues, a variety of measures of cognitive processes that do not rely on 
introspection have been proposed. Here, an overview of a number of options for 
assessing cognitive processing during the decision without relying on self-reports is 
presented. 
A frequently used and easy to employ option would be to measure decision 
times. Sometimes decision times are used as an indicator of intuitive vs. deliberate 
processing mode, assuming that intuitive decisions take less time than deliberate and 
effortfully reasoned choices (e.g., in the domains of morality and prosociality: Greene, 
Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & 
Cohen, 2001; Piovesan & Wengström, 2009; Rand et al., 2014, 2012). 
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Problematically, relying on reaction time data to infer whether a cognitive process is 
intuitive or deliberate can be subject to the reverse inference problem (e.g., in the 
domain of prosociality, see Krajbich et al., 2015). Although intuitive decisions have 
been shown to be faster (J. S. B. T. Evans & Stanovich, 2013), it is not necessarily 
true that fast decisions are intuitive. Other processes affecting response times could 
occur simultaneously, rendering the assumption that decisions are fast if and only if 
they are intuitive a potential logical error. For instance, Evidence Accumulation Models 
have argued that decision difficulty also affects response times in prosocial decision 
making (Krajbich et al., 2015). Therefore, in the absence of manipulations of intuitive 
vs. deliberate processing, reaction time data must be interpreted cautiously in the 
light of the auxiliary assumptions for its meaning.  
A break-through in the study of decision processes was achieved with the 
notion that the reasoning process itself could be followed in real time. Rather than 
assessing how long a decision took, so-called process tracing methods were 
conceived to illuminate which reasoning steps decision makers made during the 
decision process. Here, a brief overview of different process tracing methods and 
their application is sketched.  
Think-Aloud Protocols. One of the first process tracing methods were think-
aloud protocols (Ericsson & Simon, 1993; Svenson, 1974). This method asks 
participants to verbalize their thoughts while completing a decision task. For example, 
in a study on moral reasoning, participants were confronted with vignettes in which 
different actors were depicted as behaving in more or less morally praise- or 
blameworthy ways (Bucciarelli, Khemlani, & Johnson-Laird, 2008, Study 3). While 
deciding who deserved more praise or blame, participants were asked to verbalize 
their reasoning process. Results suggested that decision makers were more likely to 
reason before making a choice than to choose immediately without reasoning. 
Problematically, deriving insights about cognitive processes from think-aloud 
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protocols requires the assumption that respondents can fully report their reasoning 
process. However, some evidence suggests that think-aloud protocols are detailed 
enough for computer programs fed with reported reasons to reach the same 
conclusions (Van der Henst, Yang, & Johnson-Laird, 2002). Nevertheless, this 
method remains problematic because responses must be coded and categorized, 
decreasing the advantages of this method.  
Information Boards and Mouselab. Pursuing the idea to record appraisal of 
information, information boards were developed, where information about choice 
options remained hidden unless participants explicitly accessed it (Payne, 1976). This 
technique was later computerized such that participants could unveil information via 
mouse clicks or hovering over the area where information is hidden, and information 
would be covered again when they left the area (Mouselab; Bettman, Johnson, & 
Payne, 1990; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993), simplifying and increasing the 
objectivity of its use. In both cases, the steps of information search and the 
subsequent choice are recorded. Problematically, costs for accessing information are 
imposed, intervening in the information search strategy and subsequently changing 
choices compared to unperturbed reasoning processes (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008; 
Lohse & Johnson, 1996). Although an important breakthrough for process tracing 
research in decision making (Beach & Potter, 1992), these methods therefore carry 
marked limitations. 
Mouse Tracking. Building on the premise of inferring decision processes from 
computer mouse movements, mouse tracking was developed to trace the curvature 
of mouse movements towards specific targets (Dale, Kehoe, & Spivey, 2007; Spivey, 
Grosjean, & Knoblich, 2005). For example, in an application to the domain of 
prosociality (Kieslich & Hilbig, 2014), participants were confronted with different social 
dilemmas, and choices were made by clicking one of two buttons symbolizing 
cooperation or defection, and the mouse trajectories towards these targets were 
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analyzed. When choosing to cooperate, the trajectory was less curved towards the 
non-chosen option, indicating less cognitive conflict in cooperation.  
In sum, although important insights were accomplished using the process 
tracing techniques introduced above, they have critical limitations. The methods both 
interrupt and fail to capture the decision process on a sufficiently fine-grained level of 
analysis. Therefore, many questions regarding the cognitive processes driving 
prosociality and morality were left unanswered.  
Eye Gaze and Decision Processes 
To address the need for a fine-grained and unobtrusive measure of cognitive 
processes in the decision process, eye tracking has emerged as an increasingly 
popular tool. This section gives an overview of the rationale of eye tracking as a tool 
to study cognitive processes in general and in decision processes in particular. A short 
introduction to the technical functioning and possible dependent variables is given 
and related to predictions of general process theories of decision making. Finally, a 
short overview of the use of eye tracking in the domains of prosociality and morality 
is provided. 
The Link between the Eye and the Mind. Eye gaze is used to study selectivity in 
perception, which is defined as visual attention (for an overview of the perception-
attention link, see Orquin & Mueller Loose, 2013), to infer how information acquisition 
and cognitive processing take place (Ashby, Johnson, Krajbich, & Wedel, 2016). This 
strategy relies on the Eye Mind Hypothesis (Just & Carpenter, 1980), positing that 
what is visually fixated on is being processed in working memory (“There is no 
appreciable lag between what is fixated and what is processed.“; Just & Carpenter, 
1980, p. 331). The human eye can monitor a visual field of about 200° with varying 
degrees of clarity, but the fovea, the point of clearest vision, only covers a 2° visual 
angle (Levi, Klein, & Aitsebaomo, 1985). Rapid eye movements called saccades are 
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used to position the eye so that the reflection of stimuli enters the foveal region. During 
fixations, instances where a stimulus is held in the foveal region for a relatively long 
period of time (more than 50ms; Salvucci & Goldberg, 2000; but typically around 
200ms to 300ms; Holmqvist et al., 2011, p. 21), focused stimuli can be processed. 
Sometimes information that is not held in the foveal region, but in neighboring regions 
of the eye where vision is less clear, can still be processed (for examples of experts’ 
processing of parafoveally regarded stimuli, see Charness, Reingold, Pomplun, & 
Stampe, 2001; Reingold, Charness, Pomplun, & Stampe, 2001). Critically, information 
cannot be processed when it is passed over in a saccade (Rayner, 1998), because 
the speed at which the eye moves during saccades is too high for information to be 
detected and processed (saccadic suppression; Matin, 1974).  
At the same time, there are also indications that visual attention does not 
necessarily indicate that certain stimuli are being cognitively processed, contradicting 
the eye-mind hypothesis. For instance, visual attention and awareness are not 
identical (Lamme, 2003), and attention can shift even when the processing of a certain 
piece of information has not been completed (Engbert, Nuthmann, Richter, & Kliegl, 
2005). Moreover, eye gaze and attention can also be decoupled (Posner, 1980): 
When attention is covert (as opposed to overt), people may look at one stimulus but 
think about something else. These caveats have led to the formulation of less strong 
versions of the original Eye Mind Hypothesis in which a one-to-one relationship of 
attention and cognitive processing is no longer assumed. One such reformulation is 
that of Huettig, Olivers and Hartsuiker (2011, p. 141): “The most active location in 
working memory will eventually determine the most likely direction of the eye 
movement at a given point in time.“.  
This reformulation further points to the directionality of the relation of eye gaze 
and attention: Does eye gaze determine what will be processed, or will eye gaze follow 
cognitive shifts in attention? Both directions are argued to occur. Shifts in attention 
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brought about by an involuntary reorientation are referred to as exogenous, bottom-
up or stimulus-driven attention shifts, while endogenously determined, top-down or 
goal-directed attention shifts describe the voluntary orientation towards a certain 
stimulus (for overviews, see Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Theeuwes, 2010; Yantis, 
2000). A number of stimulus features can determine the exogenous direction of 
attention (for a review, see Orquin & Mueller Loose, 2013). An early theory on stimulus-
driven attention suggested that the visual field could be perceived as a saliency map, 
where features such as luminance or direction of movement could increase the 
likelihood that an area captures attention (Koch & Ullman, 1985) For other examples 
of stimulus features capturing attention, Lohse (1997) showed that colored or large 
stimuli received more attention. Moreover, the position of stimuli relative to others has 
been shown to influence attention: stimuli displayed in the center (central position 
effect; Chandon, Hutchinson, Bradlow, & Young, 2009) or at the top (Sütterlin, 
Brunner, & Opwis, 2008) receive more attention. Overall, research shows that such 
saliency-based models perform better than chance in predicting attention shifts 
(Foulsham & Underwood, 2008). 
Top-down shifts in attention are famously illustrated with the rubber band 
metaphor (Holmqvist et al., 2011, p. 379): When part of a rubber band is stretched to 
one point (i.e., when attention is directed at a certain piece of information), the other 
parts of the band will follow (i.e., eye gaze will be directed to the relevant stimulus). 
When attention is endogenously redirected, the lag between this shift in attention and 
the subsequent shift in eye gaze is about 250ms (Deubel, 2008). When making 
decisions, gazes can be categorized into three types of distinct functionality (Glaholt 
& Reingold, 2011): initial short fixations to gain an overview (Glöckner & Herbold, 
2011) and decide which alternatives to incorporate into the set of options considered 
in depth (Russo & Leclerc, 1994; Wedell & Senter, 1997), longer fixations in the middle 
of the decision process to compare the alternatives (Russo & Leclerc, 1994), and 
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finally shorter fixations to confirm the emerging decision tendency (Krajbich, Armel, & 
Rangel, 2010; Krajbich, Lu, Camerer, & Rangel, 2012; Krajbich & Rangel, 2011).  
In a seminal investigation of how different processing goals determine eye 
gaze, scan paths were compared when participants repeatedly viewed artworks 
when given different instructions (Yarbus, 1967). How the painting was viewed 
depended dramatically on which goals participants pursued, such as when estimating 
the material wealth or assessing the age of a depicted family, and when trying to 
memorize the location of people and objects in the painting (e.g., Yarbus, 1967, p. 
174). Since then, a large body of research has been devoted to studying how top-
down attention shifts occur (for reviews, see Baluch & Itti, 2011; Noudoost, Chang, 
Steinmetz, & Moore, 2010). Here, a special focus is placed on investigations of top-
down influences on attention in decision making research (for an overview, see Orquin 
& Mueller Loose, 2013). A number of studies have investigated how different decision 
tasks affected information search patterns. For instance, time pressure to make a 
decision quickly resulted in altered scan paths and decreased the number of features 
fixated on (Pietersa & Warlopb, 1999). In risky choices, preference reversals between 
different choice tasks (Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1971) are accompanied by diverging 
gaze patterns (B. Kim, Seligman, & Kable, 2012): When people decided between two 
risky gambles, they focused more on probabilities and subsequently were more likely 
to choose the gamble with the more probable outcome but lower expected payoff. 
However, when betting on a single risky gamble, outcome amounts were attended 
more and higher outcome gambles with low probabilities received higher prices than 
high probability gambles.  
The latter example also alludes to the relation of utility and eye gaze: Decision 
makers are more likely to gaze at information that has a high utility (Fiedler & Glöckner, 
2012) or is important to the decision maker (Glöckner, Fiedler, Hochman, Ayal, & 
Hilbig, 2012; Glöckner & Herbold, 2011; van Raaij, 1977). People fixate more on the 
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decision alternative they will later choose (Russo & Leclerc, 1994), and are more likely 
to direct their last fixation before deciding to the later chosen alternative (Krajbich et 
al., 2010, 2012; Krajbich & Rangel, 2011). This attention shift is not a sudden change, 
but is reflected in a gradual increase in fixations on the later chosen option over the 
course of the decision process (Gaze Cascade Effect; Shimojo, Simion, Shimojo, & 
Scheier, 2003; Simion & Shimojo, 2007). Moreover, decisions that are more difficult, 
i.e. where the alternatives are very similar in their respective utility, are associated with 
higher fixation counts (Fiedler & Glöckner, 2012; Glöckner & Herbold, 2011; Krajbich 
et al., 2010, 2012; Krajbich & Rangel, 2011). 
Currently, a debate is ongoing about the question whether attention can bias 
choices. This idea that attributes which receive more attention bias the decision was 
formulated both in the literature on gaze cascade effects (Shimojo et al., 2003) and in 
the attentional drift diffusion model (Krajbich et al., 2010). There have been successful 
attempts to bias simple choices by manipulating visual attention (Armel, Beaumel, & 
Rangel, 2008; Milosavljevic, Navalpakkam, Koch, & Rangel, 2011) but the strong 
formulation of the causal role of attention on decisions in more complex domains such 
as morality (Pärnamets et al., 2015; but see Newell & Le Pelley, 2018) remains to be 
shown. Rather, empirical evidence is argued to be more consistent with a form of 
mere exposure effect (Glaholt & Reingold, 2011; Glaholt, Wu, & Reingold, 2009; 
Shimojo et al., 2003), i.e., an increased likelihood to choose an alternative to which 
one has been exposed longer, in combination with an increased likelihood to choose 
the more salient alternative based on bottom-up effects (e.g., Chandon et al., 2009; 
Lohse, 1997). 
In sum, the relation of eye gaze and attention, and ability to illuminate which 
information is being processed and how by investigating gaze behavior have been 
well established in the literature.  
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Measuring Eye Gaze. Given that eye gaze can be considered as a helpful tool 
for the investigation of cognitive processes underlying decision making, the following 
section gives an overview of the technical side of measuring eye gaze.  
Eye tracking methodology has its roots in reading research at a time where 
eye motions were first investigated using mirrors, leading to the initial observation of 
saccades (Javal, 1878). Moreover, saccades were counted while participants read 
with one eye by counting the bumps of the other, closed eye’s cornea against a 
microphone (see Tinker, 1928). Since then, eye tracking tools have undergone an 
extreme development (for detailed overviews, see Richardson & Spivey, 2008; Wade 
& Tatler, 2005), passing a stage where a writing device was connected to the 
participants’ eyes via wires and contact lenses (Delabarre, 1898; Huey, 1898), and 
ultimately evolving to contemporary techniques using video recordings of the eye.  
To identify the location to which gaze is directed (point of regard) 
independently of movements of the head, these recording tools base real-time 
calculations on corneal reflections relative to the center of the pupil (for an in-depth 
description, see Duchowski, 2007, Chapter 5.4). An infrared light ray is directed at 
the eye and reflected by the cornea in four light rays (Purkinje reflections, see Crane, 
1994). In a calibration phase, the position of the first Purkinje reflection relative to the 
center of the pupil is assessed while the participant is directed to gaze at specific 
locations. Subsequently, when participants freely gaze at different locations, their 
point of regard can be calculated.  
Dependent Variables. A number of variables is used to characterize eye gaze 
based on fixations, saccades, blinks and the pupil. Here, key variables are introduced 
and related to the cognitive processes that have been inferred from them in the 
existing literature.  
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First, measures related to fixations have already been referred to above. 
Three attributes of fixations are used to infer cognitive processes: their location, their 
frequency and their timing. The location on which decision makers fixate, or rather the 
information symbolized in these locations, is used to infer attention, and the content 
of information processed in working memory. Often, certain stimuli are embedded in 
so-called Areas of Interest (AOIs), which are slightly larger than the stimuli themselves 
to account for inaccuracies in the gaze recording (for an in-depth discussion, see 
Orquin, Ashby, & Clarke, 2016). From counting the number of fixations (also called 
fixation count) inside an AOI, it is inferred how much attention decision makers spend 
on the stimulus. Further, the number of fixations is used to quantify the relative 
importance or weight of the contained piece of information: more important pieces of 
information are fixated more often (Russo & Leclerc, 1994). In Chapters 2 and 3, we 
use the number of fixations as an indicator for decision effort, relying on the auxiliary 
assumption that higher effort is required to resolve decision problems of high difficulty, 
which in turn increase the number of fixations (Krajbich et al., 2010). A second 
indicator for decision effort is the number of pieces of information fixated on out of all 
available pieces of information, relying on the assumption that a more effortful decision 
process integrates more pieces of information (Fiedler, Glöckner, Nicklisch, & Dickert, 
2013). The number of pieces of information fixated on as an indicator for decision 
effort is used in Chapters 2 and 3. Another variable of interest related to fixations is 
the order in which fixations to specific AOIs occur. One way of utilizing fixation 
sequences is studying gazes to the choice options over time. Differences in how 
fixations are allocated to two available alternatives as the decision process evolves 
can be assessed to infer cognitive conflict: the larger the difference in fixations over 
time, the smaller the cognitive conflict occurring between the competing options. This 
measure is utilized in Chapter 4. Another way of using fixation sequences is by 
constructing full profiles of gazes to all AOIs called scan paths. Using scan paths 
makes it possible to infer patterns of attention and search strategies to understand 
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the sequence in which information is attended to and processed (Noton & Stark, 
1971). For instance, in multi-attribute choice where choice options are described by 
several characteristics, attribute-wise vs. alternative-wise search patterns calculated 
as a so-called search index could be used to infer heuristic search strategies (Payne, 
1976). In another example, the Needleman-Wunsch algorithm (Needleman & 
Wunsch, 1970) was applied to compare scan paths in different risky choice tasks 
(Day, 2010). Regarding the timing of fixations, the total dwell time, i.e., the total 
duration of all fixations directed to the AOI, can be used to infer processing 
elaborateness (Velichkovsky, Rothert, Kopf, Dornhöfer, & Joos, 2002). Another 
variable of interest is the duration of single fixations, that is how long eye gaze “rests” 
on a specific location. Fixation durations are used to infer depth of processing 
(Velichkovsky, Dornhoefer, Pannasch, & Unema, 2000; Velichkovsky et al., 2002). 
Short fixations indicate information scanning and lower-level automatic processing 
(Glöckner & Herbold, 2011), while higher-level deliberate processing prolongs fixation 
durations.  
Second, other dependent variables make use of saccades. For instance, the 
saccadic distance, i.e., the distance between two fixations, is used to infer local vs. 
global attention states (Lans, Pieters, & Wedel, 2008; Wedel, Pieters, & Liechty, 2008). 
Global attention is used to orient oneself in the visual environment and to find a target 
stimulus, for which longer saccadic distances are used. When switching to local 
attention and shorter saccadic distances, a target stimulus is processed in detail. 
Saccadic velocity, the speed of the eye motion between two fixations, is argued to 
indicate cognitive load: Higher cognitive load was associated with faster saccades 
(Bodala, Ke, Mir, Thakor, & Al-Nashash, 2014). Relatedly, evidence indicates that 
decision-irrelevant saccades were faster when decision difficulty was higher due to 
incongruent or inconsistent stimuli (Joo, Katz, & Huk, 2016).  
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Third, eye blinks, that is the rapid opening and closing of the eyelid, can be 
counted over time to constitute the blink rate (number of blinks per minute). Although 
blinks are a biological necessity to maintain the moistness of the eye, the blink 
frequency has also been argued to depend on processing difficulty (Stern, Boyer, & 
Schroeder, 1994).  
Fourth, dependent variables make use of the size of the pupil. The pupil can 
be dilated or constricted, which is a biological process regulating the amount of light 
admitted to the cornea. Beyond the biological response to different lighting and 
luminance conditions, pupil dilation also depends on cognitive processes. It is chiefly 
used to infer arousal and cognitive load (Andreassi, 2010; Beatty & Lucero-Wagoner, 
2000; Kahneman & Beatty, 1966).  
In sum, eye tracking offers a versatile toolbox of variables that can be used 
to operationalize specific cognitive functions. Additionally, the use of multiple related 
dependent variables is especially advantageous to perform precise tests of theoretical 
process predictions (Glöckner & Betsch, 2011).  
Theories of Decision Processes 
The theories of prosocial and moral decision making introduced in the 
beginning make some explicit process predictions, but few predictions are directly 
specified for dependent measures that can be gained from eye tracking. Therefore, 
more general theories of decision processes could be consulted here, which describe 
the role cognitive processes are assumed to play during the decision making process 
(also see Marewski, Bröder, & Glöckner, 2018) and make specific predictions for eye 
tracking variables. One of these general theories is reviewed here to provide context 
for the specific process models referenced above, and as the basis for process 
predictions specific to eye tracking which are derived in the subsequent chapters of 
this dissertation.  
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Evidence Accumulation Models of decision making, such as the Decision 
Field Theory (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993), as well as the Attentional Drift Diffusion 
Model (aDDM; Krajbich et al., 2010, 2012; Krajbich & Rangel, 2011) share the notion 
that that information is accumulated in a sequential sampling process until a threshold 
is passed and a choice is made. Utility or decision value of the available options 
determine the choice. One of the key differences between the decision field theory 
and the aDDM is that the former assumes that attention is distributed following a 
weighted additive function, which is consistent with most empirical evidence on 
changing fixation likelihoods depending on task characteristics and utility, while the 
latter assumes a stochastic distribution of attention. The aDDM yields a large number 
of specific process predictions. It posits that attention to an option increases its 
relative value, indicating that the option gazed at first is initially favored over the other 
alternatives, and that any mechanism directing more attention to one alternative will 
increase the likelihood that this option is chosen. Moreover, the rate at which the 
decision threshold is approached is argued to be steeper the larger the utility 
differences between the alternatives. The model further proposes a stable fixation 
duration across the decision process that depends on the choice difficulty (in contrast 
to empirical evidence suggesting changed fixation durations depending on 
characteristics such as time pressure (Pietersa & Warlopb, 1999) and utility (Fiedler & 
Glöckner, 2012), with the exception of the last fixation, which is argued to be cut short 
as the decision threshold is passed. This also means that the last fixation is assumed 
to be allocated to the later chosen alternative.  
Given its relative parsimony in assumptions about the decision process, and 
the formulation of highly specific processing predictions, the evidence accumulation 
models and the aDDM in particular have emerged as a frequently employed decision 
theory. In the scope of this dissertation, we make use of the predictions of the aDDM 
to derive specific hypotheses in the context of prosocial choices (Chapter 3), and to 
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motivate measures used to investigate moral decision making, we rely on auxiliary 
assumptions derived from findings in the context of the aDDM (Chapter 4).  
Eye Gaze in Moral and Social Decision Making. Finally, some prior research has 
made use of eye gaze to study decision making in the domains of prosociality and 
morality, which is briefly summarized here to provide context for the subsequent 
empirical contributions made in the scope of this dissertation. 
Regarding prosociality, a recent paper on the processes underlying 
prosociality showed that decision makers’ SVO determined how information was 
searched for in Dictator Games and Public Goods Games (Fiedler et al., 2013). With 
increasing deviation from prosocial SVO, increases in decision times, fixation counts 
and the proportion of inspected information, as well as the proportion of attention to 
others’ payoffs and transitions between own and others’ payoffs were found. These 
findings point to a weighted additive decision strategy in prosocial decision making, 
in line with Evidence Accumulation Models. The findings also directly contradicted the 
prediction that cooperation is intuitive derived from the Social Heuristics Hypothesis. 
Another study supported the notion that social preferences are distinctly related to 
the proportion of attention allocated at information relevant for the subsequent choice 
(Jiang, Potters, & Funaki, 2015). Moreover, another study has contributed eye 
tracking evidence in group settings, albeit not directly addressing prosociality but 
trust. Pupil dilation was used to study behavior in incentivized trust games (Kret, 
Fischer, & De Dreu, 2015). Trustees were trusted more when they had dilated pupils, 
and trustors’ pupils mimicked trustees’ pupil dilation. Trust was predicted by trustors’ 
mimicking of ingroup members’ pupil dilation. Finally, other work has demonstrated 
that ingroup members receive preferential visual attention (Kawakami et al., 2014). 
Regarding the relation of attention and morality, in a study using trolley-type 
dilemmas post-decisional attention was shown to be directed away from the victim, 
suggesting a motivation to avoid feelings of guilt (Kastner, 2010). Moreover, a number 
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of studies have addressed the processes underlying moral decision making via eye 
tracking in contexts other than trolley-type dilemmas (for an overview, see Fiedler & 
Glöckner, 2015). For instance, recent work using pupil dilation has found that the 
dilation of the pupil predicted deceptive messages to a partner (Wang, Spezio, & 
Camerer, 2010) and dishonest reporting of outcomes in a simple counting task 
(Hochman, Glöckner, Fiedler, & Ayal, 2016) to increase one’s own payoffs.  
Overall, eye tracking has been shown to be a useful tool to investigate, in 
real-time and unobtrusively, the cognitive processes underlying decision making. The 
use of various dependent variables enables a variety of insights into information 
search behavior, cognitive effort, and the importance of certain pieces of information 
for the decision maker. Finally, initial evidence suggests that eye tracking is well suited 
for the investigation of decision processes in the domains of prosociality and morality. 
Summary 
In sum, this introduction has given an overview of the historical and current 
debates in research on prosociality and morality, finding parallel trends in their 
development, such as with regard to the increasing use of decisions with real 
consequences as a paradigm for investigation, or the concurrent juxtaposition of dual 
process models and choice differentiability accounts. Importantly, in both areas of 
research, a growing interest in cognitive processes is observed, which this thesis 
addresses. In particular, the cognitive processes underlying prosocial decision making 
in group settings and moral decision making are identified as areas where further 
research is needed. This need for further empirical investigations in the domain of 
prosociality specifically concerns the acquisition of information about others’ group 
membership, attention towards own and others’ outcomes, and effort invested in 
information search during the decision process. In the domain of moral decision 
making, we test the predictions made by competing theoretical models, the dual-
process theory of moral decision making, and the choice discriminability account, 
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about the relation of deontological vs. utilitarian decision preferences and decision 
effort. In a discussion of empirical research methods potentially usable for 
investigating cognitive processes, eye tracking is demonstrated to be the optimal 
methodology to conduct unobtrusive and fine-grained analyses of decision 
processes, and the aDDM is introduced as a general theory of decision processes, 





Staying Blind to Stay Fair: 
To Avoid Ingroup Favoritism, Decision 











This chapter is based on Rahal, R., Fiedler, S., & De Dreu, C. K. W. (in preparation). 
Staying Blind to Stay Fair: To Avoid Ingroup Favoritism, Decision Makers Avoid 
Information about Group Membership. https://bit.ly/2ERcmCV  
STAYING BLIND TO STAY FAIR  44 
Abstract 
Ingroup favoritism is pervasive in decision making, and research has long 
aimed at understanding which decision makers are particularly prone to discriminate 
against the outgroup and favor their ingroup. Here we show that some decision 
makers deliberately avoid information revealing group membership to avoid biasing 
their choice. We present evidence from the reanalysis of two eye tracking studies 
showing that in money allocation tasks where the matched receiver is an in- or an 
outgroup member, decision makers visually avoid group identifying information, and 
consequently showed no ingroup favoritism. Additionally, we show in two behavioral 
studies that decision makers deliberately avoid learning the group membership of their 
partner in a dictator game. Avoidance of group membership information was linked 
to inter-differences and correlated with lower first and second order beliefs about 
discrimination. Theoretical implications for intergroup research and theories of ingroup 
favoritism are discussed.  
Keywords: ingroup favoritism, deliberate ignorance, expectations 
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Staying Blind to Stay Fair: Inequality Averse Decision Makers Avoid Group 
Membership Information and Ingroup Favoritism 
Sometimes, who belongs to your team and who does not is so obvious to 
see that it is almost impossible to stay blind to someone’s group membership. For 
instance, when rivaling soccer teams run on the field, they jersey colors make it 
obvious which player belongs to your favorite team and who does not. However, in 
many situations, group membership is signaled far less obviously. Consider the subtle 
cues about belonging to a social class transmitted via jewelry, identifying someone as 
a member of the group of outdoorsy people from their weather tanned skin, or 
detecting a fellow academic because of her disbelieving facial expression when 
someone mistakes correlation for causation. If you successfully identified her as a 
member of your group, you might be more likely to discriminate in favor of your fellow 
academic, for instance when you decide whether to share some of the cake you just 
bought in your coffee break. If you did not notice she was part of Team Academia, 
her chances for getting a bite of your cake might be much slimmer. While the prospect 
of missing out on cake due to an outgroup status may seem trivial, the issue 
generalizes to social interactions with larger repercussions. For instance, wearing a 
necklace with a Koran charm may decrease applicants’ likelihood to find an apartment 
in a Christian neighborhood, and job applicants whose name can reveal their ethnicity 
may be less likely to be invited to interviews (e.g., Kaas & Manger, 2011) if the recruiter 
uses this information to infer grup membership. In many social interactions, one can 
catch the cue revealing group membership, or stay blind to it. Here, we investigate 
why people seek out cues of others’ belonging to social groups, and what they do 
with this information when they need to decide whether to be prosocial. 
A large body of research has demonstrated that groups play an important 
role in people’s lives, motivating them to invest effort in achieving their ingroup’s goals 
(Ellemers, De Gilder, & Haslam, 2004; Worchel, Rothgerber, Day, Hart, & Butemeyer, 
1998) to compensate for their group members’ defection when they strongly identify 
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with the group (Arora, Logg, & Larrick, 2015), and to generally trust and cooperate 
more with ingroup members (e.g., Dorrough & Glöckner, 2016; Halevy, Bornstein, & 
Sagiv, 2008; Romano, Balliet, Yamagishi, & Liu, 2017; for a meta-analysis, see Balliet 
et al., 2014). Much theorizing in social psychology has tried to explain why groups are 
so important to people, arguing for instance that aspects of individuals’ self-concepts 
are derived from the social groups they belong to (Social Identity Theory, Tajfel & 
Turner, 1986), or that groups simplify decisions because of generalized expectations 
of favorable treatment by the ingroup (Bounded Generalized Reciprocity, Yamagishi 
et al., 1999). Given standard economic assumptions (Stigler, 1961) in the context of 
such theories, it is nearly always rational to find out whether other people are members 
of one’s in- or outgroups: Based on the claims of Social Identity Theory and 
particularly Bounded Generalized Reciprocity, accessing information about other’s 
group membership is useful, because one would expect to benefit from interacting 
with similar people who might also treat their ingroup members preferentially. Yet, 
even when interactions are non-strategic, meaning that decision makers do not base 
their decisions on their beliefs about the strategy of their counterpart, prosocial 
behavior has been shown to be conditioned on group membership (e.g., Chen & Li, 
2009; Ockenfels & Werner, 2014). Therein, decision makers seem to be interested in 
group membership information even beyond what would be rationally expected. 
Despite the large body of evidence suggesting that people are concerned with group 
membership and condition their behavior on it, sometimes people stay blind. Here, 
we explore the extent and drivers of ignorance to group membership information, i.e., 
the avoidance of information revealing which social group another person belongs to.  
Ignorance despite costless and easily available information is a common 
paradox in a variety of domains (for recent overviews, see Golman, Hagmann, & 
Loewenstein, 2010; Hertwig & Engel, 2016). For example, people avoid information 
they fear might carry negative implications for them (“ostrich effect”, term originally 
used in Galai & Sade, 2006). People at high risk for health conditions were shown to 
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avoid screening tests (Lerman et al., 1996, 1999; Oster, Shoulson, & Dorsey, 2013) 
and investors in stock markets were shown to check on their investments more often 
when prices were rising than when prices were falling (Karlsson, Loewenstein, & 
Seppi, 2009). A related area of the literature focuses on confirmation bias (for a review, 
see Nickerson, 1998) or congeniality bias (Hart et al., 2009) in information search: 
New evidence is accumulated and evaluated such that it favors an existing decision 
or belief. Therefore, (partial) ignorance towards information that is at odds with the 
preexisting choice or belief follows. For example, new car owners preferred 
advertisements of other models than the one they had recently bought (Ehrlich, 
Guttman, Schonbach, & Mills, 1957), and doctors reported to rather put trust in data 
in line with their initial diagnosis when they were busy with too many patients (Ogdie 
et al., 2012). In another line of research, ignorance is related to the protection of 
intuitive preferences: Woolley and Risen (2018) showed that people avoided learning 
the caloric content of tempting foods, and their potential earnings from betting on 
others’ misfortunes.  
Ignorance and Ingroup Favoritism 
Ignorance or information avoidance can extend beyond the scope of factual 
information (such as whether a certain feature of a different car model is better or 
worse) to social information and person perception. A large body of research has 
addressed the person- and group-related features that are often used in social 
decisions. For instance, interaction partners’ attractiveness (R. K. Wilson & Eckel, 
2006), facial similarity (DeBruine, 2002) and facial width (Stirrat & Perrett, 2010) are 
used as cues for trustworthiness, different expectations of generosity have been 
shown when people differentiate others by sex (Aguiar, Brañas-Garza, Cobo-Reyes, 
Jimenez, & Miller, 2009), and perceived threat levels in aggressive actions are higher 
depending on the actors’ race (Sagar & Schofield, 1980). In social decisions where 
group-based discrimination could arise, group membership information carries a 
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central role, as it encapsulates the critical piece of information that can bias the 
choice. Yet, there may be a number of reasons why decision makers remain ignorant 
to other’s group membership. For instance, discrimination in choices based on 
membership to social, racial, religious or other groups in social settings such as hiring, 
promotions and compensations must be avoided by law under many jurisdictions (for 
an overview, see European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2010). Factors 
such as fairness concerns beyond legal requirements, caring very little about group 
membership, or preferring to make swift decisions at the cost of not being fully 
informed may play a role in motivating ignorance, and are discussed in more detail 
below. Therefore, contexts emerge in which decision makers may remain blind to 
cues that would offer the potential for discrimination, particularly to group membership 
information, and avoid bias in their choices. 
In many natural decision situations, decision makers can remain ignorant to 
others’ group membership. For instance, the year of birth or an accompanying 
headshot could be ignored in résumés submitted for a job application, rendering age-
, race- and gender-based discrimination less likely. However, most previous research 
takes for granted that decision makers are interested in whether others are members 
of the in- or outgroup (but see Ockenfels & Werner, 2014). In behavioral investigations 
of ingroup favoritism, the setup of the choice tasks and economic games often forces 
knowledge of whether they interact with in- or outgroup members on participants. For 
instance in the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (Halevy et al., 2008), the set-up asks 
participants to decide between keeping resources to themselves, sharing them with 
their ingroup at everyone’s advantage, or employing their resources to both benefit 
the ingroup and simultaneously harm the outgroup. Given the choice options, all 
players automatically have full information about the group membership of all others 
involved. Problematically, such experimental investigations of intergroup decision-
making, in which decision-makers cannot remain blind to the beneficiaries’ group 
membership, may overestimate ingroup favoritism in general. For example, without 
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discriminating between cases where group membership was considered or ignored, 
a small overall effect of ingroup favoritism overlooks the possibility that some 
individuals identify others’ group membership and bias their choices strongly, while 
others ignore group membership and show no bias.  
In this project, we study people’s tendency to remain ignorant of others’ 
group membership, and its implication for ingroup favoritism. Specifically, we estimate 
the prevalence of ignorance to group membership, comparing three different 
manipulations of group membership, two of which involve a minimal group paradigm, 
while the last involves real groups. Moreover, we aim to establish how ignorance 
affects ingroup favoritism. Given the crucial nature of group membership information 
for discrimination, when decision makers remain truly blind to it and do not visually 
attend to group membership information, there can by definition be no ingroup 
favoritism. When decision makers only state a general preference to stay ignorant of 
others’ group membership, this might signal different motives: (1) Unbiased decision 
makers might indeed not be interested in the available information and will ignore it 
accordingly when presented. And would be indifferent about the information being 
shown or not. (2) Sophisticated, but biased decision makers on the other hand that 
are aware of their decision biases might want to use information avoidance as a form 
of commitment device to avoid ingroup favoritism. Hence stating a preference for 
ignorance should be linked to reduced or even eliminated ingroup favoritism. Here, 
we study the effects of visual inattention to group membership information and stated 
preferences for remaining ignorant of group membership on the occurrence and 
degree of ingroup favoritism in a repeated non-strategic money allocation task, where 
participants decided between a selfish and a prosocial option of distributing money 
between themselves and another in- or outgroup player.  
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Nature of Ignorance 
Further, upon establishing that ignorance in group settings may occur and 
lead to the reduction of ingroup favoritism, the question how decision makers arrive 
at ignoring group membership information arises: Is the nature of ignorance that of a 
deliberate choice to remain blind? Ignorance could be characterized in two ways: as 
involuntary neglect, i.e. missing to detect a certain piece of information and 
consequently neglecting it in the decision process, or as deliberate or active 
information avoidance, i.e. although the decision maker knows a certain piece of 
information is freely available, it is not accessed on purpose (Golman et al., 2010).  
Here, we take two approaches to clarifying the nature of ignorance to group 
membership information. Using an unobtrusive measure of ignorance, we studied via 
eye tracking how decision makers allocated their visual attention to decision-critical 
information, after having been instructed fully about the information freely available to 
them. Decision makers knew about the group context and knew where group 
identifying information was presented on the decision screen, such that not accessing 
this information would constitute active information avoidance in line with the definition 
above. In addition, to establish the deliberate nature of ignorance to group 
membership more directly, we further assess the relation of visual inattention to stated 
preferences for uncovering group identifying information. Decision makers self-
reported if they would prefer to learn about others’ group membership before making 
a final allocation decision. Taken together, both measures point towards active 
information avoidance, and allow us to gauge the nature of ignorance.  
Drivers of Ignorance 
Moreover, given that ignorance can be more than haphazard neglect of 
information, a variety of different motivations could drive systematic ignorance, in 
particular when others’ social group membership is concerned. Here, we derive 
hypotheses for possible drivers of ignorance to group membership from three different 
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explanatory approaches. First, we take an ingroup bias perspective, aiming to identify 
measures of individual differences driving the extent to which decision makers engage 
in ingroup favoritism and discrimination, which in turn are hypothesized to also play a 
role for ignorance to group membership information. Second, we are interested in the 
motivations for ignorance more generally. We identify a set of reasons why decision 
makers may choose to stay ignorant in general, and link these motivations for 
ignorance to individual difference measures. Third, we take a belief-based preference 
approach, considering the role of expectations for ignorance. All three approaches 
are outlined in detail below. 
Inclination to Ingroup Bias. Given that ignorance to others’ group membership 
and ingroup favoritism itself by design have to be closely linked, known drivers of 
ingroup bias could be good predictors for ignorance as well. Some social 
psychological theories have hypothesized that the source of prejudice and 
discrimination in group contexts could lie at least in part in inter-individual differences 
(Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis, & Birum, 2002). Indeed, people differ in the extent to 
which they engage in group-based discrimination. For instance, Kranton, Pease, 
Sanders and Huettel (2017) showed inter-individual differences in groupiness, with 
some actors displaying ingroup favoritism across different situations, while others are 
conditionally groupy or non-groupy. More traditionally, the degree to which people 
identify with and like their ingroup have long been considered important predictors for 
ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation (Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Struch & 
Schwartz, 1989).  
A number of inter-individual differences could be considered as indicators of 
people’s inclination to ingroup bias, some of which we outline below. For instance, 
differences in social dominance orientation, the preference for groups and hierarchy 
in society (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994; Sidanius, Pratto, & Mitchell, 
1994), or differences in attitudes about power, benevolence and. universalism 
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(Schwartz, 1992; Souchon, Maio, Hanel, & Bardin, 2016) have been conceptually and 
empirically linked with prejudice. Similarly, people who have a strong desire to feel 
belonging to their social groups (NTB, Leary, Kelly, Cottrell, & Schreindorfer, 2013) 
may be more likely to treat their highly valued ingroup contacts more favorably. Finally, 
less risk averse individuals may be more likely to discriminate against the outgroup. 
For example, in accordance with the Male Warrior Hypothesis (Van Vugt, De Cremer, 
& Janssen, 2007), men, who are also less risk averse than women (Eckel & Grossman, 
2008) engage more in intergroup conflict, carrying significant risk for personal harm 
to benefit the ingroup in competitions against rivaling outgroups. In parallel, risk 
preference could be related to group-based discrimination more generally. In sum, a 
number of inter-individual differences can be considered as predictors for people’s 
inclination to exhibit ingroup bias. 
Because these inter-individual differences are associated with ingroup 
favoritism and discrimination, they might also be potential drivers of ignorance in an 
in- vs. outgroup setting. People who want to discriminate need to know the respective 
group membership to make their choice. To that effect, Ockenfels and Werner (2014) 
showed that participants were more likely to reveal the group membership of the 
matched receiver in a one-shot dictator game when they strongly identified with the 
ingroup. How much people are concerned with the group structure of society could 
therefore be related to accessing information about others’ group membership.  
Here, to investigate if differences in the extent to which people are inclined to 
favor the ingroup drive ignorance, we study eight predictors: group identification and 
group attitude, social dominance orientation (SDO), the preference for belonging to a 
social entity (need to belong, NTB), risk preferences, and personal values 
(universalism, benevolence, power). 
Motivations for General Ignorance. Further, individual differences in factors that 
have been shown to affect ignorance more generally (for a systematic review, see 
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Hertwig & Engel, 2016) could also be at play in the determining attendance to group 
membership information. Two of the general functions of ignorance seems particularly 
pertinent for contexts of prosociality and discrimination in groups: ignorance as a 
device to increase fairness, and as a device to reduce cognitive demand.  
Demonstrating the fairness increasing function of ignorance, Kandul and 
Ritov (2017) showed in a dictator game setup unrelated to group contexts that 28% 
of dictators deliberately chose to stay blind to their own outcomes, and that the most 
of these subjects subsequently chose a prosocial allocation of resources. In parallel, 
in group contexts, some decision makers might think that it is unfair to discriminate 
based on group membership, and choose to stay blind in order to stay fair. In other 
words, people might choose ignorance to group membership to avoid making 
ingroup favoring choices. An example of such deliberate avoidance of group 
membership are blind auditions for professional musicians, which were successfully 
introduced to reduce sexist discrimination against female applications by originally 
predominantly male decision makers (Goldin & Rouse, 2000). A similar mechanism 
could be at play on an individual level: some individuals may censor their own 
information acquisition of group membership information to avoid bias in their choices. 
In other words, people may be motivated to stay blind because they want to stay fair. 
Therefore, individual differences in the desire to make fair decisions could determine 
ignorance generally, and specifically ignorance to group membership information. 
Here, we assess the influence of fairness motivations on ignorance to group 
membership information using five predictors. We study decision makers’ aversion to 
inequality (Engelmann & Strobel, 2004), both regarding individual-level interactions 
and on the societal scale. We further study the related concepts of social value 
orientation (SVO, the preference for allocating resources between oneself and another 
person, Messick & McClintock, 1968) and honesty-humility (Ashton et al., 2004), as 
well as the tendency to instrumentalize others for own gain (machiavellianism, Christie 
& Geis, 1970). 
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Moreover, managing cognitive resource expenditure is an immediately 
obvious benefit of ignorance. Information that is not accessed does not have to be 
evaluated regarding its value und impact on a pending decision. People who prefer 
to think things through thoroughly or who prefer to diligently examine a decision 
problem before making their choice could have a generalized preference to avoid 
ignorance. In this vein, individual differences related to cognitive style, such as 
conscientiousness from the HEXACO model of personality (Ashton et al., 2004), or 
reliance on intuitive vs. rational cognitive styles when making decisions (e.g., Hamilton, 
Shih, & Mohammed, 2016) could determine whether ignorance is shown. In turn, the 
argument that individual differences in the desire for full information exist which drive 
ignorance may also apply to group contexts, which are arguably laden with rich social 
information. To lift the heavy burden of processing a lot of information, some decision 
makers may decide not to access all available information. Therefore, ignorance to 
group membership information could serve as a coping mechanism to manage 
cognitively demanding decision settings for decision makers who generally exhibit less 
effortful thinking styles.  
Here, to study the influence of thinking style on ignorance, we assess six 
predictors: rational vs. intuitive decision styles, actively open-minded thinking, need 
for cognitive closure, self-control and conscientiousness. 
Belief-dependent Preference for Ignorance. Finally, the beliefs and expectations 
held by decision makers about others’ behavior are hypothesized to be another driver 
of ignorance. Expectations have long been considered an important driver of 
cooperative behavior (Dawes, 1980; Offerman, Sonnemans, & Schram, 1996; Pruitt 
& Kimmel, 1977), suggesting that in strategic interactions some decision makers 
condition their contribution in social dilemmas on others’ behavior (Fischbacher, 
Gächter, & Fehr, 2001). Expectations about the behavior of others also feature 
prominently in the Bounded Generalized Reciprocity Theory, which posits that ingroup 
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favoring choices are largely a function of the expectation that ingroup members will 
be more likely to cooperate (Foddy, Platow, & Yamagishi, 2009; Yamagishi et al., 
1999). Taking this argument one reasoning step further, Güth, Ploner, and Regner 
(2009) showed that dictators made higher estimates for what they thought others 
expected them to transfer estimated to in- compared to outgroup members in a 
dictator game, and these beliefs in turn predicted contributions. 
In models of belief-dependent preferences, beliefs about others’ behavior 
and expectations are considered a standalone part of the decision makers’ utility 
function (Battigalli & Dufwenberg, 2009; Geanakoplos, Pearce, & Stacchetti, 1989) in 
contexts beyond strategic interactions. What we think others will do (first order beliefs) 
and why, as well as what we think others expect us to do (second order beliefs) is 
argued to affect our decisions through a number of different routes, such as guilt 
aversion (the desire not to disappoint others, see e.g., Battigalli & Dufwenberg, 2007), 
the desire to punish unkind and reward kind actions (Falk & Fischbacher, 2006) even 
when own outcomes are unconcerned (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Henrich et al., 
2006), or the desire to comply with perceived social norms (Kimbrough & 
Vostroknutov, 2016; Krupka & Weber, 2013; López-Pérez, 2008). 
Here, we posit that decision makers’ first and second order beliefs do not 
only exert effects on their choices, but also on their interest in group membership. 
Expectations that other players will condition their own choices on the receivers group 
membership will increase the likelihood of discrimination of the decision maker and 
subsequently increase the likelihood of looking up group membership. Similarly, 
ingroup favoring choices can be assumed to be driven in part by the desire not to 
disappoint ingroup members’ expectations of favorable treatment of ingroup 
members and discrimination against the outgroup, and the general preference to act 
in line with the perceived social norms. With increasing second order beliefs of 
discrimination, the likelihood of accessing group identifying information should 
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therefore increase in parallel. Similarly, decision makers who strongly emphasize 
acting in accordance with others’ expectations and conventionalized rules should also 
be more likely to follow others’ expectation. We capture these tendencies through 
decision makers’ subscription to personal values of conformity traditionalism. In sum, 
this belief-based preference account presumes that higher first and second order 
beliefs of discrimination and higher first order beliefs of attention to group membership 
information, as well as inter-individual differences related to compliance with second 
order beliefs increase the preference to unveil group membership.  
On the other hand, staying blind could serve the motivation to create moral 
wiggle room in a situation where social norms and expectations would otherwise 
compel a certain behavior conflicting with one’s personal preferences. Remaining 
ignorant of group memberships, therefore, could be a strategic choice to evade this 
pressure of second order beliefs. In the context of inter-individual interactions, the 
term “moral wiggle room” (Dana et al., 2007) has been coined for this form of strategic 
ignorance. Dana et al. (2007) showed that more than half of dictators in a dictator 
game deliberately chose to stay blind to others’ outcomes, and that most of them 
subsequently made a selfish choice. In another example of selfish exploitation of moral 
wiggle room, DellaVigna, List and Malmendier (2012) conducted a field experiment, 
where a door-to-door fundraiser was either unannounced or residents were told 
about the donation drive the day before. When the fundraiser was announced, the 
proportion of households opening the door shrank by 9%, and when potential donors 
indicated they did not want to be disturbed by the fundraisers but opened the door 
to them anyway, their donations were reduced by 28%. In both examples, decision 
makers’ ignorance reduced the pressure to comply with social norms and others’ 
expectations, creating space to make selfish choices. 
Ignorance to group membership information may carry a similar function in 
group contexts: Staying blind allows decision makers to create wiggle room to ignore 
STAYING BLIND TO STAY FAIR  57 
others’ expectations of ingroup favoritism and increased prosociality towards the 
ingroup, making space for selfish choices. People might choose ignorance to group 
membership to avoid being pressured to benefit the ingroup if they prefer to keep 
resources to themselves. Individualistic decision makers could therefore have a 
preference to stay blind because they want to maximize their own outcomes and 
avoid the pressure to act prosocially when facing an ingroup member. In line with this 
strategic ignorance hypothesis, Ockenfels and Werner (2014) found that the majority 
(63%) of dictators preferred group membership to remain unknown in a one-shot 
dictator game with students from two German cities as the in- vs. outgroup. After 
choosing to remain blind to group membership, dictators transferred significantly less 
money to the matched receiver. Dictators who strongly identified with the ingroup and 
chose to remain blind were particularly less generous. In line with this moral wiggle 
room hypothesis, it could be expected that decision makers who estimate higher 
second order beliefs but prefer to remain ignorant to group membership to be able to 
evade others’ expectations would then contribute only little. 
In sum, our approach to investigating individual differences driving ignorance 
to group membership focuses on borrowing explanatory variables from three 
perspectives. On the one hand, we aim to investigate whether factors that describe 
decision makers’ inclination to engage in ingroup favoritism also predict whether they 
seek out group identifying information. On the other hand, we consider if individual 
differences in factors related to two general functions of ignorance for increasing 
fairness, and managing cognitive resources predict attendance to group membership 
information as well. Third, we consider ignorance as a belief-dependent preference, 
investigating the role of decision makers’ beliefs about others’ behavior and 
expectations and their tendency to comply with expectations for ignorance to group 
membership information. 
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Research Agenda.  
Although some limited previous literature has assessed ignorance to others’ 
membership to social groups, there is no systematic account of what drives people 
to unveil who belongs to which group, or to stay blind. Further, evidence on what 
people will do with uncovered group membership information is limited, and 
expectations about prosociality in these cases are inconsistent. Therefore, in this 
project we aimed to clarify how behavior differs depending on ignorance in intergroup 
settings, and what motivates ignorance. After we observed a large extent of ignorance 
in a first eye tracking study, we followed up on the phenomenon with a second eye 
tracking study aiming at identifying potential drivers of this kind of inattention. Building 
on these first findings, we ran two further behavioral studies, replicating the findings 
and extending them to situations involving real groups. Overall, we report results from 
two eye tracking studies and two behavioral studies, as well as pooled analyses. 
In sum, we focused on five areas of exploration. First, we aimed to establish 
the prevalence of ignorance through visual inattention to group membership in simple 
money allocation tasks involving in- vs. outgroup players. Second, we explored how 
visual (in-) attention to group membership and the stated preference to stay blind 
affected ingroup favoritism. We third assessed if ignorance was deliberate in nature, 
by comparing visual inattention to group membership information with stated 
preferences for unveiling a matched receivers’ group membership in a subsequent 
dictator game. Fourth, we explored inter-individual differences related to decision 
makers’ inclinations for ingroup favoritism and general ignorance (based on the 
functionality of ignorance to increase fairness and manage cognitive resources), as 
potential correlates of ignorance to group membership. Fifth, we considered if 
preferences to stay ignorant depended on first and second order beliefs of 
discrimination and ignorance.  
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We additionally report an analysis of the inter-individual difference studied as 
potential drivers of ignorance while pooling the data across studies. In using this 
pooled analysis, we aim to increase the accuracy of the estimated correlation effects 
(Kelley & Maxwell, 2003; Maxwell, Kelley, & Rausch, 2008) by approaching a sample 
size in which the estimated size of a correlation (in our case the correlation between 
inter-individual differences and stated preference) can be expected to stabilize based 
on Monte-Carlo simulations (Schönbrodt & Perugini, 2013).  
Study 2.1 
Here, we present the reanalysis of data reported in Chapter 3. We studied 
eye gaze in incentivized money allocation tasks, where decision makers in each task 
faced as the receiver either a member of the in- or outgroup.3  
Material & Methods 
Participants and Design. Eighty-four participants (55.95% women, Mage = 
24.82, SDage = 6.76) (mainly students) took part after they had been recruited from 
the DecisionLab subject pool in Bonn, Germany, via the database system ORSEE 
(Greiner, 2015). The study followed a SVO x 2 (intergroup decision setting: ingroup 
vs. outgroup) mixed design. Participants were paid for one randomly selected choice 
in the task assessing SVO and one randomly selected choice in the money allocation 
task, where they were randomly selected to be in the dictator role for one of the two 
payoff relevant tasks. Payoffs varied between 5.30 € and 13.80 € (M = 9.52€, SD = 
2.15€). 
Stimulus Material and Procedure. Before participants came to the lab, SVO was 
assessed online via unipark (www.unipark.de) with the SVO Slider Measure (Murphy et 
al., 2011), where they made six money allocation decisions between themselves and 
                                               
3 For a full account of the materials and procedure, see https://bit.ly/2qJDqjB. 
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another person. From participants’ choices, their SVO angle was computed by taking 
the inverse tangent of the proportion between average payoffs allocated to 
themselves and others, each reduced by 50. Based on the SVO angle, participants 
can be categorized into prosocials (22.45° < SVO° < 57.15°) and individualists (-
12.04° < SVO° < 22.45°). 
For the group membership manipulation, an adaptation of the Kandinsky-or-
Klee procedure (Tajfel et al., 1971) was used to induce minimal groups. Participants 
saw 5 pairs of clippings of paintings by Kandinsky and Klee presented in a random 
order (Chen & Li, 2009) and were assigned to one of two groups based on their 
painting preference (Giants (preference for Klee) or Titans (preference for Kandinsky)).  
In the lab stage, participants first completed a reaction time competition 
(group reinforcement task), where they had to compete with the other group in quickly 
and correctly identifying the position of an asterisk repeatedly presented randomly in 
four locations on the screen to earn a bonus payoff of 3€ for their group. 
Finally, participants played 80 rounds of two-person money allocation tasks 
(decomposed dictator games), and received information about the group 
membership of their respective partner in each trial. In half of the tasks they faced an 
ingroup member, and in the other half of the tasks an outgroup member. In each trial, 
participants decided between two options of allocating money between themselves 
and a matched receiver. Participants could give up a certain amount of their own 
payoff that they would receive in the selfish option, to benefit the other player by 
choosing the prosocial option (see Figure 1). Matched receivers differed in every trial. 
Next to the payoff matrix, a box with information about the matched receiver was 
presented. This box showed two non-diagnostic pieces of information about the other 
player: whether a coin toss had shown them heads or tails, and which random 
number between 1 and 40 they had drawn. The third and only informative piece of 
information presented was the matched receivers’ group membership (in- vs. 
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outgroup). The location on the screen where the information about the other 
participants was presented was randomized between subjects.  
Eye movements were recorded during this task with the remote eye gaze 
binocular system (LC Technologies) with a sampling rate of 120Hz and an accuracy 
of about 0.45˚. Decision options were presented on monitors with a native resolution 
of 1280x1024 pixels and a refresh rate of 60 Hz (Samsung SyncMaster 740B (17 in, 
response time 8ms), Samsung SyncMaster 931BF (18 in, response time 2ms), Asus 
VB195T (18 in, response time 5ms)). 
After participants made all 80 decisions, they then completed two group 
manipulation checks. They indicated their explicit identification (1 = strongly disagree, 
7 = strongly agree) with their in- and outgroups on eight items (e.g., “I identify with the 
group Giants [Titans]”, (Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995) and their explicit attitude 
towards their in- and outgroups on four items (e.g., “I like the group Giants [Titans]”, 
(Pinter & Greenwald, 2010).  
Results 
Data Pre-Processing. Three types of areas of interests (AOI) were defined: AOIs 
containing payoff information and AOIs containing information about the matched 
receiver (100x100 pixels each), as well as AOIs containing labels (100x190 pixels). 
Fixations were identified with a 30 pixel tolerance in the summed deviation of points’ 
maximum and minimum coordinates on the x- and y-axes. To reduce the number of 
false negatives for inattention to groupID (i.e., marking a trial as one in which the group 
information was not attended even though it was), we conservatively included 
fixations regardless of their duration, meaning some fixations might have been 
constituent parts of a saccade. 
Data was excluded from two participants who could not be calibrated and 
therefore had no gaze recordings, from one further participant because they indicated 
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that they decided against their personal preferences during the experiment, and from 
an additional nine participants who failed to correctly indicate their outgroup, identified 
more with their outgroup than with their ingroup, liked the outgroup better than the 
ingroup, or had missing data on these variables. In total, data from 72 subjects was 
retained for further analyses. 
Manipulation Check. Participants identified more with the in- than the outgroup 
by an average of 2.31 points (SD = 1.68) on the 7-point Likert scale, and liked the 
ingroup better than the outgroup by an average of 1.61 points (SD = 1.82).  
Inattention. Analyzing participants’ interest in the group identifier, results 
showed that only 31.32% of all subjects attended to groupID at least once. The other 
players’ group membership was overall attended to in only 24.62 % of trials. 
Ingroup Favoritism. Analyzing ingroup favoritism separately for all trials and 
only for trials where groupID was attended to vs. not attended to, we ran three mixed 
effects repeated measures logistic regressions predicting the odds of making a 
prosocial choice depending on the receiver’s group membership. We controlled for 
SVO and the interaction of SVO and the receiver’s group membership, because we 
expected both predictors to influence the level of prosocial choices, as well as for 
item-specific effects. In the overall regression, the odds of making a prosocial choice 
was 2.17 times higher when facing in- compared to outgroup members, 
demonstrating the expected overall ingroup favoritism effect (Table 1, Model 1; and 
Figure 2, Panel A). As expected, when restricting the regression to participants who 
remained blind to the receiver’s group membership, ingroup favoritism was no longer 
present (OR = 1.00, Table 1, Model 2; and Figure 2, Panel A). When predicting only 
decisions where participants attended to the groupID at least once, the odds of 
deciding prosocially were 29.38 times higher when facing in- compared to outgroup 
members (Table 1, Model 3; and Figure 2, Panel A), showing a large ingroup favoritism 
effect in this subset of trials. 
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Inter-individual Differences Predicting Ignorance. Next, in a mixed effects 
repeated measures logistic regression, the likelihood of attending to groupID at least 
once during the trial was regressed on the three person-specific predictors4 included 
in this study, SVO, group identification and group attitude, controlling for trial number5. 
Results (Table 2, Model 1) showed that people who identified more strongly with the 
in- compared to the outgroup were more likely to visually attend to groupID6.  
Discussion 
Study 2.1 unveiled widespread ignorance to group identifying information. 
Visual non-attendance to group membership determined whether ingroup favoritism 
was shown. Analyses showed that ignorance was driven by the degree of 
identification with the in- vs. outgroup: people who indicated they felt more strongly 
that they were a part of their ingroup compared to the outgroup were more likely to 
visually attend to group membership information. While Study 2.1 gave a first 
indication that ignorance to group information was widespread, other potential drivers 
of ignorance remained largely unexplored. 
Study 2.2 
Study 2.2 built on Study 2.1 by aiming to test the robustness of the finding 
that group membership information is largely ignored. Aiming to rule out the possibility 
that the observed ignorance of Study 2.1 was due to the specific minimal group 
manipulation used, we introduced a stronger group manipulation intended to increase 
                                               
4 Correlations between the inter-individual difference measures are reported in the online 
supplementary materials (https://bit.ly/2ERcmCV), Table A1. 
5 Results persisted when restricting analyses to using only fixations longer than 50 ms (Table A2 
in the online supplementary materials). 
6 The trial number was found to predict whether participants took a look at groupID, indicating that 
as more time passed in the experiment, the interest in the groupID reduced. These types of fatigue 
effects are to be expected in repeated games.   
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mean level of attention to group membership information. Second, because Study 
2.1 only yielded a first glance at potential drivers of ignorance, we added further 
questionnaires capturing inter-individual differences potentially related to seeking 
outgroup revealing information. Specifically, we included two measures of inter-
individual differences related to the inclination to discriminate in group decisions, SDO 
and NTB, as well as three measures for different fairness motives, machiavellianism, 
as well as inequality aversion on an individual and on a societal level. Third, we 
explored whether ignorance to group membership was deliberate in nature, by 
assessing the correlation of stated preferences for ignorance and visual inattention. 
Parts of the data for Study 2.2 was also analyzed in Chapter 3. 
Material & Methods 
Participants and Design. Ninety-eight participants (68.09% women, Mage = 
20.67, SDage = 3.09, demographic data missing from four participants) took part in 
the study. Participants were recruited as in Study 2.1, and compensated as 
previously, with an additional flat payment given the longer duration of the sessions. 
Payoffs ranged from 6.00€ to 18.30€ (M = 11.73€, SD = 2.74€). 
Stimulus Material and Procedure. In the online stage of the study, participants 
completed the SVO Slider Measure (Murphy et al., 2011), including the secondary 
items as a measure for inequality aversion. Further, participants indicated in a 
measure of aversion to unequal income distributions in societies (Carlsson, Daruvala, 
& Johansson-Stenman, 2005) for several pairs of societies with different average 
incomes and income distributions which one they would prefer. Finally, we assessed 
participants’ NTB (Leary et al., 2013, German scale by Hartung & Renner, 2014) with 
ten items (e.g., “I want other people to accept me.”). 
Group membership was manipulated with a minimal group assignment 
procedure adapted from Simon and Brown (1987), where participants were shown 
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12 color boards (3 clearly blue, 3 clearly green, 6 an ambiguous mixture of blue and 
green). They were asked to indicate their perception of each color board as blue or 
green and based on their perceptions, they assigned to two groups: Giants (indication 
of more blue colors) and Titans (indication of more green colors). To increase the 
relevance of the group, participants were asked to memorize a secret group 
password, which they had to reproduce in the subsequent lab stage. Spying out the 
rivaling group’s password would earn them an additional group bonus of 1€. 
The lab stage was identical to Study 2.1: participants completed the group 
reinforcement task, as well as the money allocation task where eye gazes were 
recorded, and checks on the group association manipulation and on experimental 
demand. 
Following the money allocation task, participants additionally completed the 
group identification and attitude questions from Study 2.1, as well as the 
questionnaires for Machiavellianism (Henning & Six, 2008), and SDO (Sidanius et al., 
1994), German scale from Zick & Six, 1997, e.g., “Inferior groups should stay amongst 
themselves.”). Finally, to assess the nature of ignorance, we included a game where 
participants had to explicitly state their preference for ignorance. Participants played a 
hypothetical dictator game, where they were asked to imagine they had 100 points 
convertible to1€, which they could distribute between themselves and another player. 
They were asked if they preferred the group membership of the second player to be 
revealed before the decision. In accordance with their preference, the information was 
then (not) presented, and participants made their hypothetical choice.  
Results 
Data Pre-Processing. Pre-processing and data preparation for eye tracking 
analyses were conducted as in Study 2.1. One participant was excluded for deciding 
against his/her personal preferences during the experiment. Further, participants were 
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excluded if they failed to correctly indicate their outgroup, if they identified more with 
their outgroup than with their ingroup, or liked the outgroup better than the ingroup 
(10 participants in total). Data from three participants had to be excluded because 
choice and gaze data could not be recorded. In total, data from 84 subjects was used 
in the analyses below. 
Manipulation Check. Participants identified more with the in- than the outgroup 
by an average of 2.80 points (SD = 1.72) on the 7-point Likert scale, and liked the 
ingroup better than the outgroup by an average of 2.15 points (SD = 2.04), indicating 
a slight increase compared to Study 2.1. 
Inattention. Overall, 51.46% of participants gazed at groupID at least once 
during all trials, and groupID was attended to in 45.29% of target trials, indicating a 
substantive decrease in ignorance compared to Study 2.1.  
Nature of Ignorance. Only 26.19% of participants explicitly stated they 
wanted to unveil group membership information. Further, analyses showed that the 
proportion of trials in which participants freely sought out groupID during the money 
allocation task predicted whether they subsequently explicitly decided to reveal the 
group membership of the matched receiver in the dictator game (OR = 10.93, z = 
29.95, p < 0.001).  
Ingroup Favoritism. Analyzing ingroup favoritism in the money allocation task 
as in Study 2.1, we replicate the previous pattern (Figure 2, Panel B). When assessing 
all participants regardless of their attention to groupID, the odds of making prosocial 
choices when facing an ingroup member where 4.62 times higher than when facing 
an outgroup member, indicating an increase in ingroup favoritism compared to Study 
2.1 (Table 1, Model 4). In trials where participants remained blind to the matched 
receiver’s group membership, no ingroup favoritism emerged (OR = 1.15, Table 1, 
Model 5). When restricting the regression to trials where groupID was attended to at 
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least once, the pattern of the overall regression was restored (Table 1, Model 6). The 
ingroup favoritism effect was markedly increased, with the odds of prosocial choices 
being 15.86 times higher when matched with an ingroup member. 
When splitting choices in the money allocation task not by free visual 
attendance but depending on stated preference for unveiling group membership 
information in the subsequent dictator game, a similar pattern emerged (Figure 3, 
Panel A). Ingroup favoritism was reduced, but not eliminated among participants with 
a preference to remain blind to group information (OR = 3.05, Table 3, Model 1) and 
more substantial among those preferring to unveil group membership (OR = 15.86, 
Table 3, Model 2). 
In the dictator game, participants who wanted to reveal the receivers’ group 
membership were significantly less generous (β = -15.55, t = - 3.74, p < 0.001, Figure 
4, Panel A).7 The choices of participants who decided to uncover group membership 
information showed clear ingroup bias (β = 21.06, t = 3.07, p < 0.01). 8 Specifically, 
during ingroup choices, contributions were similar to anonymous choices when 
participants had decided to stay ignorant, whereas contributions to outgroup 
members were markedly reduced. 
Inter-individual Differences Predicting Ignorance. To assess which inter-
individual differences could predict whether groupID was visually attended to, we ran 
mixed-effects repeated measures logistic regressions predicting the likelihood of 
                                               
7 Because SVO is often a strong predictor of prosocial choices, it was entered as a control variable 
in this linear regression (β = 0.65, t = 4.73, p < 0.001)). 
8 SVO (β = 0.65, t = 2.48, p = 0.02) and the interaction of group membership and SVO (β = 0.14, 
t = 0.26, p = 0.80) were entered as control variables in this linear regression. All predictors were 
centered. 
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attending groupID at least once during the trial, controlling for the trial number9 (Table 
2). We entered predictors10 stepwise to maximize the available sample size, as some 
predictors had missing values due to a malfunction in the online questionnaire (NTB), 
invalid values due to inconsistent choices (aversion to income inequality), or could not 
be calculated because the concept is theoretically defined to apply only to a subset 
of the sample (inequality aversion index of the SVO slider measure, which disentangles 
prosocials’ motivation for joint gain maximization from their motivation to avoid 
unequal outcomes and can therefore only be assessed for prosocial participants 
(Murphy et al., 2011). 
In the first model omitting aversion to income inequality and the inequality 
aversion index, results showed that people high in SVO, group identification 
(marginally significant effect) and SDO (marginally significant effect) were more likely 
to attend to groupID, while the likelihood of attending to groupID decreased when 
NTB was high (Table 2, Model 2). In the second model, adding the measure for 
aversion to income inequality, results showed that participants higher in aversion to 
income inequality were more likely to gaze at groupID (marginally significant effect), 
while the negative effect of NTB persisted (Table 2, Model 3). Finally, we added the 
inequality aversion index, restricting the sample to prosocials. Results showed an 
effect of SVO, indicating that the more extreme prosocials were more likely to attend 
to groupID than less extreme prosocials (Table 2, Model 4) Further, the effect of SDO 
persisted (marginally significant), indicating an increase of the odds of gazing at 
groupID for prosocials who were also high in SDO. 
                                               
9 As in Study 2.1, gazes to groupID were less likely the more trials participants had already 
completed. As before, results when restricting analyses to fixations longer than 50ms are reported 
in Table A2 of the online supplementary materials. 
10 Correlations between the inter-individual difference measures are reported in Table A3 in the 
online supplementary materials. 
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When running the analyses to predict the stated preference for revealing 
group membership information in the dictator game, only SDO was a significant 
predictor (Table 4, Models 1 through 3). 
Discussion 
In Study 2.2, information revealing others’ group membership was again 
ignored in a substantial proportion of decision situations and determined whether 
ingroup favoritism was shown in the money allocation task, corroborating our previous 
exploratory findings. Again, attendance to groupID determined if ingroup favoritism 
was shown.  
Stated preferences for revealing group membership information were related 
to the probability of visually attending to group membership, suggesting that visual 
non-attendance was rather deliberate in nature. Further, explicitly preferring to 
uncover group membership was also related to exhibiting larger ingroup bias in the 
money allocation task, indicating a link between the explicit preference, free 
attendance and discrimination behavior. In particular, attention to and a preference 
for uncovering group membership information was related to reduced generosity 
towards the outgroup.  
Further, we explored a number of inter-individual differences as potential 
drivers of the observed ignorance. Corroborating the pattern of the previous study, 
we again found that increased group identification was related to increased attention 
to group membership. Moreover, prosociality was also related to decreased 
inattention, indicating that the inclination to ingroup favoritism was part of the drivers 
of visual inattention. Similarly, regarding the newly included predictors, results 
suggested that people with higher SDO, who have a preference for hierarchy in 
societies where their ingroup dominates other groups, were more likely to visually pay 
attention to and explicitly decide in favor of information revealing group membership. 
STAYING BLIND TO STAY FAIR  70 
However, inconsistently, decision makers high in NTB, i.e. those with a strong desire 
to feel socially accepted or included, were less likely to uncover group membership 
information. Here it could be argued that NTB resembles a general rather than 
ingroup-specific desire to feel connected to others, therefore lowering the appeal of 
uncovering others’ group membership. Finally, the results suggested that the people 
with a heightened preference for equality in income distributions were more likely to 
identify others’ group membership, indicating that fairness motivations in situations 
when decision makers’ outcomes were not involved played a role in the decision to 
stay blind. In sum, this evidence corroborates the impression that inter-individual 
differences matter for ignorance to group membership information. 
Study 2.3 
Given the evidence of the prior studies that SVO and group identification, as 
well as SDO and inequality aversion correlated with ignorance, in Study 2.3, we aimed 
to tests the replicability of these effects and extent the investigation to other inter-
individual differences. Therefore, we added an extensive battery of questionnaires 
related to the inclination for ingroup favoritism, fairness motivations, and thinking style. 
Further, we investigated belief-dependent preferences through eliciting decision 
makers’ beliefs about others’ behavior and expectations. Instead of visual attention 
to groupID, we used stated preference for uncovering group membership information 
in an incentivized dictator game as the dependent variable. Additionally, to investigate 
how decision makers reacted when their stated preference for ignorance was met or 
overridden in the dictator game at the end of the study, irrespective of their 
preference, participants were matched randomly with an anonymous, an in- or an 
outgroup receiver.  
Material & Methods 
Participants and Design. Two hundred ninety-nine participants (41.13% 
women, Mage = 24.67, SDage = 6.57) took part in the online study. Participants were 
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recruited from the pool of the DecisionLab in Bonn, and compensated as previously, 
with the addition of the incentivized inter-individual difference measures and the 
incentivized dictator game. Payoffs ranged from 2.11€ to 12.34€ (M = 7.17€, SD = 
2.11€). The study followed a SVO x 2 (intergroup decision setting: ingroup vs. 
outgroup) x 2 (group reinforcement: direct vs. delayed) x 2 (group info: first vs. last) 
mixed design.  
Stimulus Material and Procedure. This study was administered online via 
unipark. 11 We first assessed participants’ demographics, and then their SVO with the 
SVO Slider Measure (Murphy et al., 2011), including the secondary items as a measure 
for inequality aversion.  
Second, participants were allocated to one of two sequences of stimulus 
presentation: They either first completed a series inter-individual difference 
questionnaires, and only then underwent the group membership manipulation via the 
color-boards method from Study 2.2 to assign participants to two minimal groups, 
directly followed by the group reinforcement task (direct group reinforcement), or they 
first underwent the group membership manipulation, followed by the inter-individual 
difference questionnaires and only then completed the group reinforcement task 
(delayed group reinforcement). In the subsequent analyses, the presentation order 
had no effect, such that the data was pooled. 
The group reinforcement task presented participants with four hidden picture 
puzzles, where a number of foxes had entered a chicken coop and were hiding 
among the chickens. Participants were asked to protect their ingroup’s chickens by 
correctly reporting the number of foxes in each picture. The group with a smaller 
                                               
11 Due to a programming error, answers to the PVQ questionnaire, as well as to the aversion to 
income inequality measure, were not recorded for all participants (Nmissing = 103). Moreover, one 
item was missing from the SDO scale. 
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running total of reporting errors would win the competition and earn an additional 
payoff of 1€.  
In the inter-individual difference measures battery, where the presentation 
order of the scales was randomized between participants, we included measures 
already used in Study 2.2 to assess whether the previous effects would replicate, as 
well as additional measures aimed at capturing different facets of the inter-individual 
differences in question, and measures of concepts not previously included to broaden 
our search for correlates of ignorance.  
Regarding participants’ inclination to favor the ingroup, we again included a 
measure for SDO. Moreover, we assessed risk attitudes by asking participants to 
repeatedly choose between two lotteries were the probability for gaining the higher 
payoff was varied between 0% and 100% in increments of 10% (Holt & Laury, 2002). 
Lottery pairs consisted of one “safe” lottery with little variance in the payoffs of the 
two outcome possibilities (2.00€ or 1.60€), and a “risky” lottery with large variance in 
the payoffs of the two outcome possibilities (3.85€ or 0.10€). One choice was 
randomly selected to be paid out. We used this measure because risk-aversion is 
associated with increased engagement in intergroup conflict (Van Vugt et al., 2007), 
in turn predicting ignorance to group membership. Further, participants completed a 
21-item version of the German Portraits Value Questionnaire (PVQ, Schwartz et al., 
2001, German scale from Schmidt, Bamberg, Davidov, Herrmann, & Schwartz, 2007, 
e.g., “It is important to him/her to develop new ideas and to be creative. He/she likes 
doing things in his/her own original way.”) that was administered to correspond to the 
sex participants stated in the beginning of the online study. Using this measure, we 
aimed to capture a broad range of values participants could subscribe to. Particularly 
pertinent values for the correlation with ignorance to group membership from the 
perspective of an increased inclination to discriminate were universalism and 
benevolence, which refer to prosociality directed towards society at large or the 
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ingroup in particular, as well as power, for its close thematic relation to SDO. Here, 
we also assessed participants’ subscription to tradition and conformity, for their 
relation to acceptance of customs and conventionalized social norms, which may 
relate to belief-dependent ignorance. 
Relating to fairness motives, we included the measure on unequal income 
distributions in societies from Study 2.2 (Carlsson et al., 2005). Participants also 
completed a 24-item German version of the Brief HEXCAO Inventory (BHI, de Vries, 
2013, e.g., “I can look at a painting for a long time.”), where we took honesty-humility 
as a further indicator of prosociality, which might relate to ingroup favoritism and 
therefore ignorance to group membership in this context. 
For inter-individual differences related to managing cognitive resources, we 
took the HEXACO conscientiousness subscale as a proxy for thinking style, assuming 
that highly conscientious people would prefer being fully informed about a decision 
situation, consequently becoming more likely to also access group membership 
information. Further, we included four other measures for managing cognitive 
resources. Participants completed a 10-item German version of the Rational and 
Intuitive Decision Styles Scale (Hamilton et al., 2016, e.g., “I prefer to gather all the 
necessary information before committing to a decision.”), a 7-item German version of 
the Actively Open Minded Thinking Scale (Haran, Ritov, & Mellers, 2013, e.g., 
“Allowing oneself to be convinced by an opposing argument is a sign of good 
character.”), a 16-item German short scale to assess need for cognitive closure 
(Schlink & Walther, 2007, e.g., “I don’t like it when a person’s statement is 
ambiguous.”), and a 13-item German adaption of the short version of the Self-Control 
Scale (Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004, German scale: SCS-K-D, Bertrams & 
Dickhäuser, 2009, e.g., “I am good at resisting temptations.”).  
In the inter-individual difference questionnaires block, we also included a 
question asking participants to indicate if they were a member of the Giants or Titans. 
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Since participants in the direct group reinforcement condition had not yet undergone 
the group manipulation, they self-categorized here and were informed of their true 
group membership later.  
Next, participants completed a 20-item short version of the money allocation 
task used in the previous studies, where 10 decisions regarded an in- or outgroup 
receiver, respectively. Payoff information was presented in one of two sequences: 
participants either first saw the other player’s group membership, then the payoff 
matrix, then a numeric random code identifying the other receiver, and then again the 
payoff matrix (group info first), or they first saw the player’s numeric code, and the 
receiver´s group membership was only displayed after they had already viewed the 
payoff matrix once (group info last). Decisions were made on the last screen.  
Next, we introduced participants to an incentivized version of the dictator 
game that was run as a hypothetical scenario in Study 2.2. They were asked to 
distribute 100 points that were convertible into 10€ between themselves and another 
player who also participated in this study. Participants were informed that the decision 
of one randomly chosen participant would be paid out to herself and to a randomly 
chosen receiver. Prior to making their choice, they were asked to state if they wanted 
to know the group membership of the second player. Irrespective of their preference, 
they were then randomly shown a decision screen that either did not reveal the other 
players’ group membership, or a screen that showed that whether a Titan or a Giant 
was the other player.  
To investigate belief-dependent preferences, we then assessed participants’ 
beliefs of the proportion of participants in the study that would have wanted to see 
the group membership of the receiver in the dictator game, whether they believed that 
members of their ingroup would be more generous towards them than members of 
the outgroup (yes / no, first order belief), and their beliefs about the proportion of 
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participants in the study that expected that members of their ingroup would be more 
generous towards them than members of the outgroup (second order belief). 
Lastly, a manipulation check of participants’ identification with and attitude 
towards the in- and outgroup, respectively, which we also took as a proxy of caring 
about groups, as well as a memory check where participants were asked which group 
they did not belong to, were included. Participants were thanked, debriefed, and 
received a payoff according to their choices made in the experiment. 
Results 
Data Pre-Processing. Data was excluded if participants failed to correctly 
indicate their in- or outgroup, respectively (13 participants in total), if they identified 
more with their outgroup than with their ingroup, or liked the outgroup better than the 
ingroup (12 participants in total). Inconsistent preferences in the risk aversion task (11 
participants) or the aversion to income inequality task (42 participants) were marked 
as invalid. Finally, we dropped data from participants where a programming error led 
to them self-categorizing before learning their allocated group membership and they 
did not pick the same group they were later allocated to (57 participants). In total, 
data from 223 participants was retained for the analyses below. 
Manipulation Check. Participants identified more with the in- than the outgroup 
by an average of 1.12 points (SD = 1.11) on the 7-point Likert scale, and liked the 
ingroup better than the outgroup by an average of 0.43 points (SD = 0.92), indicating 
a decrease of the strength of the manipulation in this online setting compared to the 
previous lab studies. 
Ignorance. Analyzing participants’ stated preference for learning the group 
membership of the receiver in the dictator game, we found that only 20.18% of 
subjects wanted to reveal the groupID of the receiver. 
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Ingroup Favoritism. Assessing ingroup favoritism in the money allocation task 
as in Study 2.2, we again compare the full sample and the subsamples of those who 
wanted vs. did not want to reveal the other receivers group membership (Table 5; and 
Figure 3, Panel B). Ingroup favoritism was present in all three models, however, 
among participants who preferred to stay blind, the effect of the matched receiver’s 
group membership on the odds of making prosocial choices was markedly decreased 
(OR = 2.22, Table 5, Model 2) compared to participants who later preferred to unveil 
the matched receiver’s group membership (OR = 5.60, Table 5, Model 3). In 
particular, participants who later revealed group membership were less generous to 
the outgroup than those remaining blind (Figure 3, Panel B).  
We further analyzed ingroup favoritism in the dictator game at the end of the 
study depending on participants’ stated preference for ignorance to groupID in a 
linear regression, for all choices and separately for choices when the matched receiver 
remained anonymous, or belonged to the in- or outgroup (Table 6, Models 1 through 
4; Figure 5, Panel A). We controlled for SVO, which is strongly associated with the 
likelihood of making prosocial choices. When the matched receiver belonged to the 
outgroup, participants who had chosen to unveil the matched receiver’s group 
membership gave significantly less than those who had wanted to remain blind (Table 
6, Model 4; Figure 5, Panel A). In all other models, there was no evidence for a main 
effect of the preference for unveiling group membership on giving in the dictator game.  
When restricting analyses to observations where participants’ preference for 
ignorance was met to replicate the analyses of Study 2.2, we could not fully 
corroborate the previous results. Participants who wanted to reveal the receivers’ 
group membership were descriptively less generous (β = -4.51, t = - 1.25, p = 0.22, 
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Figure 4, Panel B) as in Study 2.2.12 However, the choices of participants who decided 
to uncover group membership information overall showed no ingroup bias (β = -2.33, 
t = -0.36, p = 0.72) 13, possibly due to the weak manipulation in the online setting.  
Inter-individual Differences Predicting Ignorance. We further investigated 
potential systematic differences between participants who chose to unveil the 
matched receiver’s group membership and those who chose to remain blind. As 
before, we ran three logistic regressions predicting the odds of choosing to unveil the 
group membership information from inter-individual differences14. In the first 
regression with the full sample, all inter-individual difference factors were included 
except for values where a malfunction of the online questionnaire led to data loss for 
42 participants (Table 4, Model 4). Group identification and attitude (marginally 
significant effect) were found to be associated with an increased likelihood to prefer 
unveiling group membership information. Participants higher in honesty humility were 
significantly less likely to want to unveil the matched receiver’s group membership, 
while participants higher in conscientiousness were more likely to want to unveil group 
membership. In the second model, aversion to societal income inequality and the PVQ 
predictors were added (Table 4, Model 5). The positive effect of group attitude 
remained. Further, the effects of honesty humility and conscientiousness remained 
significant. There was an effect of subscription to traditional values and conformity 
(marginally significant effect), showing that participants scoring high in tradition were 
less likely to want to unveil groupID, while more conformist decision makers were 
                                               
12 SVO was again entered as a control variable in this linear regression (β = 1.03, t = 8.35, p < 
0.001)). 
13 SVO (β = 0.49, t = 2.08, p = 0.05) and the interaction of group membership and SVO (β = -
0.98, t = -2.00, p = 0.06) were entered as control variables in this linear regression. All predictors 
were centered. 
14 Correlations between the inter-individual difference measures are reported in Tables A4 through 
A6 in the online supplementary materials. 
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more likely to access group membership information. As in Study 2.2, results showed 
a marginally significant effect of aversion to income inequality, indicating that 
participants more averse to income inequality were more likely to seek out group 
membership information. The inequality aversion index did not predict preferences for 
unveiling group membership (Table 4, Model 6). 
Beliefs. Beliefs were predicted by participants’ own preference for unveiling 
the matched receivers’ group membership. Participants who preferred to uncover 
group membership information expected a higher percentage of others to also want 
to know the other players’ groupID (β = 26.36, t = 6.37, p < 0.001, see Figure 6, 
Panel A), were more likely to expect others to discriminate in the dictator game based 
on group membership (OR = 2.66, z = 2.85, p = 0.004, see Figure 6, Panel B), and 
thought that a higher percentage of others expected participants to discriminate (β = 
12.68, t = 2.68, p = 0.008, see Figure 6, Panel C). 
Discussion. 
As before, decision makers largely preferred not to unveil group membership 
information of the recipient. Decision makers preferring to stay blind also showed less 
pronounced intergroup bias in the money allocation task, in particular less outgroup 
discrimination, compared those preferring to find out about others’ group identity. In 
the money allocation task, we replicated the pattern of Study 2.2, showing decreased 
ingroup favoritism when participants stated a preference for ignorance. In the dictator 
game, people who preferred to unveil group membership information were particularly 
less generous when facing an outgroup member compared to those who had 
preferred to stay blind. 
Studying potential drivers of the observed ignorance, results corroborated 
findings of Study 2.2 that people with higher group identification were more interested 
in unveiling group membership. Similarly, group attitude was found to affect 
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ignorance. Unlike Study 2.2, no SVO effect was found, but a significant negative effect 
of honesty humility was present. People who were generally more prosocial were 
more likely to remain ignorant. In contrast, meticulous decision makers scoring high 
in conscientiousness were more likely to access group membership information. 
Corroborating Study 2.1, decision makers with a heightened preference for equality 
in income distributions were more likely to identify others’ group membership, 
indicating the importance of fairness motives for ignorance. While the previous effect 
of SDO did not replicate, we found evidence that traditionalism and conformity 
affected ignorance: more traditional people were more likely to remain ignorant, while 
more conformist people were more likely to unveil group membership information. 
Therein, surprisingly, the effects of traditionalism and conformity were not both 
positive. It could be argued that conformity indeed captures decision makers’ 
willingness to behaviorally adapt to others’ expectations of ingroup bias, increasing 
the need to access group membership information. At the same time, the negative 
relation between traditionalism and stated preference to unveil group membership 
information could point to decision makers’ subscription to the conventionalized rule 
not to discriminate. Among the Bonn student population, this rule may be more 
prominent than the assumed tradition to discriminate. 
Finally, Study 2.3 showed that people who preferred not to remain ignorant 
of group identity had higher expectations that others would seek out group identifying 
information, discriminate more, and in turn expect higher discrimination.  
Study 2.4 
In Study 2.4, we used a lab study with real groups to investigate if the findings 
of the previous studies held when studied in a more externally valid context. In 
particular, we aimed to replicate the effects of individual difference measures 
correlating with ignorance, and the relation of beliefs to ignorance.  
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Material & Methods 
Participants and Design. One hundred and three participants (70.59% women, 
Mage = 21.02, SDage = 3.38) took part in the study. Participants were recruited from 
the pools of the DecisionLab in Bonn and the Hagen DecisionLab. Participants from 
Bonn were paid as before, with payoffs ranging from 5.50€ to 25.60€ (M = 18.14€, 
SD = 3.47€).15 The study followed a SVO x 2 (intergroup decision setting: ingroup vs. 
outgroup) x 2 (group info: first vs. last) mixed design.  
Stimulus Material and Procedure. Participants from the Bonn lab underwent a 
procedure similar to Study 2.3, but separated into an online and a lab stage16. In the 
first part of the study administered online via unipark (www.unipark.de), we collected 
data on participants’ SVO, and included from the inter-individual differences 
measures battery of Study 2.3 the measures for aversion to income inequality, SDO 
decision making style and open-minded thinking, the HEXACO subscales honesty-
humility17 and conscientiousness, as well as the PVQ subscales tradition and 
universalism. In the lab stage, participants completed the group reinforcement task 
from Study 2.3 and then made 80 money allocation decisions, using the tasks of 
Studies 2.1 and 2.2. Participants were randomly allocated to one of two group info 
conditions (as in Study 2.3), where in each trial they were either informed about the 
matched receivers’ group membership prior to seeing the payoff matrix for the first 
time (group info first), or after having already seen the payoff matrix once (group info 
last). They then completed the dictator game and answered the questions about 
                                               
15 Participants from Hagen were paid only for the money allocation task in the randomly allocated 
dictator or receiver role, with payoffs ranging from 0.80€ to 8.90€ (M = 4.49€, SD = 1.81€). 
16 Participants from the Hagen lab worked on a short version of the study in an online questionnaire 
administered via unipark (www.unipark.de). Results from Hagen participants are not reported here. 
17 Due to a programming error, answers to one item from this subscale was not recorded. 
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expectations in this task. Finally, they completed manipulation checks and reported 
demographics.  
Results 
Data Pre-Processing. Data from Bonn participants was excluded if participants 
failed to correctly indicate their in- or outgroup, respectively (1 participant in total), if 
they identified more with their outgroup than with their ingroup, or liked the outgroup 
better than the ingroup (2 participants in total). Inconsistent preferences in the 
aversion to income inequality task (25 participants) were marked as invalid. In total, 
data from 99 participants was retained for further analyses. 
Manipulation Check. Participants identified more with the in- than the outgroup 
by an average of 2.45 points (SD = 1.03) on the 7-point Likert scale, and liked the 
ingroup better than the outgroup by an average of 0.90 points (SD = 0.98), indicating 
a stronger manipulation in this lab compared to the previous online setting, but a 
manipulation strength similar to the one achieved in the two lab studies using minimal 
groups. 
Ignorance. In this study, 29.29% of subjects wanted to find out the matched 
receivers’ group membership in the dictator game.  
Ingroup Favoritism. To assess ingroup favoritism in the money allocation task 
depending on participants’ stated preference for unveiling the matched receivers’ 
group membership in the dictator game, as in the previous studies, mixed effects 
repeated measure logistic regressions were performed separately for all decisions, 
and for decisions by participants who wanted vs. did not want to know the other 
players’ group membership (Table 7; and Figure 4, Panel C). Ingroup favoritism was 
found in all three cases. As before, ingroup favoritism was decreased when 
participants later preferred to stay blind (OR = 1.55, Table 7, Model 2) compared to 
when participants later wanted to uncover group information (OR = 1.90, Table 7, 
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Model 3). As before, participants who later preferred to unveil group membership were 
less generous to outgroup members (Figure 3, Panel C).  
As in Study 2.3, we next predicted dictator game giving from whether 
participants wanted to unveil the matched receivers’ group membership (Figure 5, 
Panel B) in a linear regression for all choices, and separately for choices when the 
matched receiver remained anonymous, or belonged to the in- or outgroup (Table 8, 
Models 1 through 4). Overall, the preference to unveil group membership was again 
associated with less giving (Table 8, Model 1). When matched with an anonymous 
player or an outgroup member, decision makers preferring to uncover group 
membership information were descriptively less generous than those preferring to 
remain blind to group membership. The effects did not reach standard levels of 
significance, possibly due to the reduced size of the subsample analyzed. When 
matched with an ingroup player, no difference in dictator game giving between 
decision makers who preferred to unveil group membership and those who preferred 
to remain ignorant emerged.  
When restricting analyses to observations where participants’ preference for 
ignorance was met, we partially replicated results of Study 2.2. Participants who 
wanted to reveal the receivers’ group membership were descriptively less generous 
(β = -2.66, t = - 0.47, p = 0.64, Figure 4, Panel C) as shown in Study 2.2.18 However, 
as in Study 2.3, there was no evidence of ingroup favoritism among those who 
unveiled group membership information and consequently were shown the 
information (β = 9.37, t = 1.01, p = 0.33). 19 Effects did not reach significance, possibly 
                                               
18 SVO was again entered as a control variable in this linear regression (β = 0.75, t = 3.87, p < 
0.001)). 
19 SVO (β = 1.20, t = 2.51, p = 0.03) and the interaction of group membership and SVO (β = -
1.10, t = -1.13, p = 0.28) were entered as control variables in this linear regression. All predictors 
were centered. 
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due to the small remaining sample size (N = 42 for the first analysis, N = 18 for the 
second analysis). 
Inter-individual Differences Predicting Ignorance. To assess inter-individual 
differences20 between participants who chose to unveil the matched receiver’s group 
membership and those who chose to remain blind, we again entered variables 
stepwise in three regressions. In the first regression omitting inequality aversion and 
the aversion to income inequality, the inter-individual differences factors where data 
was available for all subjects were included (Table 4, Model 7). Participants higher in 
SVO were less likely to want to unveil group membership information, while higher 
identification with the ingroup predicted higher odds of preferring to unveil the other 
players’ group membership. In the second model, aversion to income inequality and 
universalism were added (Table 4, Model 8) and the effects of SVO and group 
identification replicated. Finally, in the third model, the inequality aversion index did 
not predict preference for unveiling group membership information (Table 4, Model 9).  
Beliefs. Beliefs were predicted by participants’ own preference for unveiling 
the matched receivers’ group membership. Participants who preferred to uncover 
group membership information expected a higher percentage of others to also want 
to know the other players’ groupID (β = 26.29, t = 5.57, p < 0.001, see Figure 6, 
Panel D), were more likely to expect others to discriminate in the dictator game based 
on group membership (OR = 5.01, z = 3.23, p = 0.001, see Figure 6, Panel E), and 
thought that a higher percentage of others expected participants to discriminate (β = 
10.54, t = 1.87, p = 0.06, see Figure 6, Panel F). 
                                               
20 Correlations between the inter-individual difference measures are reported in Table A7 in the 
online supplementary materials. 
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Discussion 
Decision makers again largely preferred to remain blind to the group 
membership of their matched partner, despite the use of real groups. Ingroup 
favoritism was smaller among decision makers with a stated preference to stay blind, 
presenting again with more discrimination against the outgroup. In the dictator game, 
those preferring to unveil group membership information were less generous overall, 
and particularly when matched with an anonymous or outgroup player. 
Regarding drivers of the observed ignorance, the previously shown effect of 
the strength of identification with the ingroup was replicated, suggesting that higher 
identification with the ingroup increased the likelihood that the decision maker would 
want to unveil group membership. Unlike in Study 2.2 and 2.3, we found an effect of 
SVO, which indicated that more prosocial decision makers were less likely to want to 
unveil a matched receivers’ group membership.  
Finally, Study 2.4 corroborated the finding that people who preferred not to 
remain ignorant of group identity expected more discrimination.  
Pooled Analyses 
Last, we report additional analyses using pooled data to assess the overall 
influence of inter-individual differences on visual attention to group membership 
information, and on the stated preference to unveil groupID. To better account for the 
data structure where not all variables were collected from all subjects, we report 
regression results after multiple imputation (Rubin, 1987). Analyses are run both with 
and without controls for the study number, and for data collection online vs. in the 
lab. 
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Inter-individual Differences Predicting Inattention 
To assess predictors available for visual attention to group membership 
information, we use the proportion of trials in which groupID was visually attended to 
as the dependent variable. When running regressions with pooled and multiply 
imputed data on all predictors used in Studies 1 and 2, group identification was a 
predictor of visual attention to group membership information (Table 9, Models 1 and 
2). Additionally, a marginally significant negative effect of NTB was shown.  
Inter-individual Differences Predicting Ignorance 
To assess predictors of decision makers’ stated preference for unveiling 
group membership information, we again first pooled the data, this time from Studies 
2 through 4. When running analyses with the pooled and multiply imputed data, 
predictors were entered by category to enable convergence of the models. First, 
assessing indicators of inclination for ingroup bias, results showed a positive effect of 
group identification (Table 10, Models 1 and 2). From the predictors indicating fairness 
motives, a marginally significant positive effect of aversion to income inequality was 
shown (Table 10, Models 3 and 4). Among the predictors of cognitive style, a negative 
effect of open-minded thinking and a positive effect of conscientiousness (marginally 
significant when omitting control variables) were shown on the likelihood of preferring 
to uncover receivers’ group membership (Table 10, Models 5 and 6). Finally, from the 
group of predictors related to belief-dependent preferences, a marginally significant 
negative effect of subscription to traditional values was shown (Table 10, Models 7 
and 8). In sum, this analysis showed that people who identified more with the in- vs. 
outgroup, who advocated more equality in income distributions or who were highly 
conscientious were more likely to have a preference for unveiling group membership 
information, while decision makers with a high open-minded thinking score and those 
subscribing to traditional values were less likely to want to know receivers’ group 
membership.  
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Summary 
Over all models several effects were continuously at least marginally 
significant and showed the same directionality. The effects of group identification, 
aversion to income inequality and conscientiousness were consistently positive, while 
the effect of traditional values was consistently negative, suggesting that these effects 
emerged comparatively reliably.  
General Discussion 
In this work, we presented evidence from two eye tracking and one online 
studies using artificial groups, as well as one lab study with real groups in which we 
demonstrated that (i) group membership was systematically ignored surprisingly 
often, (ii) effectively eliminating ingroup favoritism. Moreover, we found that (iii) 
ignorance was deliberate in nature and associated with both (iv) both inter-individual 
differences and (v) decision makers’ first and second order beliefs about 
discrimination and ignorance. 
Starting out with the realization that group membership information was not 
as self-evidently a part of the decision process as often assumed, this work showed 
that the majority of decision makers remain ignorant to the group membership of their 
counterparts. Moreover, findings suggest that ignorance was active and deliberate in 
nature. Decision makers did not visually attend to group membership information 
although instructed about the availability and location of this piece of information. 
More directly suggesting the deliberate nature of ignorance, stated preference for 
ignorance predicted visual attention to group membership information. Therefore, it 
seems that decision makers actively avoided group membership information to avoid 
ingroup bias, and sought out group membership information to enable discriminating 
choices.  
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Further, we showed that ingroup favoritism critically depended on whether 
decision makers stated interest in group identifying information: those who wanted to 
stay blind showed less ingroup favoritism. In sum, active ignorance of others’ group 
membership was widely prevalent, suggesting that research designs not allowing for 
participants’ ignorance may overestimate both the degree to which decision makers 
generally condition their decisions on others’ group membership, and consequently 
overrate the size of ingroup bias. 
Exploring the roots of ignorance, evidence is presented that ignorance is 
driven to some extent by inter-individual differences. In particular, decision makers 
who identified more strongly with the in- compared to the outgroup were consistently 
more likely to visually attend to group membership information, and more likely to 
state a preference for unveiling others’ group membership, supporting the findings in 
Ockenfels and Werner (2014). Taken together with the deliberate nature of ignorance 
and increased ingroup bias among non-ignorant decision makers the results 
strengthen the evidence on the crucial role of group identification in discrimination. 
Moreover, the results also indicated that aversion to income inequality and 
conscientiousness were related to an increased interest in group information. The 
unexpected direction of the relation of aversion to societal income inequality to an 
increased desire to find out about the matched receivers’ group membership might 
be better understood when considering the operationalization of the measure. 
Participants were asked to indicate which future society they would prefer for their 
fictitious grandchild. Instead of enabling participants to distance themselves and their 
outcomes from the question of income distribution as originally intended by the 
authors (Carlsson et al., 2005), this operationalization may have invoked a focus on 
kinship as a form of social ingroup. Decision makers highly motivated to ensure that 
their fictitious grandchild is well off in a future society with low inequality may at the 
same time be more strongly concerned about the outcomes for other ingroup 
members beyond the scope of family ties, in turn leading to a higher inclination for 
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ingroup bias and an increased preference to unveil receivers’ group membership. The 
findings on conscientiousness are in line with the argument that decision makers may 
use ignorance as a tool to reduce processing needs (see Hertwig & Engel, 2016). 
Conscientiousness is related to decision makers’ desire to be thoroughly informed 
before making a choice, therefore increasing the likelihood of looking up group 
membership. Finally, subscription to traditional values was related to a preference to 
remain ignorant. Traditional values, operationalized through whether participants 
identified with a person who preferred not to attract attention and to stick to 
conventionalized rules, could be related to increased ignorance through capturing the 
conventionalized attitude among Bonn students that discrimination is unfavorable. 
Problematically, the sample size in the studies reported here was insufficient to yield 
more than a first indication of potential inter-individual differences correlated with 
ignorance in social dilemmas. Future investigation in the matter should include large 
scale studies better suited to find stabilized correlation effects (Schönbrodt & Perugini, 
2013). Some effects were volatile and depended strongly on the set of predictors 
within the model. These results should therefore be interpreted cautiously. However, 
given the sample size and the number of expected replications, finding some unstable 
or non-significant effects is not surprising (Maxwell, 2004; Schimmack, 2012). 
Moreover, results showed differences in the directionality of effects of inter-individual 
differences depending on whether visual inattention or stated preference for 
ignorance was the predicted variable. For example, prosociality was associated with 
an increased tendency to visually attend to group membership information in Studies 
1 and 2, speaking in favor of an interpretation that parochial prosocials who are 
motivated to discriminate between the in- and outgroup (De Dreu, 2010) were 
consequently also more likely to access this piece of information. At the same time, 
prosociality was negatively related to stated preferences for uncovering others’ group 
membership in Studies 3 and 4, suggesting that when prosocials had to explicitly 
describe their ignorance preferences, a generalized preference for prosociality 
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independent of group membership (Thielmann & Böhm, 2016) could have been at 
play. This changed effect of prosociality depending on the way in which ignorance 
was operationalized could possibly be driven by social concerns: When decision 
makers had to explicitly state their preference for ignorance, more prosocial people 
may have felt more pressure to make a fair decision. Similarly, the finding could be 
explained from the perspective of dynamic inconsistency over time (Hammond, 1976): 
Prosocials may have been more likely to deal with the anticipated temptation to 
discriminate by choosing a sophisticated strategy to stay blind to group membership 
information when explicitly asked about it. However, without the explicit prompt to 
decide about revealing group membership information, prosocials may have given in 
to their natural search behavior and visually accessed group membership information. 
Building on these two interpretations, an interesting avenue for future research would 
be clarifying the role of prosociality for inattention and ignorance in group contexts. In 
particular, understanding why prosociality was differently related to comparatively 
casual visual inattention than to explicitly intended ignorance would be a promising 
avenue for future research. 
Last, this work showed that first and second order beliefs about 
discrimination and attendance to group membership were associated with ignorance. 
People who uncovered group membership information expected others to be more 
likely to unveil group membership, to discriminate more, and to expect more 
discrimination from them, and were in turn less prosocial to outgroup members. 
These findings invite an interpretation from the belief-dependent preference 
perspective, supporting the notion that ingroup favoritism emerges due to differential 
expectations of cooperative behavior from in- vs. outgroup members. These findings 
are in line with the literature suggesting that guilt aversion drives ingroup bias (Güth, 
Ploner, & Regner, 2009), and by extension also with the Bounded Generalized 
Reciprocity account, positing that ingroup favoritism depends on differential 
expectations of cooperation from in- vs. outgroup members. Therein, the presented 
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evidence not only supports but enriches the literature by explaining ingroup favoritism 
through information search behavior. Interestingly, these findings are inconsistent with 
the moral wiggle room hypothesis, in which contributions are expected to drop when 
information is ignored.  
Overall, this work highlighted the crucial role of attendance to group 
membership information, which had so far rather been taken for granted. Therein, 
evidence calls for further research on the drivers of ignorance. In particular, situation 
specific dependencies of ignorance are unexplored, but could offer a valuable avenue 
in developing interventions to promote fairness in intergroup settings by promoting 
ignorance. While it seems obvious that the central findings of this paper would 
advocate policies such as omitted group membership information in housing or job 
applications, other interventions aimed at changing the expectations of decision 
makers and therefore their preference for ignorance and subsequent ingroup 
favoritism could also be pursued.  
In sum, the present work showed that decision makers sometimes 
deliberately turn away form information revealing others’ group membership, 
effectively eliminating discrimination between in- and outgroup members. Therefore, 
it is not only the case that social cues about others’ group membership are sometimes 
missed due to involuntary neglect. Instead we demonstrated that decision makers 
avoid group membership information to avoid bias in their choices, and unveil others’ 
group membership when they believe discrimination to be more likely and more 
expected by others. Therefore, ignorance to group membership information emerged 
as a crucial piece of the puzzle when it comes to understanding ingroup favoritism in 
social dilemmas.  
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1 
Mixed effect repeated measures logistic regression predicting the odds of making a prosocial 
choice in the money allocation task in Studies 2.1 and 2.2. Model 1 and 3: all observations, Model 
2 and 5: only for trials where participants did not attend to groupID, and Model 3 and 6: only for 
trials where participants did attend to groupID. 
 
  




 Study 2.1  Study 2.2 
    
  
















              
              
 OR z OR z OR z  OR z OR z OR z 
              
              
Group 
(0 = Out-,  
 1 = Ingroup 




4.62*** 20.62 1.15 1.27 15.86*** 23.63 
              
Controls:              
SVO Angle 1.13*** 5.22 1.17*** 5.22 1.19*** 5.53  1.09*** 4.92 1.14 5.65 1.07*** 4.03 
SVO Angle x 
Group 1.02
* 2.44 1.01 0.91 0.99 -0.76  1.02*** 3.97 1.01 1.71 1.01* 2.01 
Item-specific 
Effects YES YES YES 
 YES YES YES 
              
              
Constant 0.22** -3.01 0.17** -2.70 0.15* -2.31  0.76 -0.71 1.37 0.51 0.52 -1.36 
Observations 5544  4179  1365   6468  3537  2931  
              
 
Note. All predictors are centered; + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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Table 2 
Mixed effects repeated measures logistic regression predicting the Odds Ratio of visually attending 
to groupID in the money allocation task in Studies 2.1 and 2.2. 
 
  
 Visual Attendance to GroupID 
  
 
 Study 2.1  Study 2.2 
      
      
 
Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
      
OR z  OR z OR z OR z 
         
         
Inclination for Ingroup Bias:          
Group Identification 2.29** 3.30  1.62+ 1.66 1.39 1.04 1.35 0.56 
Group Attitude 1.03 0.13  1.39 1.31 1.22 0.71 1.32 0.58 
NTB    0.33* -1.98 0.26* -2.05 0.76 -0.22 
SDO    3.97+ 1.85 3.47 1.44 21.28+ 1.94 
          
Fairness Motives:          
SVO Angle 1.04 1.51  1.05* 2.01 1.04 1.41 1.37* 2.19 
Machiavellianism    0.93 -0.14 0.69 -0.58 0.72 -0.34 
Aversion to Income Inequality      8.68+ 1.78 0.51 -0.43 
Inequality Aversion        0.27 -0.51 
          
Controls:          
Trial 0.97*** -8.03  0.98*** -13.18 0.97*** -12.01 0.98*** -6.13 
          
          
Constant 0.02*** -5.13  0.33 -0.44 2.90 0.36 0.01* -2.29 
Observations 5760   6473  5193  2473  
  
 
Note. + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Significant effects are marked in bold. Results also held when 
additionally controlling for item-specific effects. Collinearity diagnostics revealed no Variance Inflation Factor above 4. 
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Table 3.  
Mixed effect repeated measures logistic regression predicting the odds of making prosocial 
choices in the money allocation task in Study 2.2. Model 1: only for participants later choosing to 
remain blind to the matched receiver’s group membership in the dictator game. Model 2: only for 
participants later choosing to unveil the matched receiver’s group membership in the dictator game. 
 
   
 Prosocial Decision (Money Allocation Task) 
   
    Model 1: Model 2: 
 Ignorance No Ignorance 
   
    OR z OR z 
     
     
Group (0 = Out-, 1 = Ingroup) 3.05*** 12.79 13.97*** 15.71 
     
Controls     
SVO Angle 1.10*** 4.55 1.08** 2.62 
SVO Angle x Group 1.01* 2.15 1.02+ 1.71 
Item-specific Effects YES YES 
     
     
Constant 0.89 -0.25 0.43 -1.15 
Observations 4774  1694  
     
 
Note. All predictors are centered; + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table 5.  
Mixed effect repeated measures logistic regression predicting the odds of making prosocial 
choices in the money allocation task in Study 2.3. Model 1: for all participants. Model 2: only for 
participants later choosing to remain blind to the matched receiver’s group membership in the 
dictator game. Model 3: only for participants later choosing to unveil the matched receiver’s group 
membership in the dictator game.  
 
    
 Prosocial Decision (Money Allocation Task) 
    
     Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: 
 Overall Ignorance No Ignorance 
    
     OR z OR z OR z 
       
       
Group (0 = Out-, 1 = Ingroup) 2.80*** 9.01 2.22*** 5.87 5.60*** 7.48 
       
Controls:       
SVO Angle 1.19*** 12.40 1.22*** 11.35 1.14*** 4.60 
SVO Angle x Group 1.01 0.72 1.01 1.40 0.98 -1.03 
Item-specific Effects YES YES YES 
       
       
Constant 1.44 1.31 1.89+ 1.90 0.61 -0.96 
Observations 4014  3204  810  
       
 
Note. All predictors are centered; + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Results held when controlling for 
manipulations of group reinforcement (direct vs. delayed) and group info (first vs. last), as well as for whether 
participants self-categorized. 
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Table 6.  
Linear regression predicting giving in the dictator game in Study 2.3. Model 1: for all participants; 
Model 2: only when group membership of the matched receiver was not revealed; Model 3: only 
when the matched receiver was an ingroup member; Model 4: only when the matched receiver 
was an outgroup member. 
 
     
 Dictator Game Giving 
     
      Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: Model 4: 
 Overall Anonymous Ingroup Outgroup 
     
      β t β t β t β t 
        
        
Unveil GroupID  
(0 = No, 1 = Yes) -3.38 -1.22 0.83 0.18 -0.09 -0.01 -8.83
* -2.06 
         
Controls:         
SVO Angle 0.95*** 12.20 1.12*** 8.26 0.94*** 6.06 0.87*** 7.15 
         
         
Constant 22.12*** 19.88 22.45*** 11.79 20.12*** 9.67 23.69*** 12.84 
Observations 223  71  69  83  
         
 
Note. All predictors are centered; + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table 7.  
Mixed effect repeated measures logistic regression predicting the odds of making prosocial 
choices in the money allocation task in Study 2.4. Model 1: for all participants. Model 2: only for 
participants later choosing to remain blind to the matched receiver’s group membership in the 
dictator game. Model 3: only for participants later choosing to unveil the matched receiver’s group 
membership in the dictator game. 
 
    
 Prosocial Decision (Money Allocation Task) 
    
     Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: 
 Overall Ignorance No Ignorance 
    
     OR z OR z OR z 
       
       
Group (0 = Out-, 1 = Ingroup) 1.68*** 8.56 1.55 *** 5.92 1.90*** 5.57 
       
Controls:       
SVO Angle 1.10*** 7.93 1.09*** 5.55 1.12*** 5.25 
SVO Angle x Group 1.00 -0.83 1.00 0.73 0.99+ -1.67 
Item-specific Effects YES YES YES 
       
       
Constant 1.34 0.97 1.40 0.94 1.37 0.55 
Observations 7820  5512  2308  
       
 
Note. All predictors are centered; + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Results held when controlling for the 
group info (first vs. last) manipulation. 
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Table 8.  
Linear regression predicting giving in the dictator game in Study 2.4. Model 1: for all participants; 
Model 2: only when group membership of the matched receiver was not revealed; Model 3: only 
when the matched receiver was an ingroup member; Model 4: only when the matched receiver 
was an outgroup member. 
 
     
 Dictator Game Giving 
     
      Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: Model 4: 
 Overall Anonymous Ingroup Outgroup 
     
      β t β t β t β t 
        
        
Unveil GroupID  
(0 = No, 1 = Yes) -7.29
* -1.22 -11.24+ -1.79 -3.08 -0.46 -9.74 -1.57 
         
Controls:         
SVO Angle 0.78*** 6.33 0.88*** 3.97 0.68** 3.35 0.89*** 2.76 
         
         
Constant 31.70*** 20.01 29.58*** 9.66 34.36*** 12.23 31.06*** 10.59 
Observations 98  35  32  31  
         
 
Note. All predictors are centered; + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table 9.  
Multivariate linear regressions predicting the proportion of trials in which Group ID was visually 
attended, based on pooled and multiply imputed data from Studies 2.1 and 2.2. Model 1: without 
control variables. Model 2: with control variables. 
 
     
 Visual Attention to GroupID 
   
   
 Model 1 Model 2 
     
     
 β t β t 
      
     
Inclination for Ingroup Bias:     
Group Identification 0.08** 3.09 0.08** 3.11 
Group Attitude -0.00 -0.10 -0.01 -0.29 
NTB -0.10 -1.59 -0.10+ -1.73 
SDO 0.11 1.40 0.11 1.41 
     
Fairness Motives:     
SVO Angle 0.00 1.40 0.00 1.09 
Machiavellianism -0.04 -0.62 -0.03 -0.64 
Aversion to Income Inequality 0.16 1.34 0.15 1.33 
Inequality Aversion -0.10 -0.53 -0.10 -0.53 
      
     
Controls NO  YES  
Constant 0.36 1.34 0.19 -0.71 
Observations 156  156  
      
 
Note. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Significant effects are marked in bold. A dummy-coded variable for study 
number is entered as a control variable where indicated. 
  





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1. Example of a trial in the money allocation task. Note: font sizes were smaller and 
spaces between pieces of information were larger than displayed here. 
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Figure 2. Probability of making prosocial choices in the money allocation task when facing in- 
or outgroup members depending on SVO. Separate for all trials, trials in which group ID was 
unattended, and trials in which groupID was seen. Panel A: Study 2.1. Panel B: Study 2.2. 
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Figure 3. Probability of making prosocial choices in the money allocation task when facing in- 
or outgroup members depending on SVO and the preference to unveil the group membership 
of a player matched in the later dictator game. Panel A: Study 2.2. Panel B: Study 2.3. Panel 
C: Study 2.4.
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Figure 4. Dictator game giving when the identity was (not) unveiled in accordance with 
participants’ preferences, with means and 95% confidence intervals. Panel A: Study 2.1. Panel 
B: Study 2.2. Panel C: Study 2.3. 
 
  




Figure 5. Dictator game giving depending on the preference to unveil the group membership of 
the receiver, with means and 95% confidence intervals. Panel A: Study 2.3. Panel B: Study 2.4. 
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Figure 6. First and second order beliefs in the dictator game depending on the preference to 
unveil the group membership of the receiver, with means and 95% confidence intervals. Panel 
A: first order belief of which percentage of participants would choose to unveil the matched 
receiver’s group membership (Study 2.3). Panel B: mean expectation of discrimination 
depending on group membership in the dictator game (Study 2.3) Panel C: second order belief 
of which percentage of participants expect discrimination depending on group membership in 
the dictator game (Study 2.3). Panel D: first order belief of which percentage of participants 
would choose to unveil the matched receiver’s group membership (Study 2.4). Panel E: mean 
expectation of discrimination depending on group membership in the dictator game (Study 2.4) 
Panel F: second order belief of which percentage of participants expect discrimination 
depending on group membership in the dictator game (Study 2.4).  
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Chapter 3 
Social Value Orientation  
Determines Decision Effort in  









This chapter is based on Rahal, R., Fiedler, S., & De Dreu, C. K. W. (in preparation). 
Social Value Orientation Determines Decision Effort in Intergroup Dictator Games: An 
Eye tracking Analysis. https://bit.ly/2qJDqjB  
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Abstract 
Ingroup favoritism and discrimination against the outgroup are pervasive in 
social interactions. Here, we show how people arrive at the decision to be more 
generous to members of their own group by examining the cognitive processes 
underlying decision making in intergroup settings via eye tracking. In two studies, we 
investigated how people weight own and others’ outcomes in decomposed dictator 
games when facing in- or outgroup members, and whether they are biased to invest 
more effort to inform their decision when ingroup members were concerned. We 
report systematic differences in information search effort, specifically increased 
response times and number of fixations, and more inspected information with 
increasingly prosocial SVO and when facing the in- vs. outgroup. Only individualistic 
decision makers invested relatively less effort into information search when making 
outgroup decisions, whereas with increasing SVO, decision makers showed more 
similar effort for in- and outgroup decisions. Implications for intergroup research and 
resolutions for intergroup conflict are discussed. 
Keywords: ingroup favoritism, cognitive processes, decision making, social 
preferences, eye tracking 
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Social Value Orientation Determines Decision Effort in Intergroup Dictator Games: 
An Eye tracking Analysis 
When it comes to cooperation, it is no secret that people are often biased. 
Whether in team sports, business, or political negotiations, decision makers face 
complex situations demanding a decision between maximizing their personal gain, 
being prosocial towards their team members, or even cooperating with members of 
the opposing team. In a variety of circumstances, and even when group membership 
is determined by random allocation (Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel et al., 1971), intergroup 
contexts coax people into favoring their ingroup (Hewstone et al., 2002), helping their 
group and its individual members to survive and prosper. People trust their ingroup 
more (Glaeser et al., 2000), work harder to accomplish their ingroup’s goals (Ellemers 
et al., 2004; Worchel et al., 1998), and are more inclined to make personally costly 
contributions to their ingroup, rather than to members of an outgroup (Balliet et al., 
2014). Although ingroup favoritism benefits the ingroup and its members, it often also 
leads to resentment, feelings of deprivation, and hostility against the disadvantaged 
outgroup (De Dreu, Aaldering, & Saygi, 2015; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010; Hewstone et 
al., 2002). 
Tracking Ingroup Favoritism in Decision Making 
Ingroup favoritism is a core component of prominent theories of intergroup 
relations (Hogg, 2000; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Yamagishi et al., 1999) and is robustly 
found in behavior in a range of domains (Balliet et al., 2014; Everett, Faber, & Crockett, 
2015). Moreover, the human cognitive and neural landscape appears designed for 
ingroup favoring behavior. Previous research shows that ingroup members relative to 
outgroup members are not only favored in decision-making, but are also evaluated 
more positively (Brewer, 1979; LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Mullen et al., 1992; Perdue 
et al., 1990) and are the subject of more extensive processing (Van Bavel, Packer, & 
Cunningham, 2008).  
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Heretofore sparsely addressed, however, are the cognitive processes 
through which decision makers form personally costly choices benefitting members 
of one’s ingroup rather than those of a rivaling outgroup. Taking a cognitive 
processing perspective on decision making in intergroup contexts facilitates looking 
beyond choice outcomes to the construction of the decision itself. Therein, 
investigating processes can illuminate how situational settings and personality factors 
influence the way decision makers form their choices, even if the choice outcomes 
are the same. Here, we focus on studying two facets of the decision making process 
in intergroup settings. First, how do people weight their own outcomes and those of 
other people, when being confronted with an intergroup context? In other words, 
people may differ in the degree to which they weight their personal benefits in relation 
to their counterpart, depending on whether the beneficiary of a prosocial act belongs 
to one’s own group or an outgroup. Knowing the beneficiary is from one’s ingroup 
may reduce interest in and searching for information on one’s own costs, whereas 
this becomes particularly important when the beneficiary is from the outgroup. 
Moreover, not only which information is attended to, but also the extent to which 
information is searched and processed may strongly impact the final decision. Hence, 
the second aim of this paper is to investigate if people invest more effort to learn about 
the consequences of their decision when facing an in- rather than an outgroup 
member. When contemplating their choice towards an ingroup beneficiary, people 
may be more careful to inform their choice to ensure good outcomes, thoroughly 
assessing the options rather than making a quick pick.  
Understanding the mechanism of how people decide to benefit in- and 
outgroup members is an important step towards designing interventions to reduce 
ingroup favoritism and respectively increasing fairness in a variety of social 
interactions, such as hiring decisions, school admissions, or housing allocations. 
Ultimately, understanding cognitive processes is pivotal for the design of informed 
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policy aimed at reducing intergroup discrimination, fraternal deprivation, and 
intergroup hostility.  
Here, inspired by recent developments in cognitive psychology and 
macroeconomics to turn to the underlying mechanisms of prosocial decisions 
depending on individual and contextual differences (Mischkowski & Glöckner, 2016; 
Rand, Newman, & Wurzbacher, 2015) and building on theoretical frameworks like drift 
diffusion models (Klauer, Voss, Schmitz, & Teige-Mocigemba, 2007; Lee & Cummins, 
2004; Wagenmakers, Ratcliff, Gomez, & McKoon, 2008), we  investigated the 
cognitive processes underlying ingroup favoritism using eye tracking. Eye tracking 
allows tracing overt attention allocation through recording gaze behavior during visual 
information search. It shows what is processed at a specific point in time, how much 
attention is allocated to specific pieces of information, and how much information is 
surveyed overall. Eye tracking has been utilized as a means of understanding 
underlying mechanisms that drive observable behavior beginning with the seminal 
work of Russo and Rosen (1975) as well as Just and Carpenter (1976). Gaze 
recordings are particularly interesting in the context of decision making, because one 
specific piece of information might be crucial only in certain situations and for only a 
specific subsample of people. The proportion of attention allocated towards or 
nonattendance of a specific piece of information function as a measure for the weight 
given to it during decision formation (Fiedler & Glöckner, 2012; Kawakami et al., 2014; 
Raab & Johnson, 2007; Reisen, Hoffrage, & Mast, 2008). Moreover, the extent of 
information search (i.e., number of fixations) as a measure of the depth of processing 
can be used as an index for cognitive conflict and uncertainty (in the context of 
expected value differences in risky choices Fiedler & Glöckner, 2012; Jacob & Karn, 
2003 as an example in visual search tasks, and). Recording how information search 
unfolds over the course of the decision making process can shed light on the utility 
function underlying behavior, by identifying to which extent information is acquired 
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and integrated into a decision (Krajbich et al., 2010; Krajbich & Rangel, 2011; Russo 
& Leclerc, 1994). 
Investigations of information acquisition have already proven valuable for 
understanding complex behavior involving the wellbeing of others. For instance, 
(Fiedler et al., 2013) show in simple resource allocation tasks as well as more complex 
public good games that prosocial or selfish orientations are accompanied by 
differences in gaze behavior. This connection between attention allocation and 
underlying utility functions allows inferences on the importance and weight assigned 
to specific pieces of information during decision formation. Overall, the use of eye 
tracking investigations of visual information search has contributed significantly to our 
understanding of decision making and economic behavior. Here, we used eye tracking 
to illuminate the cognitive processes driving a previously unstudied area of decision 
making. In the intergroup context, we address two specific questions: First, are own 
vs. others’ outcomes weighted differently when facing an interdependent in- vs. 
outgroup member in a social dilemma situation, and second, does effort invested into 
informing one’s choice differ in in- and outgroup situations?  
Information Search and Social Preferences in Intergroup Contexts 
When making decisions that affect the outcomes of others, people attach 
differential weight to their own outcomes, and to those of others. Such weighting can 
be formally captured in mathematical utility models including the utility derived from 
personal outcomes and from the outcomes received by others (Messick & 
McClintock, 1968). The simplest model represents utility U in terms of the tradeoff 
between own and others’ payoffs as differences in the respective decision weights 
wself and wother : 
! =	$%&' × (own payoff)+$%*+,- × (others'payoff). (3) 
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Influence of SVO on Choices and Attention to Own Outcomes. A large body of 
literature indicates that the preferences for resource allocations between oneself and 
another person as captured in this utility function are chronic personality traits. 
Anchored in classic work by Messick and McClintock (1968), such chronic social 
preferences are referred to as Social Value Orientation (Messick & McClintock, 1968; 
Murphy & Ackermann, 2013; Murphy et al., 2011; van Lange, 1999). Pro-social types, 
who weight both their own and others’ outcomes highly, are expected to make more 
prosocial choices than individualistic types, who assign weight only to their own 
outcome (HChoice1).  
Moreover, these chronic differences in weights have been shown to be 
mirrored in attention. For gazes, Fiedler et al. (Fiedler et al., 2013) showed that 
decision weights derived from individual SVO are reflected in attention to own vs. 
others’ outcomes Prosocial types paid more attention to others’ outcomes than more 
selfish individuals.  
Influence of Group Setting on Choices and Attention to Own Outcomes. Building on 
this basic model, to capture choices and attention in group situations, which are 
motivated additionally by the social norm to favor cooperation with the ingroup, we 
add a factor	!, capturing changes in the relative weights assigned to own and others’ 
outcomes conditional on the respective intergroup situation: 
! =	$%&' × (own payoff)+ / ×  $%*+,- × (others'payoff), (4) 
where / =	 0 									1,	ingroup0 < 5 < 1,	outgroup.  
In ingroup situations, the relative weight people assign to others’ outcomes 
is highest, whereas in outgroup situations, the relative weight assigned to others’ 
payoffs should be lower, resulting in ingroup favoring choices (HChoice2, Balliet et al., 
2014).  
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Influence of the Interplay of SVO and Group Setting on Choices and Attention to 
Own Outcomes. Importantly, however, we examined the interplay of social preferences 
and other’s group membership in choices and gaze behavior. Prior evidence suggests 
that in intergroup competition, prosocials show stronger behavioral ingroup favoritism 
than individualists (Aaldering, Greer, Van Kleef, & De Dreu, 2013; Abbink, Brandts, 
Herrmann, & Orzen, 2012; De Dreu, 2010; De Dreu, Dussel, & Velden, 2015; 
Thielmann & Böhm, 2016). Hence, we expected that prosocials would show stronger 
ingroup favoritism (HChoice3) as well as a larger parallel attention shift away from own 
outcomes between in- vs. outgroup situations compared to individualists (HAttention), 
given that decision makers attend more to information that receives a higher weight 
in their utility function.  
Information Search Effort. Beyond differences in the locus of attention, that is 
in the specific information people seek out before they make their choice, information 
search differences can also manifest in the effort invested to survey the information 
available, that is in the extent to which people search and process information to 
inform their choice. When two decision alternatives are assigned similar utilities, 
people have to invest more time and effort to make a choice. However, when one 
option clearly dominates the other in terms of the utility assigned, decisions are faster 
and less effortful. The theoretical basis for this link between utility differences and 
information search are attentional drift diffusion models (Krajbich et al., 2010). ADDMs 
posit that information is accumulated in a stochastic process and integrated to identify 
the best option, i.e. the option whose calculated Relative Decision Value (RDV) 
exceeds a certain decision threshold. The model captures the speed of evidence 
accumulation over time in the drift rate parameter, which depends on utility differences 
between the choice options. When the differences in utilities are large, the evidence 
sampled is relatively more diagnostic for the RDV, which therefore changes more 
drastically over time. In choice sets with large utility differences, the drift rate is 
therefore steeper compared to choice options with small differences in values 
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(Cavanagh, Wiecki, Kochar, & Frank, 2014; Ratcliff & Frank, 2012). Consequently, 
when a strong preference for one choice option exists, less effort is required to make 
a decision than when preferences are weak (Krajbich & Dean, 2015).  
In the context of allocation decisions, where alternatives differ with regard to 
the payoffs allocated to oneself and another person, drift rates depend on social 
preferences. Since pure individualists place weight only on their own outcomes, but 
prosocials consider both own and others’ outcomes, facing a relatively smaller utility 
difference between the options, more effort should be invested in information search 
with increasing deviation from individualistic SVO towards cooperativeness. Similarly, 
since outgroup outcomes are discounted in accordance with Equation 4, choices in 
which decision makers face an ingroup member should be made with a comparatively 
higher decision effort. 
Importantly, we expected an interaction of SVO and group membership on 
information search effort based on Equation 4. Since prosocials’ utility difference 
between the choice options would be more affected by the presence of an in- vs. 
outgroup member than individualists’ utility,21 we expected that prosocials would 
present with larger differences in processing effort between the in- and outgroup 
setting. We measured this expected pattern of effort changes via decision times 
(HEffort1), the number of fixations (HEffort2), and the amount of inspected information 
(HEffort3). This assumes that this cognitive effort increases the processing time required 
                                               
21 For a numerical example, consider an individualist with the utility function U = 0.9(own payoff) + 
0.1(others’ payoff), and prosocial with the utility function U = 0.5(own payoff) + 0.5(others’ payoff), 
as well as two exemplary choice options, Option A with the outcomes (7;1) and Option B with the 
outcomes (5;3). When matched with an ingroup member, the individualist’s utility difference is 1.6, 
while the prosocial’s utility difference is 0. When matched with an outgroup member (assuming the 
outgroup discounting factor β = 0.5), the individualist’s difference in utility between the options is 
1.7, while the prosocial’s utility difference between the options is 0.5, indicating a larger change in 
the utility difference between the in- and outgroup setting for the prosocial decision maker. 
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to make a choice (Bettman et al., 1990), because decision makers require more 
fixations (Krajbich et al., 2010, 2012; Krajbich & Rangel, 2011) and must take more 
pieces of information into consideration (Fielder et al., 2013) to reach a decision when 
choice difficulty is high. 
Research Strategy 
In sum, we used fine-grained analyses of the cognitive processes in 
intergroup contexts to directly investigate the formation of decisions in such contexts, 
and to elucidate potential differences in how underlying utility functions and decision 
weights are reflected in different processing of cues while facing an in- or an outgroup 
member. In two studies, we therefore investigated information search in in- and 
outgroup situations depending on individuals SVO via eye tracking in a repeated money 
allocation task. Hypotheses for confirmatory testing were pre-registered on the Open 
Science Framework before conducting the experiments (https://osf.io/wf5zy/  and 
https://osf.io/q8dfk/).  
Study 3.1 
Material & Methods 
Participants and Design. Eighty-four participants (110 participants were invited 
in accordance with the pre-registration, 55.95% women, Mage = 24.82, SDage = 6.76) 
took part in the study. Participants (mainly students) were recruited from the 
DecisionLab subject pool in Bonn, Germany, via the database system ORSEE 
(Greiner, 2015). 
The study was conducted in a SVO x 2 (group setting: ingroup vs. outgroup) 
mixed design. We first assessed participants’ SVO, followed by a manipulation of 
group membership. Participants then made repeated decisions regarding the 
allocation of money to themselves and another participant, where the other 
participants’ group membership varied (within-subjects factor). 
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The study took about 40 min to complete, and was performed in accordance 
with the DecisionLab’s regulations (no deception, full incentivization). Informed 
consent was obtained from all subjects. Participants’ payoff depended on one 
randomly selected allocation made in the online SVO pre-test, their group’s 
performance in a team task, as well as one randomly selected monetary allocation 
during the in-lab experiment. A random mechanism determined if payoff from the SVO 
task was realized as the dictator or the receiver, and consequently payoff from the 
money allocation task was realized in the respective other role. Payoffs ranged from 
5.30 € to 13.80 € (M = 9.52€, SD = 2.15€). 
Stimulus Material and Procedure. In the first stage of the study, administered 
online via unipark (www.unipark.de), we first assessed participants’ SVO with the SVO 
Slider Measure (Murphy et al., 2011), where they indicated for six monetary allocation 
problems between themselves and another person which one out of the options 
presented they preferred. From participants’ choices, we computed the SVO angle 
as a continuous measure of social preference by taking the inverse tangent of the 
proportion between average payoffs allocated to themselves and others, each 
reduced by 50. Based on the SVO angle, participants frequently have been 
categorized into prosocials (22.45° < SVO° < 57.15°) and individualists (-12.04° < 
SVO° < 22.45°). 
Then, to manipulate group membership with an adaptation of the Kandinsky-
or-Klee procedure (Tajfel et al., 1971), participants were shown 10 clippings of 
paintings, displaying 5 pairs of paintings (Chen & Li, 2009) by Kandinsky (Subdued 
Glow, 1928, Dreamy Improvisation, 1913, Landscape with Red Splashes I, 1913, 
Gentle Ascent, 1934, Development in Brown, 1933) and Klee (Gebirgsbildung, 1924, 
Warning of the Ships, 1917, Dry-cool Garden, 1921, A hoffmannesque Tale, 1921, 
The Vase, 1938). Each pair consisted of one Kandinsky and one Klee clipping, and 
presentation order was randomized. While participants were not informed of the 
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painter, they indicated their liking of each painting presented (1 = dislike very much; 7 
= like very much, (Pinter & Greenwald, 2010). Based on their preferences, participants 
were then assigned to two groups: Giants (preference for Klee) or Titans (preference 
for Kandinsky), and informed of their group membership. 
At least twelve hours after completing the online questionnaire, participants 
began the second stage of the study in the lab, where they were first introduced to a 
group reinforcement task. To reinforce group membership through experiencing 
common fate and group-level interdependence (Böhm, Rockenbach, & Weiss, 2013; 
Tajfel & Turner, 1986), participants took part in a group competition. In a simplified 
version of the Serial Reaction Time Task (Nissen & Bullemer, 1987), participants were 
instructed to indicate the position of an asterisk shown randomly in one of four 
locations on the screen as quickly and accurately as possible. They were told that 
their reaction time would be added to their group’s total reaction time, and that every 
error they made would add 5 additional seconds to the group’s total, whereas finishing 
with less than 5 errors would reduce the group’s total by 50 seconds. At the end of 
each session, the running total of the groups’ reaction times was compared, and all 
members of the winning group with a lower running total received a bonus payoff of 
3€. 
Afterwards, participants underwent the calibration procedures to set up the 
eye tracking devices. To assess decision behavior, participants played 80 rounds of 
2-person money allocation tasks (minimal dictator games) and received information 
about the group membership of their respective partner for each trial. To manipulate 
the group setting, participants were assigned to one of two within-subject conditions: 
for 40 money allocations (28 target trials, 12 filler trials) their decisions concerned an 
ingroup member; and for another 40 money allocations their decisions concerned an 
outgroup member. The order of the trials was randomized. In each trial, participants 
decided between two options of allocating money between themselves and another 
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participant, and for each option were shown how this decision could affect their own 
payoff, the other person’s payoff, what the differences and sums of their own and the 
other person’s payoff would be (Figure 7). In each trial, participants could give up a 
certain amount of their own payoff that they would receive in the selfish option, to 
benefit the other player by choosing the prosocial option. In both options, they 
remained ahead of the other player in terms of payoffs. In the target trials, own payoffs 
varied between 2.40€ and 10€ (option 1: M = 7.37, SD = 2.02, option 2: M = 7.34, 
SD = 1.87), others’ payoffs varied between 0.10€ and 7.80 € (option 1: M = 3.11, SD 
= 2.22, option 2: M = 3.19, SD = 2.16). Information on group membership of the 
matched player was presented with each trial and was embedded in less diagnostic 
information about the other person: whether the other player had received heads or 
tails in a coin toss and which number they had drawn from an urn containing the 
numbers 1 to 40. Therefore, the other player could be identified, but remained 
anonymous. The order in which the information about the other participants was 
presented and the order of payoff relevant information was randomized.  
Eye movements were recorded during this task with the eye gaze binocular 
system (LC Technologies) with remote binocular sampling rate of 120Hz and an 
accuracy of about 0.45˚. Decision options were presented on monitors with a native 
resolution of 1280x1024 pixels and a refresh rate of 60 Hz (Samsung SyncMaster 
740B (17 in, response time 8ms), Samsung SyncMaster 931BF (18 in, response time 
2ms), Asus VB195T (18 in, response time 5ms)). 
Finally, participants completed two checks on the group association 
manipulation and on experimental demand. To check the group association 
manipulation, participants indicated their explicit identification (1 = strongly disagree, 
7 = strongly agree) with their in- and outgroups on eight items (“I identify with the group 
Giants [Titans]”, “I see myself as a member of the group Giants [Titans]”, “I am glad 
to be a member of the group Giants [Titans]”, “I feel strong ties with the group Giants 
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[Titans]”, (Doosje et al., 1995). Finally, participants indicated their explicit attitude 
towards their in- and outgroups on four items (“I like the group Giants [Titans]”, “The 
group Giants [Titans] is good”, (Pinter & Greenwald, 2010). To assess the extent to 
which participants felt their decisions were pressured by experimental demand or 
where made freely, they indicated in an open question whether and why they deviated 
from their typical preferences while completing the study.  Lastly, participants were 
debriefed, and received a payoff according to their choices made in the experiment. 
Results 
Data Pre-Processing. We defined three types of areas of interests (AOI) to 
assess fixations. AOIs containing payoff information or information on the identity of 
the second person involved in the decision were defined as 100x100 pixels in size. 
AOIs containing labels describing the payoff information on the left side of the decision 
screens were contained by AOIs of 100x190 pixels. Fixations were identified with a 30 
pixel tolerance in the summed deviation of points’ maximum and minimum 
coordinates on the x- and y-axes and a minimum duration of 50ms (Salvucci & 
Goldberg, 2000).  
Data from two participants had to be excluded because of missing gaze 
recordings. As specified in the pre-registration, trials in which participants allocated 
less than 50% of their fixations towards payoff and identifying information (2.99%), as 
well as trials in which decision times were shorter than 200ms and longer than 3 
standard deviations above the overall mean decision time (1.91%) were excluded from 
further analysis to ensure high quality data. Overall, 85.01% of all observations were 
retained for further analyses. Additionally, one participant’s data was excluded 
because they indicated that they decided against their personal preferences during 
the experiment. Further, data was excluded if participants failed to correctly indicate 
their outgroup, if they identified more with their outgroup than with their ingroup or 
liked the outgroup better than the ingroup (8 participants in total).  
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To determine if participants attended to the group membership of the other 
player in the dictator game, all gazes to the AOI containing this information, regardless 
of the fixation duration, were considered. Trials were excluded if participants paid no 
attention to group membership information. Data from 55 participants was retained 
for further analyses. 
Choice Behavior. First analyzing choice behavior, a mixed effects repeated 
measures logistic regression using centered variables was conducted, predicting 
prosocial choices from SVO angle, the group setting (ingroup vs. outgroup) and their 
interaction while controlling for the percentage of monetary disadvantage incurred 
when making the prosocial choice and the decision efficiency (Table 11, Model 1). 
Supporting HChoice1, a main effect for SVO angle was found, indicating that participants 
with increasing deviation from pure individualism in the direction of prosociality made 
more prosocial choices than individualists. Analyzing the choice behavior of all 
participants for in- and outgroup decisions, the odds of deciding prosocially increased 
by a factor of 27.07 when participants had been matched with an ingroup instead of 
an outgroup member, supporting HChoice2. Both effects were qualified by a significant 
interaction of SVO angle and group setting, supporting HChoice3: while individualists 
made similarly few prosocial choices in both group settings, we observed more 
prosocial participants making more prosocial choices in the ingroup than in the 
outgroup setting (Figure 8, Panel A). The effect held when also including trials in which 
the receivers’ group membership was not attended to (Table 11, Model 2). 
Attention to Own Outcomes. We ran a mixed effects repeated measures 
linear regression, predicting the proportion of attention to own payoffs from SVO angle, 
group setting as well as the respective interaction (Table 12, Model 1). Results showed a 
significant main effect of SVO angle, indicating that with increasing deviation from 
individualism towards prosociality, participants paid proportionally less attention to 
their own payoffs. Moreover, results showed a significant main effect of group setting, 
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indicating that in ingroup compared to outgroup settings, participants proportionally 
attended less to their own payoffs. Finally, an interaction effect between SVO angle and 
group setting was present, which, against our original hypothesis (HAttention), indicated 
a larger attention shift away from own outcomes between the in- and outgroup setting 
for individualists than for prosocials (Figure 9, Panel A).  
Effort in Information Search. We ran three mixed effects repeated measures 
linear regressions, predicting effort in information search operationalized via (i) 
decision times (Table 12, Model 2), (ii) number of fixations (Table 12, Model 3), and (iii) 
number of inspected information (Table 12, Model 4). As predictors, SVO angle, group 
setting as well as the respective interaction were used. Results showed a significant main 
effect of SVO angle, indicating that with increasing deviation from individualism 
towards prosociality, participants showed higher decision effort. They (i) took longer 
to make decisions, (ii) had more fixations and (iii) inspected more information. Results 
further showed a significant main effect of group setting, indicating that in ingroup 
compared to outgroup settings, effort was increased, as reflected by (i) longer 
decision times, (ii) a higher fixation count, and (iii) a higher number of inspected 
information. Finally, we found an interaction effect between SVO angle and group 
setting for all three effort measures. Results revealed that individualists displayed the 
pattern expected for in- vs. outgroup decision effort, since they (i) invested less time, 
(ii) showed fewer fixations, and (iii) inspected less information when making a decision 
concerning the outgroup than when the ingroup was concerned. In contrast to our 
initially derived predictions that prosocials should show bigger differences in 
information search effort between the in- and outgroup settings compared to 
individualists (HEffort1, HEffort2, and HEffort3), we found reduced differences in effort 
between in- vs. outgroup settings among prosocial participants (Figure 10).  
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Summary Study 3.1 
In Study 3.1, individual differences in social preferences and the other 
players’ group membership influenced choice and information search behavior. We 
uncovered that an increase in individuals’ prosociality was accompanied by more 
prosocial choices, by a systematic increase in the attention allocated to others’ payoff 
and by an increase in information search effort, extending previous findings to the 
intergroup context. In particular, we observed a reduction of the proportion of 
attention spent on own payoffs and an increase in the extent of information search 
when facing an ingroup rather than an outgroup member. In contrast to the initially 
derived process hypotheses, the interaction effect between the intergroup context 
and the individual social preference led to a greater reduction in attention to own vs. 
others' outcomes for individualists compared to prosocials, and strong ingroup 
favoritism in processing effort for individualists, but a smaller difference in processing 
effort between in- and outgroup settings for highly prosocial individuals. Given the 
surprising results concerning the attention and effort hypotheses and the prevalence 
of trials in which participants did not attend group membership information, we 
replicated and extended the design of Study 3.1 in a follow-up study.  
Study 3.2 
In Study 3.2, we introduced a stronger group manipulation to increase the 
proportion of trials where group membership was assessed and respectively increase 
power of the analyses of choice and gaze behavior. Further, this change allowed us 
to assess the robustness of the findings to a different group manipulation procedure. 
Material & Methods 
Participants and Design. Ninety-eight participants (in accordance with the pre-
registration, participants were invited to participate until we had reached 90 valid 
observations of eye gaze, 65.31% women, Mage = 20.67, SDage = 3.09, 
sociodemographic data missing from four participants) took part in the study. 
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Participants were recruited as in Study 3.1, and compensated as previously, with an 
additional flat payment given the longer duration of the sessions. Payoffs ranged from 
6.00€ to 18.30€ (M = 11.73€, SD = 2.74€). 
Stimulus Material and Procedure. In the first stage of the study, administered 
online via unipark, we again assessed participants’ social value orientation with the 
SVO Slider Measure (Murphy et al., 2011), as well as a set of other personality 
characteristics (assessed in Study 2 of Rahal, De Dreu & Fiedler (in preparation); see 
https://bit.ly/2ERcmCV).  
Group membership was manipulated with a procedure adapted from Simon 
and Brown (1987). Participants were shown 12 color boards (3 clearly blue, 3 clearly 
green, 6 an ambiguous mixture of blue and green) and asked to indicate their 
perception of each color board as blue or green. Based on their perceptions, 
participants were then assigned to two groups: Giants (indication of more blue colors) 
and Titans (indication of more green colors). To increase the relevance of the group 
and reinforce group membership, each participant also received a secret group 
password. They were asked to protect the secrecy of their own group password, and 
told that if they spied out the other teams’ password they would receive an additional 
group bonus of 1€. 
At least twelve hours after completing the online questionnaire, participants 
began the second stage of the study in the lab, which was conducted as in Study 
3.1: they completed the group reinforcement task, as well as the money allocation 
task where eye gazes were recorded, and checks on the group association 
manipulation and on experimental demand. Lastly, we collected data on 
demographics, and participants were thanked, debriefed, and received a payoff 
according to their choices made in the experiment. 
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Results 
Pre-processing and data preparation for eye tracking analyses were 
conducted as in Study 3.1. Again, trials in which participants allocated less than 50% 
of their fixations towards payoff and identifying information (2.87%), as well as 
extremely short or long trials (2.59%) were excluded from the analyses. Overall, 
85.19% of all trials were retained for further analyses. One participant was excluded for 
deciding against their personal preferences during the experiment. Further, data was 
excluded from participants who failed to correctly indicate their outgroup, they 
identified more with their outgroup than with their ingroup, or liked the outgroup better 
than the ingroup (10 participants in total). Three participants could not be calibrated, 
and therefore did not complete the study.  
As in Study 3.1, to determine if participants attended to the group 
membership of the other player in the dictator game, all gazes to the AOI containing 
this information, regardless of the fixation duration, were considered. Trials were 
excluded if participants paid no attention to group membership information. In total, 
data from 77 participants was retained for further analyses.  
Choice Behavior. Again first analyzing choice behavior, a mixed effects 
repeated measures logistic regression predicting prosocial choices from the SVO 
angle and the group setting (ingroup vs. outgroup) was conducted, controlling for the 
percentage of monetary disadvantage incurred when making the prosocial choice and 
the decision efficiency (Table 11, Model 3, and Figure 8, Panel B). As in Study 3.1, 
results showed a main effect for SVO angle (HChoice1), such that more prosocial 
participants were more likely to make prosocial choices than individualists. Analyzing 
the choice behavior of all participants for in- and outgroup decisions, results revealed 
that the odds of deciding prosocially increased by a factor of 21.91 when participants 
had been matched with an ingroup instead of an outgroup member, supporting 
HChoice2. These effects were qualified by a significant interaction of SVO angle and 
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group setting, supporting HChoice3: while individualists showed smaller differences in 
prosocial choices between in- and outgroup settings, differences were larger for more 
prosocial participants. The effects held when also including trials in which the group 
membership information was not attended to (Table 11, Model 4). 
Attention to Own Outcomes. Regarding attention to own vs. others’ 
outcomes, we again ran a regression with SVO angle and the group setting as the 
independent variables, predicting the proportion of attention to own payoffs (Table 13, 
Model 1; Figure 9, Panel B). As in Study 3.1, results showed significant main effects 
of SVO and the ingroup: prosocials were attended less attention to own outcomes 
than individualists, and when facing an ingroup member, the level of attention to own 
outcomes was lower than when facing an outgroup member. In line with our initial 
hypotheses (HAttention), we found an interaction effect of SVO and group setting 
indicating a bigger difference in attention to own outcomes between in- and outgroup 
situations for more prosocial participants. This finding was in contrast to the result of 
Study 3.1, where individualists had shown bigger differences in response to the group 
setting than prosocials. Analyzing these differences on a more fine-grained level, we 
compared the distributions of SVO for the two studies. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
showed that both samples differ substantially in their composition (d = 0.24, p = 0.02). 
In Study 3.1, the sample contained smaller values of SVO, i.e., more highly 
individualistic participants than in Study 3.2 (d = 0.24, p = 0.01), but not more highly 
prosocial participants (d = -0.01, p = 0.99). The directional shift of the interaction effect 
seemed to be driven by the behavior of decision makers with more extreme SVO (i.e., 
exceeding the preferences of a purely individualistic or purely prosocial decision maker in 
the direction of competitiveness or altruism, respectively). When running the analyses of both 
studies restricting the sample to observations of non-extreme participants, from whom data 
was sampled to similar degrees in both studies, the interaction effects were no longer 
significant in either of the studies (Table 14).  
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Effort in Information Search. Again, three regressions were conducted to 
assess effort in information search, predicting (i) decision times (Table 13, Model 2), 
(ii) number of fixations (Table 13, Model 3), and (iii) number of inspected information 
(Table 13, Model 4) from SVO angle, the group setting and the interaction of both 
factors as the independent variables (Figure 10). As in Study 3.1, results showed 
significant main effects of SVO and the group setting. Further, the results also indicated 
a significant interaction of SVO and the intergroup setting, replicating the results of 
Study 3.1. While individualists generally invested less effort when making a decision 
concerning the outgroup than when the ingroup was concerned, these differences 
shrank when participants were increasingly prosocial replicating the results of Study 
3.1 (HEffort1, HEffort2 and HEffort3, see Figure 10).  
Summary Study 3.2 
Study 3.2 presents an overall replication of the initial results, using a stronger 
group manipulation. Results showed that prosociality and ingroup favoritism 
influenced choices and processing effort as in Study 3.1. We found again that 
prosocials were more likely to discriminate in favor of the ingroup than individualists, 
and that –replicating the results of Study 3.1, but in contrast to the original hypotheses 
- individualists showed bigger differences in information search effort between the in- 
and outgroup setting than prosocials. Driven by a different sample composition with 
regard to SVO, in contrast to the results of Study 3.1, participants showed bigger 
differences in their attention to their own payoffs between the in- and outgroup setting 
with increasing prosociality, in line with the original expectations.  
General Discussion 
In two process tracing studies, we investigated the cognitive processes 
underlying prosocial behavior in intergroup contexts via eye tracking. Our central 
findings revealed that both choice and processing effort systematically differed 
between in- and outgroup settings. Process evidence showed that people weighted 
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others’ outcomes more highly and invested more time and effort into acquiring 
information before making a decision that regarded an ingroup member. This finding 
adds to the understanding of ingroup favoritism by suggesting that increased 
considerations of the other person involved and of the decision situation precedes 
biased behavior to benefit one’s ingroup. Therefore, results are in line with the 
predictions of the attentional drift diffusion model, lending new support to the notion 
of relative utility weighting being reflected in the sampling process.  
However, results regarding the interplay of social preferences and group 
membership on attention to others’ outcomes were mixed and seemed to affect only 
participants with extreme social preferences. Future research explicitly sampling 
subgroups in the tails of the SVO distribution has to clarify the directionality of the 
interaction effect.  
Importantly, process evidence affords a look beyond choices and outcomes 
to the preceding cognitive processes occupying decision makers in group contexts. 
By surpassing this restriction to choices and outcomes, we gain valuable insights into 
peoples’ reasoning process. In the present research, we find that choices are not 
necessarily reflective of the mental process that preceded them. Specifically, 
individualists were largely unwavering in their choices: They rarely made prosocial 
choices, and the difference they made in choices between the in- and outgroup was 
small. Deducing the underlying reasoning process from individualists’ choices would 
have led to the conclusion that their mental process has the simple rule to prioritize 
themselves over anyone else, and is largely unaffected by group membership. 
However, the available process data showed that the choices are accompanied by 
large processing differences between the in- and the outgroup setting. Although it 
required little deliberation for an individualist to be selfish when facing the outgroup, 
when an ingroup member was concerned, individualists still invested comparatively 
high effort into assessing the decision situation and forming their choice. Cognitive 
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processes in individualists were even more strongly affected by the intergroup context 
than in prosocials.  
Further highlighting the insights achieved by combining choice data with 
processing evidence, we found that although the choices of prosocials showed big 
differences between in- and outgroup members, their mental process seemed 
unexpectedly similar for the two cases. We consider three possible explanations for 
this pattern. First, the result could be attributed a ceiling effect in processing effort: 
Prosocials showed generally higher levels of processing, such that they already gather 
the full set of information necessary to differentiate between in- and outgroup 
situations respectively. A second explanation for the comparatively smaller differences 
in processing between in- and outgroup situations for prosocials could stem from 
differences in the construal of the decision situation (Balliet, Tybur, & van Lange, 2016; 
De Dreu & McCusker, 1997; Rusbult & van Lange, 2003), leading to a trade-off 
between individual-level preferences and group-level choice rules. Specifically, 
prosocials’ decision process could have additionally been guided by superordinate 
goals derived from the decision situation, such that their personal preference to make 
prosocial choices could have been superseded by the goal to parochially benefit the 
ingroup. This clear-cut behavioral guideline could have simplified prosocials’ cognitive 
weighting process. In the ingroup setting, prosocials could have perceived a group 
goal to only benefit the ingroup, and therefore readily made prosocial choices. When 
confronted with an outgroup setting, prosocials readily implemented the group-level 
goal through making more selfish choices. Therefore, this simple additional decision 
rule would decrease processing differences between the in- and outgroup, matching 
the pattern we observe in attention allocation. On the other hand, individualistic 
decision makers, as hypothesized, differed in terms of the effort they invested for 
information search depending on the matched players’ group membership, despite 
showing little difference in choices. From this perspective, individualists seem to regard 
the intergroup decision situation more in terms of their individual-level preferences for 
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selfish decisions rather than group-level goals for parochial ingroup favoritism. Third, 
prosocials could have more readily adapted to the demand of the intergroup situation 
to favor the ingroup with prosocial choices. While individualist types seemed to 
cognitively struggle to justify making overall few prosocial choices, even when facing 
an ingroup member, prosocials could have coped with the situational demand more 
easily by giving in and adapting their choices. Supporting this account, Wills, Hackel, 
and Van Bavel (2018) showed that neuroimaging data suggests that choices defying 
group norms involved more effortful processing. 
The present study has limitations, which could be addressed in future 
research. First, it may be that the use of eye tracking in and of itself may have reduced 
ingroup favoritism because individuals may have felt watched. However, comparing 
the proportion of the overall endowment that participants transferred to others in the 
present studies (28.56%) to the generosity in a meta-analysis of giving in dictator 
games (Engel, 2011), it seems that the choice patterns observed here are similar to 
contexts without eye tracking. Second, groups were not outcome-interdependent 
and there is evidence that a stronger interdependency between groups enhances 
ingroup biases in both judgment and decision-making (Balliet et al., 2014). Third, the 
current focus was on prosocial decision making in which individuals could extend 
more or less gain to another individual. There may be stronger ingroup biases at both 
the choice and processing level when not only gains but also losses are involved. 
Finally, and relatedly, in our choice options, individual decision makers were always in 
the lead, and were unconcerned that the other player be better off in a specific trial 
than they would be. Therein, we constructed a simple decision situation, reducing 
ambiguity in the motives that could potentially be at work. Considering more complex 
or even strategic decision situations would be a fruitful avenue for future research. 
Moreover, future research could continue the application of tracing cognitive 
processes through visual information search to intergroup decision making by 
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investigating the potential of directing attention towards others’ outcomes to cue less 
discriminatory behavior in intergroup contexts. Another avenue of research could 
consider increasing individuals’ willingness to invest effort into preparing a decision, 
to encourage unbiased choices. Beyond implications for future research, our findings 
carry practical implications. In a time of global migration and increased potential for 
individuals to be confronted with members of an outgroup, countering harmful ingroup 
favoritism and resolving intergroup conflict reach a new level of importance. The 
application of findings from tracing cognitive processes and attention manipulation in 
intergroup decision situations therefore allows psychological research to develop new 
strategies for these increasingly pressing social issues. In a variety of circumstances, 
from job interviews to court hearings, fair decisions are of paramount importance to 
society. Our findings that discriminatory choices were accompanied with reduced 
effort invested in the decision imply that potentially harmful favoritism of the ingroup 
can be circumvented if decision makers were reminded to be equally thorough in 
preparing their decisions. For instance, in job interviews, where interviewers meet the 
applicant personally, pre-interview reminders of the required thoroughness in the 
assessment, as well as semi-structured interview techniques could prove to be 
valuable tools in avoiding discrimination.  
In conclusion, the present research takes a new look at intergroup research, 
moving beyond assessing mere choice behavior and towards considering the 
processes underlying these choices. First evidence sheds light on how much people 
with different social value orientation care about others’ outcomes in the intergroup 
context, and how much they invest into searching for information when they make a 
decision that maximizes their own outcomes, that favors the ingroup or that supports 
the outgroup. With this glimpse at the cognitive processes underlying intergroup 
decisions, future avenues of research could investigate the implications of our findings 
for ameliorating ingroup favoritism, and intergroup conflicts.  
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Tables and Figures 
Table 11 
Mixed effect repeated measures logistic regression predicting the odds ratio of making a prosocial 
choice in Study 3.1 (Model (1): only for trials where participants attended to group membership 
information, Model (2): for all trials) and Study 3.2 (Model (3): only for trials where participants 
attended to group membership information, Model (4): for all trials). 
 
  
 Prosocial Decision 
  
   
 Study 3.1 Study 3.2 
     
     







     
 OR z OR z OR z OR z 
     
         
SVO Angle 1.18*** 5.45 1.14*** 5.24 1.08*** 3.97 1.10*** 5.33 
Group (0 = Out-, 1 = Ingroup) 27.07*** 11.16 2.57*** 8.32 21.91*** 21.73 6.37*** 19.58 
SVO Angle x Group 1.02 1.15 1.03** 3.28 1.02*** 2.49 1.03*** 5.70 
Percentage of Disadvantage 0.96** -30.3 0.98*** -3.84 1.01 1.31 1.01 1.29 
Efficiency 10.25*** 4.02 9.57*** 9.27 7.45*** 7.23 10.20*** 11.93 
     
     
Constant 0.27** -3.28 0.20*** -4.33 1.02 0.07 1.32 1.02 
Observations 1006 4036 2086 4502 
     
Note. All predictors are centered. ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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Table 12 
Mixed effects repeated measures linear regression predicting (1) proportion of attention to own 
outcomes, (2) log response times, (3) log number of fixations, and (4) proportion amount of inspected 
information, from group setting and individual SVO in Study 3.1. 
 
















	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  
/ z / z / z / z 
 
        
         
SVO Angle -0.92*** -5.71 0.01** 2.72 0.01** 2.69 0.03* 2.39 
Group (0 = Out-, 1 = Ingroup) -6.28*** -5.61 0.21*** 6.59 0.26*** 7.68 0.44*** 5.299 
SVO Angle x Group 0.17* 2.29 -0.01*** -3.70 -0.01*** -4.04 -0.02** -2.70 
Trial 0.09+ 1.86 -0.01*** -5.29 -0.01* -2.44 -0.01* -2.19 
     
     
Constant 54.90*** 22.93 1.61*** 31.04 2.64*** 43.06 4.61*** 26.70 
Observations 1006 1006 1006 1006 
     
Note. Predictors are centered. + p < .10, * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. a Results also hold for 
untransformed values. 
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Table 13 
Mixed effects repeated measures linear regression predicting (1) proportion of attention to own 
outcomes, (2) log response times, (3) log number of fixations, and (4) proportion amount of inspected 
information from group setting and individual SVO. 
 




Attention to Own 
Outcomes 
(2) 
Log Response  
Time a 
(3) 







    
	  	  	  	  
/ z / z / z / z 
         
         
SVO Angle -0.31** -2.88 0.01** 2.58 0.01* 2.49 0.03*** 3.20 
Group (0 = Out-, 1 = Ingroup) -4.33*** -5.95 0.11*** 5.29 0.13*** 5.94 0.25*** 4.28 
SVO Angle x Group -0.10* -1.98 -0.01* -2.35 -0.01** -3.39 -0.01*** -3.33 
Trial 0.12*** 7.17 -0.01*** -22.19 -0.01*** -18.43 -0.02*** -17.35 
         
         
Constant 42.12*** 24.70 2.24*** 47.76 3.26*** 59.54 6.27*** 45.68 
Observations 2078 2078 2078 2078 
     
Note. All predictors are centered. ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p <  .001; a Assumption of normality was 
violated (Shapiro-Wilk test for response time showed W = 0.89, z = 12.43, p < 0.001 and for number 
of fixations W = 0.89, z = 12.41, p < 0.001. Results also hold for untransformed values, but do not 
reach standard levels of significance. 
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Table 14 
Mixed effects repeated measures linear regression predicting the proportion of attention to own 
outcomes, from group setting and individual SVO when restricting the sample to participants who are 
pure individualists, pure prosocials or fall in between. 
 
  
 Proportion of Attention to Own Outcomes 
   






	  	  
	  	  
/ z / z 
     
     
SVO Angle -1.34** -3.26 -0.21** -1.13 
Group (0 = Out-, 1 = Ingroup) -5.54** -3.01 -3.08*** -3.50 
SVO Angle x Group 0.27 1.20 -0.01* -0.01 
Trial 0.01 0.18 0.19*** 9.38 
     
     
Constant 45.37*** 11.43 39.83*** 21.96 
Observations 397 1231 
   
Note. All predictors are centered. ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p <  .001; a Assumption of normality was 
violated (Shapiro-Wilk test for response time showed W = 0.89, z = 12.43, p < 0.001 and for number 
of fixations W =  0.89, z = 12.41, p < 0.001. Results also hold for untransformed values, but do not 
reach standard levels of significance. 
  







Figure 7. Money allocation task requiring a decision between two options for own and others’ 
payoff. Font sizes used in the experiment were smaller and spaces between items were larger 
than displayed here. 
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Figure 8. Probability of making prosocial choices in the money allocation task when facing in- 
or outgroup members depending on SVO. Separate for all trials, and trials in which group 
membership information was seen. Panel A: Study 3.1; Panel B: Study 3.2. 
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Figure 9. Attention to own vs. others’ outcomes depending on SVO with 95% confidence 
intervals for Study 3.1 (A) and Study 3.2 (B). 
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Figure 10. Mean decision times (A), number of fixations (B) and number of inspected information 
(C) with 95% confidence intervals for studies 1 and 2. Individual graphs denote differences in 
processing variables depending on individual SVO. 
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Chapter 4 
Eyes on Morals:  
Investigating the Cognitive Processes  









This chapter is based on Rahal, R., Hoeft, L., & Fiedler, S. (in preparation). Eyes on 
Morals: Investigating the Cognitive Processes Underlying Moral Decision Making via 
Eye tracking. https://bit.ly/2JUHKUK  
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Abstract 
How are moral decisions such as sacrificing the life of one to rescue the lives 
of many others formed? The Dual Process Theory (Greene et al., 2001) proposes that 
decisions driven by utilitarian vs. deontological moral principles are preferentially 
supported by deliberate vs. intuitive processes. A competing account proposes that 
choices would be least effortful when the choice options are readily discriminable 
depending on individual preferences (Kim et. al, 2018). Investigating the implications 
of both theoretical propositions, we report an eye tracking study, showing decision 
makers’ attentional foci, their decision effort and conflictedness during the decision 
process. To study deontological vs. utilitarian decision making, we used incentivized 
third-party helping dilemmas, where participants decided whether to leave donations 
for cataract operations with a predetermined child (deontological option) or to 
reallocate the donation to operate a group of other children (utilitarian option). Moral 
preferences determined via choices in classical hypothetical trolley-type dilemmas 
predicted choices in the third-party helping dilemmas. Surprisingly, deontologists 
fixated more on operation costs than utilitarians, and less on information about the 
original allocation of the operation. Decision effort measured via reaction times, 
number of fixations and number of inspected information was lowest for participants 
with strong utilitarian moral preferences, while more deontological decision makers 
made their decisions more effortfully. Gaze patterns over the course of the decision 
process indicated that deontological decisions were accompanied by higher 
conflictedness than utilitarian choices, and that preference-consistent choices were 
made with less decision conflict. Implications for the theories of moral judgment are 
discussed.  
Keywords: moral judgment, decision making, dual process theory, eye 
tracking 
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Eyes on Morals: Investigating the Cognitive Processes Underlying Moral Decision 
Making via Eye tracking 
Moral dilemmas prevail in everyday life: Your spouse asks you if you approve 
of his or her outfit, your friends wonder if you like the present they gave you. Although 
it seems immoral to hurt others’ feelings needlessly, lying seems unethical too. For 
their essential juxtaposition of disparate moral positions, pitting different concepts of 
morality against each other, moral dilemmas are used to illuminate the structure of 
moral decision making. What should be done, what people decide to do in moral 
dilemmas and why, as well as the way through which decision makers arrive at the 
decision to resolve the situation in one way or the other has been the object of much 
theorizing in philosophy, ethics and psychology. While psychological theories of moral 
decision making traditionally favored cognitive approaches (Kohlberg, 1963; Turiel, 
2006), the 21th century witnessed a stronger emphasis on the role of emotions in 
moral judgment (Haidt, 2001). How to formulate a unified theory that explains all facets 
of moral decision making still remains an open question.  
Dual Process Theory 
One approach that has gained traction in the last decade is a dual-process 
view (Greene, 2014). It is hypothesized that patterns of judgment in moral dilemmas 
are supported by different and at times competing neural systems (Greene et al., 
2004, 2001). One processing system is considered as automatic, efficient and reliant 
on emotional processes, supporting the formation of deontological judgments 
(Greene, 2007, 2014). The other system is considered as flexible and deliberate, 
leading to consequentialist decisions through conscious reasoning (Greene, 2007, 
2014). These predictions have often been applied to classical moral dilemmas such 
as the trolley dilemma, where an uncontrolled trolley en route to kill five people can be 
stopped only by pressing a switch that redirects the trolley to a track where it will kill 
only one person (Foot, 1967). It is argued that utilitarian decisions to maximize the 
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number of survivors are preferentially supported by the deliberate processing system, 
whereas the automatic processing system supports deontological decisions to refrain 
from sacrificing the life of one person to save others. A slightly different dilemma 
situation, where the only way to stop the oncoming trolley is to push a large person 
off a footbridge (footbridge dilemma, Thomson, 1985), requiring greater personal 
force to enact the utilitarian option, would be argued to trigger stronger automatic 
emotional intuitions against taking this action. Consequently, more deontological 
decisions are to be expected in this setting (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006; 
Greene et al., 2001).  
The dual process model has found support in a number of studies ranging 
from cognitive, to clinical and neuropsychology. In line with the assumption that 
processing qualities influence moral judgments, cognitive load was found to increases 
response times for utilitarian decisions, but not for deontological ones (Greene, 
Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008; Trémolière, Neys, & Bonnefon, 2012), 
and to weaken utilitarian inclinations (Conway & Gawronski, 2013). Time pressure has 
been shown to reduce the percentage of utilitarian judgments (Suter & Hertwig, 2011). 
On the other hand, encouraging deliberation without time pressure strengthened 
consequentialist responses (Greene et al., 2009). Solving counterintuitive math 
problems, as well as the above-average ability to do so successfully increases the 
percentage of consequentialist answers (Paxton, Bruni, & Greene, 2014). In general, 
favoring effortful thinking is correlated with more consequentialist answers (Bartels, 
2008). In contrast, favoring emotional approaches to moral dilemmas such as by 
increasing empathy has been shown to increase deontological inclinations (Conway 
& Gawronski, 2013). Further, deficits in emotional awareness have been linked to 
increased rates of utilitarian responses (FeldmanHall, Dalgleish, & Mobbs, 2013; 
Koven, 2011; Patil & Silani, 2014), and increased emotionality in participants 
undergoing SSRI treatment have been shown to decrease utilitarian responses 
(Crockett, Clark, Hauser, & Robbins, 2010). Finally, emotional blunting stemming from 
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frontotemporal dementia (Mendez, Anderson, & Shapira, 2005) as well as reduced 
inhibition following damage to the prefrontal cortex (Ciaramelli, Muccioli, Làdavas, & 
di Pellegrino, 2007; Koenigs et al., 2007) were shown to decrease utilitarian 
responses.  
Despite a substantive body of research pointing towards a dual process 
interpretation of moral decision making, the dual process theory has encountered 
criticism. Some of this criticism is aimed at the methodology of fMRI-research and 
argues that the findings might be reconcilable with a single-track theory of moral 
judgment (Klein, 2011). Others argue for an integrative perspective in which the 
different processes do not compete but interact, for example through combining 
motivational or cognitive aspects to form a moral decision (Moll, De Oliveira-Souza, & 
Zahn, 2008). Further findings suggest utilitarian responses could be the result of 
impaired empathy and cognitive ability combined (Duke & Bègue, 2015). It is 
questioned whether the dual processes tie in intuitive vs. counterintuitive moral 
judgments rather than deontological vs. utilitarian judgments (Kahane et al., 2012), 
and if effects of cognitive load and time pressure can be replicated (Tinghög et al., 
2016). Overall, interpretations favoring a dual process approach remain contested so 
far (for a review, see Dubljević, 2017).  
Choice Discriminability Account 
One point of contestation is the omission of other sources of variability from 
the analysis of moral decision processes. For instance, the strength of moral 
preferences and the resultant discriminability of the choice options in moral dilemmas 
is often ignored. Research in the tradition of the dual process model has focused 
mostly on explaining choices in the moral domain, rather than on predicting moral 
choices from chronically held moral preferences (i.e., decision makers’ preferences 
about resolving moral dilemmas in line with deontological or utilitarian principles). 
However, it has been argued in related areas of literature that more extreme 
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preferences lead to faster reaction times: When more extreme preferences are held, 
the choice options become more readily discriminable by the decision makers, 
requiring less time and effort to determine the preference-consistent choice (Basten, 
Biele, Heekeren, & Fiebach, 2010; Bhatia & Mullett, in press; Gluth, Rieskamp, & 
Büchel, 2012; Krajbich, Oud, & Fehr, 2014; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008). 
 In the domain of moral decision, a computational model of moral decision 
making based on hierarchical Bayesian inference was proposed (R. Kim et al., 2018), 
where choices in dilemmas involving self-driving vehicles are used to make inferences 
about individual decision makers’ preferences, such as for saving human vs. non-
human lives, or prioritizing saving children over elderly adults. Reaction time data 
showed fast responses in dilemmas where the choice options were easily 
discriminable because individuals had a strong preference for one of the choice 
options, and slower responses where individuals needed time to discriminate 
between more ambiguous choice options.  
A related theoretical debate has recently emerged in the social preference 
literature. On the one hand, a dual process account had been proposed, where 
prosocial choices were argued to be intuitive (Rand et al., 2014, 2012). On the other 
hand, a choice discriminability perspective predicted that extreme preferences would 
lead to faster, less effortful decision: Decision conflict was shown to determine 
response times such that extremely selfish and extremely cooperative decisions, 
driven by extreme social preferences to cooperate or defect, were made more quickly 
than intermediate decisions, driven by mixed preferences (A. M. Evans et al., 2015). 
Moreover, decision conflict was shown to be distinct from the degree of reflection 
employed. Similarly, Krajbich et al. (2015) showed no reaction time differences in 
cooperative vs. selfish choices after taking choice discriminability into account. In 
other words, there are strong and increasingly prominent indications that the difficulty 
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of decisions and therefore the discriminability of choice options offers an explanation 
for choice processes competing with dual process accounts.  
Here, we consider that such a choice discriminability mechanism may also 
be at play in the domain of moral decision making. The dual process account, 
supposing a positive relation between moral preferences and processing effort, might 
be challenged by the presence of a reverse-u-shaped relation of moral preferences 
on processing, where extreme deontologists and utilitarians process faster and less 
effortfully than mixed types. Should we find evidence for a non-linear relation of moral 
preferences and processing, this evidence would question the generalized formulation 
of the dual process theory, and advocate a more nuanced theoretical approach to 
moral decision making, integrating the strength of moral preferences. Here, we 
therefore pursue hypotheses derived from the choice discriminability account as 
alternatives to the dual process approach.  
Eye tracking for Process Tracing in Moral Dilemmas 
Despite the diverse set of methodological approaches used to test the dual 
process theory, there has been no direct measure to investigate the reasoning of 
participants during the decision making process. However, eye tracking is well suited 
to illuminate the information search and decision process involved in moral decision 
making (see Fiedler & Glöckner, 2015; Strohminger, Caldwell, Cameron, Borg, & 
Sinnott-Armstrong, 2014). In particular, since there is evidence suggesting that 
people lack introspection about their deontological patterns of judgment (Cushman 
et al., 2006; Haidt, 2001; Hauser, Cushman, Young, Kang‐Xing, & Mikhail, 2007), 
using a methodology to access processes underlying moral decision making that 
does not rely on self-reports to illuminate decision makers’ reasoning seems 
advantageous. To that end, eye tracking is a valuable tool for tracing information 
processing in an objective, unobtrusive and fine-grained manner. Investigations of 
information search have proven valuable for understanding decisions in a wide variety 
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of contexts where decision makers’ own outcomes were at stake, such as risky 
choices (Fiedler & Glöckner, 2012; Kawakami et al., 2014; Raab & Johnson, 2007; 
Reisen et al., 2008). Importantly, eye tracking has also been used to understand 
behavior involving the wellbeing of others, for instance showing that prosocial and 
selfish individuals approach decisions with systematic differences in gaze patterns 
(Fiedler et al., 2013) or that own-race recognition bias and willingness to interact with 
outgroup members are predicted by systematic gaze bias at ingroup members’ eyes 
(Kawakami et al., 2014). Here, we extend the use of eye tracking to the complex 
domain of moral decision making, requiring choices between deontological and 
utilitarian options which concern the wellbeing of others without consequences on 
one’s own material outcomes.  
By using eye tracking, we gain three features enabling us to better 
understand moral decision making in trolley-type dilemmas. First, we can ask where 
decision makers’ main focus lies while they make their choice. Second, we can gain 
insights into the process of information acquisition, understanding how much effort 
decision makers invest into informing their choice. Third, eye tracking permits us to 
uncover the degree of conflict between the choice options experienced by the 
decision makers. All three insights are valuable for understanding the nature of 
deontological vs. utilitarian choices by observing the process that brings them about 
more closely.  
First, regarding the locus of attention, using eye tracking enables us to 
understand which pieces of information are particularly important to decision makers 
while they make up their mind which option to choose. In other words, studying eye-
gaze permits direct access to which pieces of information decision makers fixate 
more, and allows inferences on which pieces of information can be assumed carry a 
heavy weight for the ultimate decision. In models of comparison processes such as 
the attentional Drift Diffusion Model  (Krajbich et al., 2010, 2012; Krajbich & Rangel, 
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2011), choices are assumed to be formed through a process of stochastic information 
accumulation for the choice options available: While gazing at a certain option, its 
relative decision value increases, making it more likely that the option will eventually 
be chosen. In other words, what is important to the decision maker is more likely to 
be gazed at. Several seminal studies further provided direct evidence of the relation 
of the number of fixations and importance (Reisen et al., 2008; van Raaij, 1977). 
Therein, eye-gazes offers a comparatively straightforward way to unveil what 
motivated a certain choice. In previous research on moral decision making, the motive 
that presumably drove participants’ actions was often inferred from an elegant design, 
where in a hypothetical scenario that would pit two conflicting motives against each 
other, the choice revealed the underlying reasoning (Greene et al., 2004; Koenigs et 
al., 2007). Other designs gained insights into decision makers’ motives by asking 
participants to provide reasons for their choices (Björklund et al., 2000; Haidt et al., 
1993). By using the visual focus of decision makers’ attention, a more detailed and 
unobtrusive impression of the most important pieces of information in their reasoning 
processes can be gained. In trolley-type situations, specifically, deontological and 
utilitarian decision makers should differ substantively in the focal points of their 
decision making. Deontology, by definition, puts forth the idea of judging actions 
based on rules. Utilitarianism, in contrast, is built on the principle of weighting 
outcomes. Utilitarians, while making their decisions, should therefore be more 
focused on outcomes, while deontologists should be more concerned with 
information capturing rule breaking or rule adherence.  
Second, eye tracking is a valuable tool for understanding the deliberate vs. 
intuitive nature of the decision process. One line of research has aimed to infer which 
cognitive processes are at work during moral judgments by using neuroimaging data 
(for a recent overview, see Sevinc & Spreng, 2014). Another strand of research has 
focused on studying decision times in deontological vs. utilitarian choices to infer 
mental processes, with mixed results. While some research finds that deontologists 
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or deontological choices are faster (e.g., Ciaramelli et al., 2007; Greene et al., 2008, 
2004; Kahane et al., 2012), others find no reaction time differences (e.g., McGuire, 
Langdon, Coltheart, & Mackenzie, 2009; Whitton, Henry, & Grisham, 2014) or the 
reverse effect (e.g., Killgore et al., 2007; Moore, Clark, & Kane, 2008). Here, we extend 
this approach by using the insights available from gaze data. Specifically, to 
investigate how effortfully decision makers informed their choices, we assessed how 
many fixations participants displayed before making their choice, and which 
proportion of the information available they fixated. The use of these dependent 
variables requires the assumption that decision makers rely on more fixations 
(Krajbich et al., 2010; Krajbich & Rangel, 2011) and consider more pieces of 
information (Fiedler et al., 2013) to reach a deliberated decision. In line with the dual 
process theory, it would be hypothesized that utilitarians invest more effort (i.e., fixate 
the available information more often, and fixate more pieces of information) into 
making a decision than deontologists. The competing choice discriminability account 
would predict that decision makers who have strong preferences for deontology or 
utilitarianism would be able to resolve a moral dilemma more quickly than mixed types.  
Third, eye tracking permits us to develop an impression of decision makers’ 
conflictedness while they form a decision. The gaze cascade effect (Shimojo et al., 
2003; Simion & Shimojo, 2007) describes a phenomenon towards the end of the 
decision process, where decision makers’ gaze is focused more strongly on the later 
chosen option, such that last fixations are good predictors of the subsequent decision 
(Krajbich et al., 2010). Here, the slope of this cascade towards the later chosen option 
is used as a proxy for conflictedness in the decision process. The inference that the 
slope of the curve indicating the proportion of gazes to the later chosen is indicative 
of conflictedness rests on the following argument. First, it has been demonstrated 
that the preferred option in a decision task receives more attention than the non-
favored option (e.g., Fiedler & Glöckner, 2012; Glöckner & Herbold, 2011; for a review, 
see Orquin & Mueller Loose, 2013). Second, the degree to which an option is 
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attended to has been shown to be related to the strength of the preference the 
decision maker has for this option (Glaholt et al., 2009). Therefore, recording over the 
course of the decision process how the proportion of gazes to the choice options 
unfolds should allow inferences on which option is currently favored, and how strong 
the preference for this option is. When the proportion of gazes to the choice options 
remains balanced, no strong preference is assumed to have emerged, indicating that 
the decision maker is still undecided, while a spike of the proportion of gazes towards 
one option would indicate that this option is becoming more strongly favored, pushing 
towards a choice. Therefore, when the gaze proportion curve shows a flat slope, the 
decision maker is more conflicted, struggling to settle for one of the options, while a 
steep rise of the gaze proportion curve indicates a less conflicted decision maker.  
Interpreting the dual process theory of moral judgment in terms of decision 
conflictedness, we assume that deontological and utilitarian decision systematically 
differ in the steepness of the gaze proportion curve. Deontological decision makers, 
who are assumed to be more intuitive in their decisions, would settle on what they 
perceive as the right choice more quickly. Therefore, we expect that deontologists will 
visually gravitate towards the later chosen option relatively earlier during the decision 
process, showing a steep slope of the gaze proportion curve. Conversely, we assume 
that more deliberative decision strategies in utilitarians will lead to them being more 
conflicted during the decision process, remaining undecided while comparing the 
options for longer. Therefore, we expect that utilitarians as more conflicted decision 
makers will settle on predominantly fixating the later chosen option only later in the 
decision process, showing a flatter slope of the gaze proportion curve. In sum, we 
expect that deontological decision makers will show a steeper increase in the 
proportion of gazes to the later chosen option, compared to utilitarian decision makers 
who face higher decision conflict. However, it could again be argued that the choice 
discriminability should be taken into account. Extreme deontologists and utilitarians, 
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for whom the choice options appear more discriminate, could display less decision 
conflict than mixed types.  
In sum, our interest in the nature of moral decision making processes is 
threefold: to uncover which information is most important for deontological and 
utilitarian decision makers during the decision process, which levels of effort they 
invest into forming the choice, and how conflicted they are during the choice 
formation. Pursuing these research questions, we aim to achieve a systematic 
overview of the processes translating moral preferences into decisions in moral 
dilemmas. Therein, this paper contributes to the ongoing debate about the nature and 
underlying processes of moral decisions, gathering evidence regarding the dual 
process perspective and adding the caveat that choice discriminability may be an 
important, yet largely ignored determinant of moral decision processes.  
Method 
Beyond the substantive additions to the theoretical debate, this paper 
contributes an attempt at increasing the methodological diversity in moral judgment 
research (see Christensen & Gomila, 2012). By employing eye tracking, several 
methodological exigencies to avoid bottom-up capturing of attention, clouding the 
top-down process of cognitions driving eye-gaze we are set to study, emerge, which 
make the use of the traditional trolley-type dilemmas problematic. Building on a 
number of pilot studies,22 we progress from the use of traditional hypothetical trolley-
type scenarios, which are disassembled and visualized on the computer screen, to 
the development of an incentivized, non-hypothetical choice task, which offers the 
possibility to finely adjust and repeatedly administer moral dilemma decision 
situations. At the same time, this standardized task allows for increased control and 
                                               
22 The pilot studies are reported in online supplementary materials, see https://bit.ly/2JUHKUK. 
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clean manipulation of important design parameters of moral decisions. This strategy 
follows the increasing use of real moral goods in the behavioral economics literature, 
where decision makers’ choices are implemented instead of remaining hypothetical. 
For instance, market interactions were shown to erode the willingness to pay for 
saving the lives of surplus lab mice (Falk & Szech, 2013), and the presence of social 
norms was shown to reduce selfish behavior when leprosy operations were at stake 
(Bartling & Özdemir, 2017). A third-party helping dilemma we develop based on the 
task structure to differentiate utilitarian vs. deontological motives introduced by Perera 
et al. (2015) is subsequently used here. In this task, the essential juxtaposition of 
deontological vs. utilitarian motivations present in trolley-type hypothetical dilemmas 
is captured by confronting participants with the choice between keeping a donation 
allocated to a certain child, for whom a vision-restoring cataract operation is financed, 
or reallocating the donation so that more children can be treated. Reallocating the 
donation conflicts with deontological preferences because the child originally 
designated to receive the operation would be robbed of her chance of restored vision. 
In turn, reallocating the donation would be in line with utilitarian reasoning, maximizing 
the number of children benefitting from the donation.  
In line with the general hypotheses derived above, we preregistered 
(https://osf.io/4edhk/) hypotheses specific to the design of this incentivized third-party 
helping task. First, as a sanity check, we expected that more utilitarian decision 
makers would be more likely to make utilitarian choices to reallocate than 
deontologists (H1). Regarding the locus of attention, we expected that more 
deontological decision makers would focus more on information revealing whom the 
operation was originally assigned to, relative to information about the cost of the 
operation (H2). Regarding decision effort, we formulated hypotheses both from the 
perspective of the dual process theory and the choice discriminability account, for the 
three dependent variables (i) decision time, (ii) number of fixations, and (iii) number of 
inspected information. From the dual process perspective, we expected that more 
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utilitarian decision makers (i) take longer (H3a), (ii) show more fixations (H3b), and (iii) 
fixate on more pieces of information (H3c) compared to deontological decision 
makers. The alternative choice discriminability account leads to the predictions that 
decision makers with mixed moral preferences (i) take longer (H3a_alt), (ii) show more 
fixations (H3b_alt), and (iii) fixate on more pieces of information (H3c_alt) compared to 
decision makers with more extreme moral preferences. Similarly, regarding 
conflictedness, we made predictions from both perspectives: Following the dual 
process account, we expected that more utilitarian decision makers would show a 
flatter slope of the curve representing the proportion of gazes to the later chosen 
option over time (H4), compared to deontological decision makers. Following the 
choice discriminability account, we expected a steeper curve for decision makers with 
extreme compared to mixed moral preferences (H4_alt). For all analyses, we 
controlled for the decision makers’ indecisiveness and equality-efficiency trade-off to 
ensure that results were driven by moral preferences and not omission bias or 
preference for equal distribution, as well as item-specific effects to ensure that 
variations in the exact donation costs were not the driver of the results. In analyses 
regarding decision effort and conflictedness, we further controlled for trial number to 
exclude fatigue effects during the course of the experiment. 
Design and Participants.  
One hundred and four participants (Mage=21.04, SDage=3.37, 75 female) 
recruited from the DecisionLab subject pool in Bonn via ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) took 
part in this study for a payoff of 12€ per hour. Gaze and choice data was collected at 
the MPI DecisionLab in Bonn.  
We ran a repeated measures design (20 target trials, 20 filler trials) with moral 
preference as a between-subjects continuous predictor. We varied within subjects 
the size of the group of recipients (3 levels: 2 vs. 3 vs. 4 children), and the cost-benefit 
ratio of the operation costs.  
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Procedure.  
Personality variables were assessed in an online questionnaire administered 
12 hours before the lab stage of the study, where the choices and eye-gaze in the 
operations task were assessed. In the online stage, participants completed an 
adapted version of the rule-following task (Kimbrough, Miller, & Vostroknutov, 2014; 
Kimbrough & Vostroknutov, 2016). We used this task as a proxy for deontological 
preferences to assess the content validity of the operations tasks. In three tasks, they 
sorted 18 yellow and blue balls displayed in a random order to the top or the bottom 
of a sorting field. Participants were told that the rule was to sort only yellow balls to 
the top of the sorting field, and blue balls to the bottom. In order to create temptation 
to not comply with the rule participants additionally learned that for each yellow ball 
they sorted to the top, they would earn 5¢, and for each blue ball they sorted to the 
top, they would earn 10¢. Participants who followed the rule more would be assumed 
to have higher deontological preferences.  
As an additional way to assess convergent validity, we introduced 
participants to the insulin task, where they decided about reallocating donation to 
purchase insulin for children in 10 items, following in-depth instructions including a 
text explaining the importance of insulin kits for people suffering from diabetes, as well 
as an example task in which the choice options were explained. For each trial, 
participants were shown a t-shirt with a child’s name on it representing a potential 
donation receiver. They were informed about the amount of money donated for the 
purchase of the insulin kit for the specific child (costs ranged between 21.50€ and 
52.00€), and about the option to reallocate the donation to benefit a group of children 
(two, three or four) at a lower individual cost (costs ranged between 6.50€ and 
41.50€). One item (21.50€ for an individual operation vs. group of two children where 
each kit cost 17.00€) was chosen a priori as the best match to real-life operation 
pricing to be implemented according to a randomly selected participants’ choice. 
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We then assessed participants’ equality-efficiency trade-off, which we used 
as control variable, in a hypothetical third-party decision task via a new measure 
assessing the degree to which participants follow each motivation based on 
Engelmann and Strobel (2004). Participants are asked to make three decisions 
between two options each (see Figure 11), where money is allocated between three 
hypothetical players (Person A, Person B and Person C). The decision makers’ payoff 
was not affected by their choice. In each decision task, choices for each of the two 
options are motivated by one motivation: inefficiency aversion (option 2), and 
Charness-Rabin inequality (the sum of all pairwise differences between the minimum 
payoff and all other values, option 1). As a further control variable, we assessed 
indecisiveness, for which participants completed a 15-item scale (e.g., “I try to put off 
making decisions.”, 1 = “strongly disagree”, 5 = “strongly agree”, Frost & Shows, 
1993).  
To assess moral preference, participants were then asked to make binary 
choices in ten high-conflict trolley-type moral dilemmas (submarine, bomb, Lawrence, 
vaccine, lifeboat, euthanasia, crying baby, sacrifice, vitamins, safari) taken from 
Greene et al. (2004) and Kahane et al. (2012). Situations and choice options were 
displayed on the same screen. For each dilemma, participants decided whether they 
preferred the deontological or utilitarian option, yielding a score of their deontological 
vs. utilitarian preference.  
In addition, participants completed the 15-item long version of the SVO Slider 
Measure (Murphy et al., 2011), as well as other measures for an unrelated study, 
which are omitted from the main analyses reported here. Finally, we collected 
information on demographics. 
In the lab stage, participants underwent a nine-point calibration procedure 
for the gaze measurements, followed by the operations task (Figure 12) with an 
extensive practice phase to familiarize subjects with the decision screen and the 
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response keys. In the operations task, participants decided whether to reallocate 
eyesight-restoring cataract operations from originally selected individual children to a 
group of other children. Instructions included a text explaining the nature and 
treatment of cataracts, as well as an example task in which the choice options were 
explained. Operation costs for the individual varied between 21.00 € and 54.00€. 
Operation costs for group members varied between 4.50€ and 106.00€ per person. 
As in the insulin task, one item (45.50€ for an individual operation vs. group of two 
children where each operation cost 23.00€) was chosen a priori as the best match to 
real-life operation pricing to be implemented according to a randomly selected 
participants’ choice. After completing all 40 trials, participants were shown their 
choice on an item chosen a priori to be implemented. They wrote their choice on a 
piece of paper, which they sealed in an envelope and threw into a closed urn. At the 




We defined four types of areas of interests (AOI) on the screens displaying 
the operation cost matrices to assess fixations. AOIs containing cost and assignment 
information are defined as 100x100 pixels in size. AOIs containing labels describing 
the cost and assignment information on the top of the decision screens are contained 
by AOIs of 190x100 pixels. AOIs containing information on the donation recipients are 
defined as 190x200 pixels in size. Fixations were identified with a 30 pixel tolerance 
in the summed deviation of points’ maximum and minimum coordinates on the x- and 
y-axes and a minimum duration of 50ms (Salvucci & Goldberg, 2000). Data from one 
participants had to be excluded because of missing gaze recordings, and data from 
one additional participant was excluded because the online questionnaire data was 
missing.  
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Choices  
Participants made utilitarian choices in 75.82% (SD = 42.83%) of cases. On 
the subject-level, choices were also skewed towards more extreme utilitarian choices: 
out of 104 decision makers, 9 chose the deontological option in more than 90% of 
the trials, while 52 chose the utilitarian option in more than 90% of the trials. Running 
a logistic mixed effect repeated measures regression, we found participants with a 
more utilitarian moral preference to be more likely to make a utilitarian choice (in 
accordance with H1, see Table 15, Model 1, and Figure 13), while controlling for their 
inefficiency aversion and third-party inequality aversion, as well as item-specific 
variation.23  
Gaze Behavior 
Regarding the locus of attention, we analyzed deontologists’ and utilitarians' 
proportion of attention to information regarding operation costs and operation 
allocations in two mixed effects linear repeated measures regressions controlling for 
the decision maker’s tendency to indecisiveness, equality-efficiency trade-off, as well 
as item-specific variation and the trial number. Regarding operation costs, more 
utilitarian decision makers were shown to attend less to cost information than 
deontologists, while the type of decision made (utilitarian vs. deontological) and the 
interaction of moral preferences and type of decision did not predict attention (in 
contrast to H2, see Table 16, and Figure 14). This pattern held both for gazes to the 
deontological and to the utilitarian option (see Figure 15). 
                                               
23 Using moral preference measured in the insulin task and the rule-following task as predictors for 
choices in the operations task revealed a strong positive effect of insulin-based moral preferences, 
but the effect of moral preferences derived from the rule-following task was non-significant (see 
Table 15, Models 2 and 3, and Figure B1 in the online supplementary materials). Moral preferences 
derived from the trolley task and the insulin task correlated positively, while the relation to the 
preferences measured in the rule-following task remained non-significant but negative as expected 
(see Table B1 in the online supplementary materials).  
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Regarding decision effort, for (i) decision times, (ii) the number of fixations and 
(iii) the number of inspected information, two analyses were performed. First, to 
assess dual process predictions, three linear mixed effect repeated measures 
regressions were conducted, using moral preferences to predict decision effort while 
controlling for indecisiveness, equality-efficiency trade-off, item-specific effects and 
trial. Second, to test the alternative hypothesis of a reverse-u-shaped relation of 
decision effort and moral type, we run three interrupted regressions, each time using 
a perfectly mixed moral type as the break point. Given non-normal distributions, all 
three dependent variables were log-transformed. Using the standard linear regression 
approach, results showed that utilitarians present with (i) descriptively shorter decision 
times (Table 17, Model 1), and (ii) less fixations overall (marginally significant, Table 
18, Model 1), and (iii) inspected fewer pieces of information (in contrast to H3c, see 
Table 19, Model 1). Using interrupted regressions, we found among deontologists no 
significant differences in decision effort (Model 2 in Tables 17 through 19), while in 
each regression, the effect was positive. Among utilitarians, more extreme types 
showed significantly reduced decision effort on all three dependent variables (Model 
3 in Tables 17 through 19). Given the sign reversal, this evidence could be interpreted 
to suggest a reverse-u-shaped relation between moral preferences and decision 
effort, supporting the choice discriminability account (H3a_alt, H3b_alt, H3c_alt; see 
Figure 16).  
Regarding conflictedness, in a linear mixed effect repeated measures 
regression attention to AOIs containing information relating to the later chosen option 
was predicted from the proportion of decision time elapsed, moral preference and the 
interaction thereof, while controlling for indecisiveness, equality-efficiency trade-off, 
item-specific effects and trial (Table 20, Model 1). Convergent with results previously 
shown in the literature, participants were found to gaze more at the later chosen 
option as the decision progressed. In line with H4, we found an interaction effect of 
decision time and moral preference, suggesting a steeper rise in attention to the later 
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chosen side among deontologists as the decision phase progressed, compared to 
utilitarian decision makers (see Figure 17). However, unexpectedly, utilitarian decision 
makers were more likely to gaze at the later chosen side already from the beginning 
of the decision process, indicating gaze bias in all stages of the decision. In contrast, 
deontological decision makers showed an initially balanced gaze pattern and only 
gravitated towards the later chosen option in the end of the decision process. 
Therefore, although the preregistered expectation of a steeper gaze proportion curve 
among deontological decision makers was found, which could suggest less 
conflictedness, the data are more in line with the interpretation that utilitarian decision 
makers are less conflicted, given the omnipresent gaze bias in those choices. 
Additionally, we ran the same analysis predicting attention to the later chosen option 
from the type of decision made. We again found a main effect of decision time, and 
a significant main effect of the kind of choice made, indicating that utilitarian decisions 
were based on a more biased information search pattern towards the later chosen 
option. No significant interaction effect of decision time and the kind of choice made 
emerged (Table 20, Model 4).  
To test the alternative hypothesis that extreme types show steeper rises in 
the proportion of gazes to the later chosen side, we ran an interrupted regression 
analysis predicting the attention to the later chosen side from moral preferences, 
separately for deontologists (Table 20, Model 2) and utilitarians (Table 20, Model 3). 
Results showed no indication of a sign reversal of the main effect of moral 
preferences, in contrast to H4_alt. Descriptively, the gaze pattern split for extreme vs. 
mixed types (Figure 18) suggested a clearer gaze bias towards the later chosen option 
at the end of the decision for extreme types’ preference consistent choices. Among 
mixed types’ utilitarian choices again presented with a clearer drifting apart than 
deontological choices.  
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Discussion 
In this study, we showed four key findings. First, results showed that choices 
in trolley-type dilemmas were strongly related to those in the newly designed 
operations task. Second, unexpected differences in the locus of attention were found: 
deontological decision makers were unexpectedly strongly focused on the outcomes 
of the decisions they made, even when they made deontological choices. In turn, 
utilitarians were found to be more interested in the structure of ownership, and 
therefore in information we had expected would be more relevant for deontologists 
than excepted. Third, we showed that especially extremely utilitarian decision makers 
showed low effort when making decisions, indicated by fast reaction times, low 
fixation counts, and a low number of information attended to overall. Fourth, gaze 
bias towards the later chosen side emerged more clearly for preference-consistent 
choices. 
Taken together, the findings provide a number of insights into the cognitive 
processes underlying moral decision making. First, that deontological decision 
makers were found to be surprisingly more focused on what we expected would be 
characteristically utilitarian cues than utilitarian decision makers suggests that the 
reasoning process of deontologists is more multifaceted than common expectations 
would hold. Notably, this finding relies on the use of eye tracking to identify through 
gaze behavior what is important to decision makers.  Therefore, by using eye tracking, 
the present work contributing to a multi-method approach to the investigation of 
deontological vs. utilitarian decision making, and leverages unobtrusive processes 
measurement techniques to gain insights into the black box of moral decisions. 
Moreover, the findings suggest that moral preferences and their interplay with 
choices carry an important role in cognitive processes of information search and 
processing, and should therefore receive more attention in future research. Decision 
effort was particularly low for extreme utilitarian decision makers, which is 
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incompatible with a dual process account of moral judgment. Instead, these findings 
are more in line with the choice discriminability account, suggesting that extreme 
decision makers require less effort to make their choices. This pattern of results 
suggested that extreme utilitarians required particularly little decision effort to resolve 
moral dilemmas. One alternative explanation could be that utilitarians had established 
an effortless, default response strategy in the repeated tasks they were presented 
with. However, this seems to be unlikely given the use of filler items which were 
structurally different and required a different decision. Another alternative explanation 
could be that the analyses were limited by the low number of extreme deontologists 
sampled, making it more difficult to test the choice discriminability account. Extreme 
deontologists were scarcer in the sample than extreme utilitarians. Potentially, this 
skewed distribution could be attributed to the student sample employed, whose 
university education may promote utilitarianism. Extreme deontology could also be a 
rare trait more generally, in a society where trends such as effective altruism are 
becoming increasingly influential. Using a sample with more extreme deontological 
types would be an interesting future step to clarify whether only extreme utilitarians 
show more effortless choice strategies, or if the choice discriminability account in full 
would be a better model to explain differences in effort. In sum, nevertheless, the 
findings indicate that the choice discriminability account offers a better explanation of 
the findings regarding decision effort than the dual process theory.  
The findings on conflictedness during the decision process were less clear. 
We found that deontologists showed a steeper gaze cascade effect measuring 
conflictedness than utilitarians, which, in principle, is in line with the dual process 
predictions. However, a consistent gaze bias towards the later chosen alternative was 
present already from the beginning of utilitarians’ decision process. One possible 
interpretation would be that utilitarians had preferentially sought out information about 
the choice option to reallocate. In other words, they could have been more likely to 
have their mind set on wanting to first find out about the alternative that would 
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reallocate donations, before seeing the exact circumstances of the decision task. In 
comparison, deontologists’ gaze pattern suggests no such preferential attention at 
the beginning of the trial. When analyzing conflictedness in a more fine-grained way, 
findings suggested that preference consistent choices raised less decision conflict. 
Therein, the fine-grained analyses contrasted with the conceptions of the dual 
process theory, and lent support to the choice discriminability account.  
Taken together, the findings on cognitive processing point to the importance 
of studying not only choices but choices in relation with preferences, although they 
provide no definitive answers about the exact relation of moral preferences, processes 
and choices. By and large, moral preferences were an important factor not only in 
determining choice outcomes, but also the cognitive processes driving these 
outcomes.  
Beyond the substantive contribution, this work contributes to the 
methodological debate in moral psychology by developing a standardizable and 
incentivized task suitable for process investigations using a real moral good to study 
deontological vs. utilitarian moral decision making. Choices in this incentivized task 
are clearly related to the traditional hypothetical moral dilemmas, and we argue that it 
provides a number of advantages. For instance, the use of real moral goods is 
advantageous because it increases external validity and reduces measurement error. 
Instead of asking participants to imagine a scenario they may never have found 
themselves in, and to imagine what they would do in this situation, participants make 
choices in a concrete real-life decision setting, where they decisions are actually 
implemented. Using the incentivized task may further be a way to reduce 
unsystematic variation in response behavior by narrowing respondents’ interpretative 
leeway, allowing better control of participants’ impression of the task. In addition, the 
task structure of the incentivized task makes it possible to conveniently visualize the 
dilemmas in a way that fulfilled process tracing requirements by relying on numerical 
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stimuli. Finally, this task structure makes it convenient to further investigate the 
influence of systematically varied isolated aspects of moral dilemmas on moral 
decisions and the underlying cognitive processes. For instance, changes to the 
standardized task, such as in the efficiency of the alternatives, the group size, or the 
moral good in question, could be easily implemented to systematically explore 
situational influences on decision making and decision making processes.  
In sum, this work advocates tighter control over the variations introduced into 
moral dilemma scenarios, and offers an option for achieving this goal by introducing 
an incentivized moral dilemma task. Moreover, it contributes to the multi-method 
assessments of decision processes in moral dilemmas, demonstrating that 
deontologists do more than “just” following the rules, as they also take matters of 
costs of their choices into account.  Finally, this work suggests that increased 
emphasis should be placed on considering moral preferences in investigations of 
moral decision making, lending support to the choice discriminability account.  
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Tables and Figures 
Table 15. 
Logistic mixed effects repeated measure regressions, predicting the likelihood of making utilitarian 
decisions from moral preference based on the trolley task, (2) insulin, or (3) rule-following task. 
 







       
        OR z OR z OR z 
       
       
Moral Preference 2215.00*** 4.76     
(Trolley Task)       
Moral Preference   3012.90*** 6.622   
(Insulin Task)       
Moral Preference     0.53 -0.57 
(Rule-Following Task)       
Indecision 0.47 -1.35 0.89 -0.22 0.46 -1.38 
Inefficiency-inequality 
trade-off 0.29
* -2.45 0.80 -0.47 0.25* -2.55 
Item fixed effect YES  YES  YES  
       
       
Constant 4.11 0.79 0.24 -0.83 523.85*** 3.30 
Observations 2080  2080  2080  
       
 
Note. + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table 16. 
Linear mixed effects repeated measure regressions, predicting the proportion of attention allocated 
to cost information. 
 
    Proportion of Attention towards Cost 
   
   
 OR z 
   
   
Moral Preference 0.79** -2.83 
Choice (0 = deontological, 
1 = utilitarian) 0.99 
-0.45 
Choice X Moral Preference 0.90 -1.31 
Indecision 0.99 -0.34 
Inefficiency-inequality trade-off 0.98 -0.74 
Trial 1.00* -2.46 
Item fixed effect YES  
   
   
Constant 4.17*** 126.67 
Observations 1807  
   
 
Note. + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table 17. 
Linear mixed effects repeated measure regressions, predicting decision time from moral 
preference, (1) overall, (2) for deontologists, (3) for utilitarians. 
 
       
 (1) Overall : 
log Decision Time 
(2) Deontologists : 
log Decision Time 
(3) Utilitarians : 
log Decision Time 
       
        OR z OR z OR z 
       
       
Moral Preference -0.27 -1.34 0.67 1.47 -1.13** 2.72 
Indecision 0.05 0.74 -0.01 -0.13 0.03 0.37 
Inefficiency-
inequality trade-off -0.05 -0.68 -0.11 -1.13 0.02 0.20 
Trial -0.01*** -9.39 -0.01*** -5.28 -0.01*** -8.99 
Item fixed effect YES  YES  YES  
       
       
Constant 1.50*** 6.28 1.42*** 3.68 2.16*** 5.43 
Observations 2056  1036  1300  
       
Note. Centered predictors, + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table 18. 
Linear mixed effects repeated measure regressions, predicting the number of fixations from moral 
preference, (1) overall, (2) for deontologists, (3) for utilitarians. 
 
       
 (1) Overall : 
log Number of Fixations 
(2) Deontologists : 
log Number of Fixations 
(3) Utilitarians : 
log Number of Fixations 
       
        OR z OR z OR z 
       
       
Moral Preference -0.44+ -1.90 0.68 1.30 -1.54** -3.16 
Indecision 0.04 0.52 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.02 
Inefficiency-
inequality trade-off -0.04 -0.54 -0.13 -1.19 0.03 0.28 
Trial -0.01*** -8.75 -0.01*** -4.63 -0.01*** -8.76 
Item fixed effect YES  YES  YES  
       
       
Constant 2.83*** 10.20 2.59*** 5.85 3.73*** 8.02 
Observations 2056  1036  1300  
       
Note. Centered predictors, + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table 19. 
Linear mixed effects repeated measure regressions, predicting the number of inspected 
information from moral preference, (1) overall, (2) for deontologists, (3) for utilitarians. 
 
       
 
(1) Overall : 
log Number of Inspected 
Information 
(2) Deontologists : 
log Number of Inspected 
Information 
(3) Utilitarians : 
log Number of Inspected 
Information 
       
        OR z OR z OR z 
       
       
Moral Preference -0.34+ -2.36 0.28 0.91 -1.12** -3.71 
Indecision 0.05 0.94 -0.02 -0.25 0.05 0.87 
Inefficiency-inequality 
trade-off -0.05 -0.99 -0.09 -1.42 0.01 0.06 
Trial -0.01*** -6.72 -0.01*** -3.01 -0.01*** -7.12 
Item fixed effect YES  YES  YES  
       
       
Constant 1.54*** 8.96 1.50*** 5.80 2.11*** 7.29 
Observations 2056  1036  1300  
       
Note. Centered predictors, + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table 20. 
Linear mixed effects repeated measure regressions, predicting attention to the later chosen side 
from moral preference, (1) overall, (2) for deontologists, (3) for utilitarians, and (4) overall from the 
kind of decision made. 
 
         
 
(1) Overall: 












log Number of 
Inspected 
Information 
         
          OR z OR z OR OR OR z 
         
         
Moral Preference 0.08* 2.13 0.09 1.29 0.04 0.41   
Choice (0 = 
deontological, 
1 = utilitarian) 
      0.06*** 5.37 
Time in the 
Decision Process 0.09
*** 6.88 0.11*** 1.29 0.11*** 4.76 0.09*** 6.85 
Moral Preference 
X Time -0.028
*** -5.20 -0.23* -2.01 -0.35** -3.19 -0.03 -1.16 
Trial 0.01 1.44 0.01* 2.21 0.01 1.30 0.01 1.44 
Item fixed effect YES  YES  YES  YES  
         
         
Constant 0.54*** 26.58 0.53*** 18.18 0.54*** 17.98 0.54*** 26.56 
Observations 14193  7406  8851  14193  
         
Note. Centered predictors, + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
  




Figure 11. Example of a decision task in the measure for equality-efficiency trade-off. 
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Figure 13. Relationship of utilitarian choices and moral preference, with bins representing the 
number of observations summarized, 95% confidence intervals and fit line.  
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Figure 14. Proportion of attention depending on moral preferences and the type of decision 
made, with 95% confidence intervals  and size of bins representing the number of observations 
summarized. 
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Figure 15. Attention to ownership and cost information located within the deontological vs. 
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Figure 16. Decision effort depending on moral preferences and the type of decision made, with 
95% confidence intervals and size of bins representing the number of observations 
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Figure 17. Conflictedness depending on moral preference and choice with 95% confidence 
intervals. Panel A: deontological decision makers making deontological choices. Panel B: 
utilitarian decision makers making deontological choices. Panel C: deontological decision 
makers making utilitarian choices. Panel D: utilitarian decision makers making utilitarian 
choices.
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Figure 18. Conflictedness depending on moral preference and choice with 95% confidence 
intervals. Panel A: extreme deontological decision makers making deontological choices. Panel 
B: mixed type decision makers making deontological choices. Panel C: extreme utilitarian 
decision makers making deontological choices. Panel D: extreme deontological decision 
makers making utilitarian choices. Panel E: mixed type decision makers making utilitarian 






Decisions are a core component of everyday life, giving rise to intense societal 
and scientific interest in examining decisions in different contexts and by different 
decision makers. Moreover, a strong trend in the field has shifted the research focus 
beyond assessing only choice outcomes, to also considering the way in which these 
decisions are reached. In this dissertation, decisions and their underlying cognitive 
processes were examined in social dilemmas in group contexts, and in moral 
dilemmas.  
Summary of Empirical Findings 
Chapter 2 investigated active ignorance to others’ group membership. 
Drawing on evidence from two eye tracking studies and two behavioral studies, in 
which we used both artificial and real groups, it was shown that systematic ignorance 
to others’ group membership was prevalent, effectively eliminating ingroup favoritism. 
Ignorance was shown to be of a deliberate nature, and was related to inter-individual 
differences and first and second order beliefs about discrimination and ignorance. 
This line of work began with the insight that group membership information was 
largely ignored surprisingly often. Over the course of the four studies reported, the 
finding could be replicated, both when free visual attention to group membership 
information was studied, and when investigating explicitly stated preferences to 
remain blind. Visual inattention determined if ingroup bias was present in choices, and 
when decision makers stated a preference for ignorance, the size of the subsequent 
ingroup favoritism effect was decreased. Moreover, visual inattention was shown to 
be active and deliberate in nature. Participants remained blind to group membership 
information even though they were explicitly instructed about the availability of 
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membership information. Additionally, stated preference for ignorance predicted 
visual attention to group membership information. This pattern of results suggests 
that decision makers actively avoided group membership information to avoid bias in 
their choices. Finally, we found evidence that inter-individual differences, in particular 
decision makers’ identification with the ingroup, as well as first and second order 
beliefs about ignorance and discrimination were associated with ignorance. 
Chapter 3 presented two eye tracking studies, in which the cognitive 
processes of prosociality in intergroup contexts were investigated. Choices and 
processing effort differed systematically between in- and outgroup settings. When 
facing an ingroup member, others’ outcomes were weighted more, and more effort 
was invested into informing the choice. Moreover, we found systematic differences 
cognitive processes depending on the interaction of the intergroup decision setting 
and social preferences. Although results about attention to others’ outcomes were 
mixed given differences in the distributions of social preferences in the two studies, 
evidence was consistent with regard to information search effort. Unexpectedly, 
individualists showed larger differences in decision effort between the in- and 
outgroup compared to prosocials, although individualists’ ingroup bias in choices was 
small. In contrast, prosocials showed smaller ingroup bias in processing, although 
their ingroup bias in choices was strong.  
Chapter 4 reported a study investigating the cognitive processes underlying 
moral decisions. Results speak to the theoretical debate in moral decision making, 
advocating a choice discriminability perspective over the dual process theory of moral 
judgment. Decision effort was particularly low for extreme utilitarian decision makers. 
This finding is in contrast with a dual process account of moral judgment, and point 
towards the choice discriminability account. Moreover, gaze bias towards the later 
chosen side indicated – when analyzed on a fine-grained level by considering the 
interaction of moral preferences and choice – that preference-consisted choices were 
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made with less decision conflict. Again, this finding was more in line with the choice 
discriminability account. Finally, deontological decision makers surprisingly paid more 
attention to stimuli which was expected to be contain more utilitarian contents than 
utilitarian decision makers.  
Implications 
Theoretical Implications 
Theoretical implications of the individual results are discussed in more detail 
in the relevant section, and only larger-scale implications are summarized here.  
In Chapter 2, ignorance in group contexts was found to generally support the 
Bounded Generalized Reciprocity account, highlighting the role of belief-dependent 
preferences. Although investigated in a non-strategic context, preference for 
ignorance was related to first and second order expectations of ignorance and 
discrimination. Thereby, these findings were, by extension, in line with the Bounded 
Generalized Reciprocity argument that differential expectations of cooperation were 
associated with whether ingroup favoritism was shown. In contrast to the moral wiggle 
room hypothesis that ignorance would be exploited selfishly, ignorance was 
associated with both higher contributions generally, and increased fairness between 
the in- and outgroup.  
In Chapter 3, the insight that ingroup bias in decision effort is increased 
among individualists compared to prosocials yields the main theoretical implications. 
The result suggests that the trade-off between individual-level preferences and group-
level goals (Balliet et al., 2016; De Dreu & McCusker, 1997; Rusbult & van Lange, 
2003) was resolved differently among individualists and prosocials. On the one hand, 
prosocials seemed to effortlessly subscribe to the group norm to make ingroup-
favoring choices. On the other hand, individualists’ decision outcomes were clearly 
guided by their individual-level preference for selfishness regardless of the receiver’s 
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group membership, while their decision processes reflected effortful processing to 
reconcile diverging individual-level preferences and group goals. This insight supports 
the notion that theories of decision making in group contexts should take the 
interaction of individual-level preferences and group norms into account (also see Wills 
et al., 2018) to understand the relation of these crucial components of the decision 
process.  
In Chapter 4, the central theoretical contribution was the investigation of 
processing predictions derived from the dual process theory of moral judgment 
(Greene, 2007; Greene et al., 2004) and the choice discriminability perspective (R. 
Kim et al., 2018). It became clear that moral preferences play an underexplored role 
in moral decisions and moral decision processes. Rather than offering support for the 
dual process theory, results considering the influence of moral preferences suggested 
that preference-consistent choices were made more effortlessly and with lower 
decision conflict. Therefore, the present work is in line with a perspective on moral 
decision making that takes individual moral preferences into account.  
In aggregate, the findings speak to the cognitive processes underlying 
decision making in two domains. Therein, the studies presented in the scope of this 
dissertation can be interpreted in the light of more general models of decision 
processes. In particular, they provide support of the prediction of the Attentional Drift 
Diffusion Model (aDDM), since relative weights assigned to decision alternatives 
depending on individual preferences were reflected in the sampling process. 
Consistently with a known limitation of the aDDM’s assumptions (see Orquin & Mueller 
Loose, 2013), information was not sampled stochastically, but more attention was 
allocated to specific pieces of information depending on decision makers’ preferences 
and the choice outcome. 
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Methodological Implications 
Two central methodological implications can be derived from the work 
presented here: the merit of using unobtrusive and fine-grained process measures for 
an in-depth analysis of how decisions emerge, and the merit of using incentivized and 
standardizable decision tasks.  
Regarding the advocacy of process measures, the work presented here has 
shown in several instances how insights can be gained on the process level that would 
have been difficult to achieve had the level of analysis been that of choices. Three 
instances are particularly noteworthy. First, the insight that deliberate ignorance in 
group contexts is such a prevalent phenomenon would have been hard to differentiate 
from the absence of ingroup favoritism on the behavioral level without the use of eye-
gaze. Indeed, eye tracking a process measure where the flow of information search 
is unperturbed and the costs of information acquisition are low was particularly suited 
to uncover this form of ignorance. Second, the insight that decisions in group contexts 
are harder for individualists than prosocials would have been hard to come by, in 
particular since individualists’ choice outcomes were largely unresponsive to the 
group setting. Third, the insight that deontologists are more interested in observing 
choice attributes that would have been expected to be of greater interest to utilitarians 
would have been difficult to obtain without the use of process measures. In all three 
cases, investigating the process level unveiled insights about what happens inside the 
black box of the decision makers’ mind, without interrupting their decision process or 
asking them to verbalize their strategy. Therein, this dissertation contributes to a larger 
body of research indicating the merit of using process tracing techniques to 
understand how choices are formed, in the tradition of the cognitive orientation of the 
discipline.  
Moreover, the work presented here makes a methodological contribution by 
developing a standardizable and incentivized moral dilemma task. We connect to the 
DISCUSSION  185 
literature in moral psychology, ethics and philosophy relying on trolley-type moral 
dilemma vignettes, and develop a new, incentivized and standardizable decision task. 
With this contribution, we follow the general trend in the decision making literature to 
rely on incentivized choices, for their increased external validity. Moreover, we argue 
that using this incentivized task may be able to reduce measurement error by reducing 
the respondents’ interpretative acts involved in understanding the decision problem.  
Societal Implications 
Both prosociality in group context and morality are important aspects of 
social life and living together with others in society. On the one hand, increasing 
mobility within and between societies has led to increased contact of people coming 
from different national, cultural, ethnical or social groups across the globe. In this 
increasingly globalized world, finding peaceful and fair solutions to the quotidian 
challenges of living together with people of different group membership has moved 
even more to the center of attention. From the two studies on prosociality in group 
settings presented here, three specific recommendations for increasing fairness can 
be derived. First, the findings on ignorance to group membership suggest that some 
people may be less to access group membership information in the first place. Given 
that ignorance reduces ingroup favoritism, promoting ignorance to group 
membership information may ameliorate ingroup bias. This could be achieved for 
instance by omitting information revealing group membership, which may be easily 
implementable in formalized procedures such as in housing or job applications. For 
instance, such procedures could easily be designed to omit information that could be 
used for gender-, age-, ethnicity-based or religious discrimination. When group 
membership information cannot be accessed, it cannot lead to discrimination. 
Second, the importance of beliefs for ignorance to group membership and 
subsequent ingroup bias suggests that interventions aimed at changing the 
expectations of decision makers may be a promising endeavor, if first and second 
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order beliefs indeed are the drivers of ignorance. This suggestion lends support to 
Allport’s (1954) seminal hypothesis of positive contact to improve intergroup relations. 
Positive interactions between members of different groups may lead to a gradual 
change in beliefs about others’ discriminatory behavior and the importance others are 
believed to assign to unveiling group membership. Subsequently, ignorance may 
become more prevalent, and discrimination may be ameliorated. Third, ignorance to 
group membership was negatively correlated with group identification. Assuming that 
the strength of decision makers’ identification with the group has a causal role for 
ignorance and subsequently for discrimination, ameliorating the focus on the ingroup 
could be another intervention mechanism. One suggestion in line with this reasoning 
has been to promote the salience of a superordinate, shared ingroup, as proposed in 
the Common Ingroup Identity Model (for an overview, see Gaertner, Dovidio, 
Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 2011). Finally, another mechanism for intervention could 
rely on the finding that reduced effort preceded discriminatory decisions. In situations 
where group membership information is salient, decision makers’ tendency to 
discriminate based on this information could be ameliorated by encouraging them to 
invest equal decision effort in in- and outgroup decisions. In particular in job 
interviews, semi-structured interview techniques and clear guidelines for the selection 
process itself may be useful interventions.  
On the other hand, moral attitudes are a defining feature of society. The moral 
judgments we subscribe to collectively as a society, and individually as decision 
makers delineate the fine line between what we think is right and what we think is 
wrong, determining not only how our actions are judged by others, but which actions 
the community at large prefers to take. The study presented here support the notion 
that, when studying only deontological vs. utilitarian decision making, there is variation 
in what people think is the right decision to make. While some people often make 
deontological decisions, preferring to uphold absolute moral rules, others often make 
utilitarian decisions, preferring to maximize the beneficial outcomes of the decision 
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problem, and yet other decision makers have mixed preferences, oscillating between 
the two moral perspectives. Therefore, although there may be collective moral norms 
explicating what we should think is right, there are also individual-level moral 
preferences, capturing what we do in moral dilemmas. Importantly, the strength of 
these individual-level preferences influenced decision processes. In the light of this 
finding, it appears misguided to use processing mode as an additional argument for 
or against deontology or utilitarianism, by assuming that some moral decisions are 
inferior because of the way they are made (either because they appear to be made 
intuitively and without good reasons, or because they appear to be falsely post-hoc 
rationalized). Rather, processing effort can be interpreted as a consequence of the 
strength of individuals’ moral convictions when they make a choice: It is easy to make 
the choice one personally thinks is right. If any societal conclusion can be drawn from 
this finding, it would be that decision difficulty alone is no good indicator whether the 
right decision is being made.  
Strengths, Limitations, and Directions for Future Research 
The work presented in the scope of this dissertation benefits from a number 
of strengths. First, it relies on explicit theoretical predictions, or even tests competing 
theoretical accounts against each other. Therein, it constitutes an example of theory-
driven research, and makes a contribution to the empirical theory testing.  
Further, the work employs a variety of different measures of cognitive 
processes (eye tracking, reaction times, and self-reported decision difficulty), uses 
multiple dependent variables to characterize decision effort (reaction times, fixation 
counts, proportion of inspected information), and tests process and choice 
predictions in multiple environments (hypothetical vignettes, incentivized choices). 
Therein, it subscribes to the notion that the materials and operationalizations, as well 
as the decision environments used can contribute to the results of experimental 
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research and should be systematically explored to gauge the robustness of specific 
effects.  
Moreover, the work presented uses state-of-the-art statistical methods, for 
instance by employing interrupted regressions rather than quadratic functions to 
study u-shaped effects (Simonsohn, 2017), by using multiple imputation rather than 
excluding missing data on inter-individual differences (Rubin, 1987) in pooled analyses 
conducted to reach the corridor of stability of correlation coefficients (Schönbrodt & 
Perugini, 2013). Additionally, in an effort to contribute to transparent and reproducible 
research, preregistrations of confirmatory analyses in three studies were used and all 
materials and data is made available openly on the Open Science Framework 
(www.osf.io). Moreover, to contribute to replicable research, Chapter 2 reports a 
multi-study paper, where the effects of certain predictors were replicated up to four 
times, and Chapter 3 reports a paper where the original effect is replicated in a second 
study.  
Finally, a strength of this work is the conception of new materials when 
previously used methods were insufficient for its objectives. In this vein, the 
incentivized moral dilemma task mentioned above was constructed. Additionally, a 
task to measure inequality-inefficiency trade-offs in third-party allocation decisions 
was designed.  
In addition to its strengths, the work presented here also has several 
weaknesses. First, in the aggregate, the empirical projects do not always paint a 
consistent picture of results. However, given the exploratory nature of some of the 
studies, except where otherwise marked by pre-registered hypotheses, as well as the 
number of expected replications, finding some unstable or non-significant effects is 
not surprising (Maxwell, 2004; Schimmack, 2012). 
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Moreover, specific criticism could be addressed to the studies of decision 
making in group settings. Here, limitations include the use of a payoff structure without 
outcome interdependence. Studying out-come interdependent groups may reveal 
larger ingroup bias (Balliet et al., 2014) and potentially larger differences in the 
underlying decision processes between in- and outgroup settings compared to the 
non-strategic decisions investigated here. Moreover, choices were always set in the 
gain domain and the decision makers’ payoff in the dictator role was always larger 
than that of the matched player in the receiver role, so that decision makers never 
had to fear losing parts of their endowment or falling behind when comparing 
themselves to the receiver. Implementing these features in the decision task which 
may again exasperate processing differences between in- and outgroup settings. 
Despite recognizing the limitations imposed by these design choices, they are justified 
here as they enable a first glance at the cognitive processes at play in a simple, 
relatively unambiguous decision setting.  
With regard to the study on moral decision making, the use of newly 
developed materials – despite being an exciting development backed by the 
correlation with choices in the traditionally used task – could be criticized because it 
departs from previously used decision tasks, necessarily reducing the comparability 
of the results to the previous literature. Moreover, the context of the decision task 
itself could interfere with the observed choice construction processes. However, it 
seems reasonable to expect that the basic decision processes of interest are active 
in different but conceptually identical decision problems, and challenging the 
robustness of effects in different decision contexts is a theoretically valuable endeavor. 
A further limitation of the studies on moral decision making is that they do not allow 
for causal interpretations of the results. Decision processes were investigated without 
random assignment to different experiment conditions. Instead, the study is restricted 
to observing correlational relations between individual moral preferences and choices 
as well as gaze behavior.  
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Finally, the work has limitations based on the use of eye tracking as a 
methodology to investigate decision processes. One potential criticism of employing 
eye tracking as an ostensibly unobtrusive process tracing method is the use of eye 
tracking in and of itself may have affected choices and gaze behavior. Decision 
makers may have felt observed, leading to demand and social desirability effects. 
Although this influence of eye tracking cannot be ruled out, it seems unlikely. The 
decision tasks used required repeated decisions in a large number of trials, making it 
rather costly to consistently override one’s decision preferences. Moreover, the use 
of incentivized decision tasks could be argued to have further decreased potential 
biases introduced by the presence of eye tracking devices. Finally, we asked 
participants to indicate if they had decided against their personal preferences in the 
eye tracking studies and found no indications that the presence of eye tracking may 
have influenced participants. Finally, in the studies utilizing dictator games, the overall 
proportion of transfers to the receivers relative to the total size of the “pie” that could 
have been shared was similar to the generosity observed in a meta-study of dictator 
game giving (Engel, 2011). Another limitation of the use of eye tracking are the kinds 
of inferences that can be drawn from gaze behavior. For instance, although we may 
know that deontologists focused more on information that had been expected to be 
of particular interest to utilitarians, the precise role of this information for the decision 
process remains unknown. Based on the auxiliary assumption that more important 
information or information carrying greater weight in the decision process receives 
more attention, deontologists attention to decision outcomes and costs could be 
interpreted to mean that this information heavily influences the decision outcome. 
However, attention to this stimulus could have a number of different reasons. For 
instance, attention could be captured by specific physical characteristics of the 
stimuli. Yet, this bottom-up capture of attention seems unlikely because the materials 
were specifically designed to avoid such effects, and since it seems unlikely that 
deontologists would be differently affected by such influences compared to 
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utilitarians. Moreover, deontologists’ proportion of attention allocated to decision 
outcomes and costs could also simply mean that they are particularly confused by 
these pieces of information, trying to determine whether they are actually relevant to 
them. Although this seems unlikely, the argument illustrates the reliance of the 
interpretation that allocated attention indicates importance on auxiliary assumptions. 
A last limitation of eye tracking to infer cognitive process from gaze behavior is based 
on the reverse inference problem. For instance, although prior research shows that 
increased cognitive effort clearly influences gaze behavior by increasing fixation 
counts (e.g., Just & Carpenter, 1980), inferring in reverse that cognitive effort was 
higher because fixation counts were increased could be a logical fallacy. This 
inference would only be valid if it is assumed that fixation counts are higher if and only 
if cognitive effort is increased. Since none of the studies reported here manipulated 
cognitive effort, it must be acknowledged that other cognitive functions than the ones 
considered here could have driven the results.  
The limitations of this work provide promising avenues for future research. 
The most fruitful future research trajectory would be substantiating the findings of the 
studies presented here with systematic manipulations of visual attention to determine 
the causal role for decision making. First, implementing manipulations which direct 
attention towards or away from certain stimuli found to be differentially attended to in 
order to cue different behavior. For instance, biasing attention towards own vs. others’ 
outcomes might determine discriminatory behavior in intergroup contexts, and 
biasing attention to utilitarian vs. deontological cues could determine moral decision 
making (but see Newell & Le Pelley, 2018 for difficulties in biasing complex decision 
tasks). Moreover, manipulating cognitive effort and decision difficulty could show the 
processes’ causal roles for changing choice outcomes or gaze behavior.  
Finally, another avenue of research could consider changes to the decision 
settings. When studying prosociality in group settings, the investigation of strategic 
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decision situations would be particularly interesting to facilitate a better understanding 
of cognitive processes and the subsequent choices in this motivationally more 
complex decision environment. For instance, the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma – 
Maximizing Difference (Halevy et al., 2008) would be an interesting strategic decision 
setting to study processes underlying choices to parochially benefit the ingroup or to 
also hurt the outgroup. Similarly, studying processing differences underlying 
generalized vs. parochial prosociality (Thielmann & Böhm, 2016) could be an 
interesting further extension of this research trajectory. With regard to moral decision 
making, systematic variations of the moral good in question could reveal interesting 
contextual dependencies of decision processes and choices, or demonstrate the 
robustness of certain basic processes. Further, investigating the role of choice 
attribute heterogeneity for the decision processes of deontologists and – presumably 
more context dependent utilitarians – could be an interesting avenue for future 
research.  
Conclusion 
Decisions are an important aspect of everyday life, giving rise to substantive 
societal and scientific interest not only in inter-individual and personal determinants of 
decision outcomes, but also in the underlying cognitive processes while the decision 
is being formed. In this dissertation, cognitive processes underlying decision making 
are investigated in two domains: prosociality in group settings, and morality. 
Knowledge of others’ group membership as a necessary condition to engage in 
ingroup bias is investigated, showing that ignorance to information revealing group 
membership is widely prevalent and determines if ingroup favoritism in prosociality is 
shown. Exploring the mechanisms of ignorance, its deliberate nature and ties to the 
identification with the ingroup and first and second order beliefs about discrimination 
and ignorance are demonstrated. Moreover, visual attention and information search 
effort in group decision settings is shown to differ systematically depending on 
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decision makers’ social preferences and the receiver’s group membership. Results 
suggested that individualists cognitively struggle more with the conflict between their 
individual-level preferences to make selfish choices and the group-level norm to be 
prosocial to ingroup members, while prosocials are effortlessly parochial in their 
prosocial choices. Finally, turning to moral dilemmas, preference-consistent choices 
were shown to be made less effortfully and with less decision conflict, advocating a 
choice discriminability perspective on cognitive processes involved in deontological 
vs. utilitarian moral decisions. These findings are discussed in the light of general 
models of decision making, and related to current debates about prosocial and moral 
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Cognitive Processes in Social and Moral Decision Making 
Decisions are a core component of everyday life, giving rise to intense societal 
and scientific interest in examining decisions in different contexts and by different 
decision makers. Moreover, a strong trend in the field has shifted the research focus 
beyond assessing only choice outcomes, to also considering the way in which these 
decisions are reached. In this dissertation, decisions and their underlying cognitive 
processes were examined in social dilemmas in group contexts, and in moral 
dilemmas. Both prosociality in group context and morality are important aspects of 
social life and living together with others in society. On the one hand, increasing 
mobility in all parts of society has led to increased contact of people coming from 
different national, cultural, ethnical or social groups across the globe. In this 
increasingly globalized world, finding peaceful and fair solutions to the quotidian 
challenges of live together with people of different group membership has move even 
more to the center of attention. On the other hand, moral attitudes are a defining 
feature of society. The moral judgments we subscribe to collectively as a society, and 
individually as decision makers delineate the fine line between what we think is right 
and what we think is wrong, determining not only how our actions are judged by 
others, but which actions the community at large prefers to take. In both situations, 
understanding the cognitive processes underlying the decisions is argued to be a 
crucial step in designing evidence-based interventions addressing not only choice 
outcomes, but the driving forces of the choices as well. 
To address the need for a fine-grained and unobtrusive measure of cognitive 
processes in the decision process, eye tracking has emerged as an increasingly 
popular tool, and is applied in the investigation of cognitive processes in this 
dissertation. Eye gaze is used to study selectivity in perception, which is defined as 
visual attention (for an overview of the perception-attention link, see Orquin & Mueller 
Loose, 2013), to infer how information acquisition and cognitive processing take place 
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(Ashby et al., 2016). This strategy relies on the Eye Mind Hypothesis (Just & 
Carpenter, 1980), positing that what is visually fixated on is being processed in 
working memory (“There is no appreciable lag between what is fixated and what is 
processed.“; Just & Carpenter, 1980, p. 331). Beyond selective attention, eye 
tracking can illuminate cognitive processing effort and decision conflict during the 
decision process. The basis for these inferences is the attentional Drift Diffusion Model 
of decision making (Krajbich et al., 2010, 2012; Krajbich & Rangel, 2011), which posits 
that the relative weights assigned to decision alternatives are reflected in the 
information search process.  
Chapter 2 investigated active ignorance to others’ group membership. 
Drawing on evidence from two eye tracking studies and two behavioral studies, in 
which we used both artificial and real groups, it was shown that systematic ignorance 
of others’ group membership was prevalent, effectively eliminating ingroup favoritism. 
This ignorance was shown to be of a deliberate nature, and was related to inter-
individual differences and first and second order beliefs about discrimination and 
ignorance. This line of work began with the insight that group membership information 
largely ignored surprisingly often. Over the course of the four studies reported, the 
finding could be replicated, both when free visual attention to group membership 
information was studied, and when investigating explicitly stated preferences to 
remain blind. Visual inattention determined if ingroup bias was present in choices, and 
stated preference for ignorance decreased the size of the ingroup favoritism effect. 
Moreover, visual inattention was shown to be active and deliberate in nature. 
Participants remained blind to group membership information although they were 
explicitly instructed about the availability of membership information. Additionally, 
stated preference for ignorance predicted visual attention to group membership 
information. This pattern of results suggests that decision makers actively avoided 
group membership information to avoid bias in their choices. Finally, we found 
evidence that inter-individual differences, in particular decision makers’ identification 
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with the ingroup, as well as first and second order beliefs about ignorance and 
discrimination were associated with ignorance. 
Chapter 3 presented two eye tracking studies, in which the cognitive 
processes of prosociality in intergroup contexts were investigated. Choices and 
processing effort differed systematically between in- and outgroup settings. When 
facing an ingroup member, others’ outcomes were weighted more, and more effort 
was invested into informing the choice. Moreover, we found systematic differences 
cognitive processes depending on the interaction of the intergroup decision setting 
and social preferences. Although results about attention to others’ outcomes were 
mixed given differences in the distributions of social preferences in the two studies, 
evidence was consistent with regard to information search effort. Unexpectedly, 
individualists showed larger differences in decision effort between the in- and 
outgroup compared to prosocials, although individualists’ ingroup bias in choices was 
small. In contrast, prosocials showed smaller ingroup bias in processing, although 
their ingroup bias in choices was strong.  
Chapter 4 reported a study investigating the cognitive processes underlying 
moral decisions. Results speak to the theoretical debate in moral decision making, 
advocating a choice discriminability perspective over the dual process theory of moral 
judgment. Consistently across both eye tracking studies, decision effort was 
particularly low for extreme utilitarian decision makers. This finding is in contrast with 
a dual process account of moral judgment, and point towards the choice 
discriminability account. Moreover, in both eye tracking studies, gaze bias towards 
the later chosen side indicated – when analyzed on a fine-grained level by considering 
the interaction of moral preferences and choice – that preference-consisted choices 
were made with less decision conflict. Again, this finding was more in line with the 
choice discriminability account. Finally, consistently across both eye tracking studies, 
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deontological decision makers surprisingly paid more attention to stimuli which what 
was expected to be more utilitarian contents than utilitarian decision makers. 
Beyond the contribution to theoretical advances in the specific areas of 
decision making addressed, the studies presented in the scope of this dissertation 
can be interpreted in the light of more general models of decision processes. In 
particular, they provide support of the prediction of the Attentional Drift Diffusion 
Model (aDDM), since relative weights assigned to decision alternatives depending on 
individual preferences were reflected in the sampling process. Consistently with a 
known limitation of the aDDM’s assumptions (see Orquin & Mueller Loose, 2013), 
information was not sampled stochastically, but more attention was allocated to 
specific pieces of information depending on decision makers’ preferences and the 
choice outcome. 
The work demonstrates the merit of further illuminating the inner workings of 
the “black box” of decision making, by using process-tracking techniques to gain 
insights about decision processes that would have been difficult to achieve when only 
using choices. Moreover, the work presented here makes a methodological 
contribution by developing a standardizable and incentivized moral dilemma task. 
Methodological issue associated with the frequently used trolley-type dilemma 
vignettes, in combination with the paradigm’s limited adaptability for process tracing 
research, led to the development of a new, incentivized and standardizable decision 
task. With this contribution, we follow the general trend in the decision making 
literature to rely on incentivized choices for their increased external validity. Moreover, 
we argue that using this incentivized task may be able to reduce measurement error 
by reducing the respondents’ interpretative acts involved in understanding the 
decision problem. 
In conclusion, this work makes theoretical and methodological contributions 
to the understanding of cognitive processes underlying prosociality in group settings 
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and morality. Specifically, people sometimes deliberately remain blind to others’ group 
membership, and, in doing so, avoid making in-group biased decisions. Social value 
orientation and group membership determine the effort invested in information when 
deciding whether to be prosocial to in- or outgroup members. Finally, when 
confronted with moral dilemmas, decision processes were influenced by the strength 
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Cognitieve processen in sociale en morele besluitvorming 
Beslissingen vormen een essentieel onderdeel van het dagelijks leven en 
geven aanleiding tot intense maatschappelijke en wetenschappelijke interesse bij het 
onderzoeken van beslissingen in verschillende contexten en door verschillende 
besluitvormers. Bovendien heeft een sterke trend in het veld de onderzoeksfocus 
verlegd, behalve het beoordelen van alleen de uitkomst van de keuze en de manier 
waarop deze beslissingen worden bereikt. In dit proefschrift warden beslissingen en 
hun onderliggende cognitieve processen ondezocht in sociale dilemma’s in 
groepscontexten en in morele dilemma’s. Zowel prosociality in groepscontext als 
moraliteit zijn belangrijke aspecten van het social eleven en het leven samen met 
anderen in de samenleving. Aan de ene kant heft het vergroten van de mobiliteit in 
alle delen van de samenleving geleid tot meer contact van mensen uit verschillende 
nationale, culturele, etnische of sociale groepen over de hele wereld.   In deze steeds 
meer geglobaliseerde wereld is het vinden van vreedzame en eerlijke oplossingen voor 
de alledaagse uitdagingen om samen te leven met mensen van verschillende 
groepslidmaatschappen, nog meer in het middelpunt van de belangstelling komen te 
staan. Aan de andere kant zijn morele attitudes een bepalend kenmerk van de 
samenleving. De morele oordelen die we collectief als een samenleving onderschrijven 
en individueel als beslissers de fijne lijn afbakenen tussen wat we denken dat goed is 
en wat we denken dat verkeerd is, bepalen niet alleen hoe onze acties door anderen 
worden beoordeeld, maar welke acties de grootste gemeenschap het liefste neemt. 
In beide situaties wordt het begrijpen van de cognitieve processen die ten grondslag 
liggen aan de beslissingen als een cruciale stap beschouwd in het ontwerpen van 
empirisch onderbouwde interventies die niet alleen betrekking hebben op de uitkomst 
van keuzes, maar ook op de drijvende krachten achter de keuzes. 
Om tegemoet te komen aan de behoefte aan een fijnmazige en onopvallende 
meting van cognitieve processen in het beslissingsproces is eye-tracking een steeds 
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populairder hulpmiddel gebleken en wordt het toegepast in het onderzoek naar 
cognitieve processen in dit proefschrift. Eye-gaze wordt gebruikt om de selectiviteit in 
perceptie te bestuderen, die worden gedefinieerd als visuele aandacht (voor een 
overzicht van de perceptie-attentielink, zie Orquin & Mueller Loose, 2013), om te 
concluderen hoe informatie-acquisitie en cognitieve verwerking plaatsvinden (Ashby 
et al., 2016). Deze strategie is gebaseerd op de Eye Mind-hypothese (MA Just & 
Carpenter, 1980), waarbij wordt gesteld dat wat visueel is gefixeerd wordt verwerkt 
in het werkgeheugen ("Er is geen merkbare vertraging tussen wat gefixeerd is en wat 
wordt verwerkt."; MA Just & Carpenter, 1980, blz. 331). Naast selectieve aandacht 
kan eye-tracking cognitieve verwerkingsinspanning en beslissingsconflicten verlichten 
tijdens het beslissingsproces. De basis voor deze gevolgtrekkingen is het aandachtige 
Drift Diffusion Model van besluitvorming (Krajbich et al., 2010, 2012; Krajbich & 
Rangel, 2011), dat stelt dat de relatieve gewichten die zijn toegewezen aan 
beslissingsalternatieven worden weerspiegeld in het informatiezoekproces. 
Hoofdstuk 2 onderzocht de actieve onwetendheid van het 
groepslidmaatschap van anderen. Op basis van gegevens uit twee oogvolgstudies 
en twee gedragsstudies, waarbij we zowel kunstmatige als reële groepen gebruikten, 
werd aangetoond dat systematische onwetendheid met betrekking tot het 
groepslidmaatschap van anderen overheersend was, waardoor in eigen land 
favoritisme werd geëlimineerd. Deze onwetendheid bleek van opzettelijke aard te zijn 
en was gerelateerd aan inter-individuele verschillen en eerste en tweede orde 
overtuigingen over discriminatie en onwetendheid. Deze lijn begon met het inzicht dat 
informatie over groepsleden grotendeels verrassend vaak genegeerd werd. In de loop 
van de vier gerapporteerde studies kon de bevinding worden gerepliceerd, zowel 
wanneer vrije visuele aandacht voor groepslidmaatschapsinformatie werd 
bestudeerd, als bij het onderzoeken van expliciet vermelde voorkeuren om blind te 
blijven. Visuele onoplettendheid bepaalde of ingroepvoorspelling aanwezig was in 
keuzes, en verklaarde de voorkeur voor onwetendheid de grootte van het ingroup-
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favoritisme-effect. Bovendien bleek visuele onoplettendheid actief en opzettelijk van 
aard. 
Deelnemers bleven blind voor groepslidmaatschapsinformatie, hoewel ze 
expliciet werden geïnstrueerd over de beschikbaarheid van lidmaatschapsinformatie. 
Bovendien voorspelde de verklaarde voorkeur voor onwetendheid visuele aandacht 
voor groepslidmaatschapsinformatie. Dit patroon van resultaten suggereert dat 
beslissingsnemers actief informatie over groepsleden vermeden om vertekening in 
hun keuzes te voorkomen. Ten slotte hebben we bewijs gevonden dat inter-
individuele verschillen, in het bijzonder de identificatie van beleidsmakers met de 
ingroup, evenals eerste en tweede orde overtuigingen over onwetendheid en 
discriminatie in verband werden gebracht met onwetendheid. 
Hoofdstuk 3 presenteerde twee oogvolgstudies, waarin de cognitieve 
processen van prosocialiteit in intergroepscontexten werden onderzocht. Keuzes en 
verwerkingsinspanningen verschilden systematisch tussen in- en outgroup-
instellingen. Wanneer ze geconfronteerd werden met een lid van een groep, werden 
de uitkomsten van anderen meer gewogen en werd meer moeite gedaan om de 
keuze te informeren. Bovendien vonden we systematische verschillen in cognitieve 
processen, afhankelijk van de interactie tussen de instelling van de 
intergroepbeslissingen en sociale voorkeuren. Hoewel de resultaten over aandacht 
voor de uitkomsten van anderen gemengd waren, gezien de verschillen in de 
verdeling van sociale voorkeuren in de twee onderzoeken, was het bewijsmateriaal 
consistent met betrekking tot het zoeken naar informatie. Onverwacht toonden 
individualisten grotere verschillen in beslissingsinspanning tussen de in- en outgroup 
in vergelijking met prosocialen, hoewel de instapvooroordeel van individualisten in 
keuzes klein was. Daarentegen toonden prosocialen kleinere ingroup-vooroordelen 
bij de verwerking, hoewel hun instapvooroordeel in keuzes sterk was.  
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Hoofdstuk 4 rapporteerde een studie naar de cognitieve processen die ten 
grondslag liggen aan morele beslissingen. Resultaten spreken over het theoretische 
debat in morele besluitvorming en pleiten voor een keuze-discrimineringsperspectief 
voor de duale procestheorie van moreel oordeel. De beslissingsinspanning was 
bijzonder laag voor extreem utilitaire besluitvormers. Deze bevinding staat in contrast 
met een duale procesrekening van moreel oordeel en wijst naar de 
keuzediscriminatierekening. Bovendien duidden de kijkvoorspellingen naar de later 
gekozen zijde aan - bij analyse op een fijnmazig niveau door rekening te houden met 
de interactie van morele voorkeuren en keuze - dat voorkeurresten bestond, werden 
keuzes gemaakt met minder beslissingsconflicten. Nogmaals, deze bevinding was 
meer in lijn met de account voor keuzediscriminatie. Ten slotte, hebben 
deontologische besluitvormers verrassend genoeg meer aandacht besteed aan 
stimuli waarvan werd verwacht dat ze meer utilitaire inhoud zouden hebben dan 
utilitaire beleidsmakers. 
Naast de bijdrage aan de theoretische vooruitgang op de specifieke 
aandachtsgebieden van de besluitvorming, kunnen de studies die in het kader van dit 
proefschrift worden gepresenteerd, worden geïnterpreteerd in het licht van meer 
algemene modellen van besluitvormingsprocessen. In het bijzonder bieden ze 
ondersteuning voor de voorspelling van het Attentional Drift Diffusion Model (aDDM), 
omdat relatieve gewichten toegewezen aan beslissingsalternatieven afhankelijk van 
individuele voorkeuren werden weerspiegeld in het bemonsteringsproces. 
Consequent met een bekende beperking van de aannames van de aDDM (zie Orquin 
& Mueller Loose, 2013), werd informatie niet stochastisch bemonsterd, maar werd 
meer aandacht besteed aan specifieke informatie, afhankelijk van de voorkeuren van 
besluitvormers en de uitkomst van de keuze. Het werk toont de verdienste aan om 
de interne werking van de "zwarte doos" van besluitvorming verder te verlichten, door 
proces-trackingtechnieken te gebruiken om inzicht te krijgen in 
besluitvormingsprocessen die moeilijk te bereiken zouden zijn geweest wanneer 
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alleen maar keuzes zouden worden gebruikt. Bovendien levert het hier 
gepresenteerde werk een methodologische bijdrage door het ontwikkelen van een 
standaardiseerbare en gestimuleerde morele dilemmataak. Methodologische 
problemen in verband met de vaak gebruikte dilemma-vignetten van het trolleytype, 
in combinatie met het beperkte aanpassingsvermogen van het paradigma voor 
onderzoek naar procesopsporing, hebben geleid tot de ontwikkeling van een nieuwe, 
gestimuleerde en gestandaardiseerde beslissingstaak. Met deze bijdrage volgen we 
de algemene trend in de besluitvormingsliteratuur om te vertrouwen op gestimuleerde 
keuzes, vanwege hun toegenomen externe validiteit. Bovendien stellen we dat het 
gebruik van deze gestimuleerde taak de meetfout kan verminderen door de 
interpretatieve handelingen van de respondenten die betrokken zijn bij het begrijpen 
van het beslissingsprobleem te verminderen. 
Kortom, dit werk levert theoretische en methodologische bijdragen aan het 
begrijpen van cognitieve processen die ten grondslag liggen aan prosocialiteit in 
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